# Middle East Aff

## 1AC

### 1AC – Util

#### First, psychological evidence proves we don’t identify with our future selves. Continuous personal identity doesn’t exist.

Opar 14 [(Alisa Opar is the articles editor at Audubon magazine; cites Hal Hershfield, an assistant professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business; and Emily Pronin, a psychologist at Princeton) “Why We Procrastinate” Nautilus January 2014] AT

The British philosopher Derek Parfit espoused a severely reductionist view of personal identity in his seminal book, Reasons and Persons: It does not exist, at least not in the way we usually consider it. We humans, Parfit argued, are not a consistent identity moving through time, but a chain of successive selves, each tangentially linked to, and yet distinct from, the previous and subsequent ones. The boy who begins to smoke despite knowing that he may suffer from the habit decades later should not be judged harshly: “This boy does not identify with his future self,” Parfit wrote. “His attitude towards this future self is in some ways like his attitude to other people.” Parfit’s view was controversial even among philosophers. But psychologists are beginning to understand that it may accurately describe our attitudes towards our own decision-making: It turns out that we see our future selves as strangers. Though we will inevitably share their fates, the people we will become in a decade, quarter century, or more, are unknown to us. This impedes our ability to make good choices on their—which of course is our own—behalf. That bright, shiny New Year’s resolution? If you feel perfectly justified in breaking it, it may be because it feels like it was a promise someone else made. “It’s kind of a weird notion,” says Hal Hershfield, an assistant professor at New York University’s Stern School of Business. “On a psychological and emotional level we really consider that future self as if it’s another person.” Using fMRI, Hershfield and colleagues studied brain activity changes when people imagine their future and consider their present. They homed in on two areas of the brain called the medial prefrontal cortex and the rostral anterior cingulate cortex, which are more active when a subject thinks about himself than when he thinks of someone else. They found these same areas were more strongly activated when subjects thought of themselves today, than of themselves in the future. Their future self “felt” like somebody else. In fact, their neural activity when they described themselves in a decade was similar to that when they described Matt Damon or Natalie Portman. And subjects whose brain activity changed the most when they spoke about their future selves were the least likely to favor large long-term financial gains over small immediate ones. Emily Pronin, a psychologist at Princeton, has come to similar conclusions in her research. In a 2008 study, Pronin and her team told college students that they were taking part in an experiment on disgust that required drinking a concoction made of ketchup and soy sauce. The more they, their future selves, or other students consumed, they were told, the greater the benefit to science. Students who were told they’d have to down the distasteful quaff that day committed to consuming two tablespoons. But those that were committing their future selves (the following semester) or other students to participate agreed to guzzle an average of half a cup. We think of our future selves, says Pronin, like we think of others: in the third person. The disconnect between our present and time-shifted selves has real implications for how we make decisions. We might choose to procrastinate, and let some other version of our self deal with problems or chores. Or, as in the case of Parfit’s smoking boy, we can focus on that version of our self that derives pleasure, and ignore the one that pays the price. But if procrastination or irresponsibility can derive from a poor connection to your future self, strengthening this connection may prove to be an effective remedy. This is exactly the tactic that some researchers are taking. Anne Wilson, a psychologist at Wilfrid Laurier University in Canada, has manipulated people’s perception of time by presenting participants with timelines scaled to make an upcoming event, such as a paper due date, seem either very close or far off. “Using a longer timeline makes people feel more connected to their future selves,” says Wilson. That, in turn, spurred students to finish their assignment earlier, saving their end-of-semester self the stress of banging it out at the last minute. We think of our future selves, says Pronin, like we think of others: in the third person. Hershfield has taken a more high-tech approach. Inspired by the use of images to spur charitable donations, he and colleagues took subjects into a virtual reality room and asked them to look into a mirror. The subjects saw either their current self, or a digitally aged image of themselves (see the figure, Digital Old Age). When they exited the room, they were asked how they’d spend $1,000. Those exposed to the aged photo said they’d put twice as much into a retirement account as those who saw themselves unaged. This might be important news for parts of the finance industry. Insurance giant Allianz is funding a pilot project in the midwest in which Hershfield’s team will show state employees their aged faces when they make pension allocations. Merrill Edge, the online discount unit of Bank of America Merrill Lynch, has taken this approach online, with a service called Face Retirement. Each decade-jumping image is accompanied by startling cost-of-living projections and suggestions to invest in your golden years. Hershfield is currently investigating whether morphed images can help people lose weight. Of course, the way we treat our future self is not necessarily negative: Since we think of our future self as someone else, our own decision making reflects how we treat other people. Where Parfit’s smoking boy endangers the health of his future self with nary a thought, others might act differently. “The thing is, we make sacrifices for people all the time,” says Hershfield. “In relationships, in marriages.” The silver lining of our dissociation from our future self, then, is that it is another reason to practice being good to others. One of them might be you.

#### This proves util – a. If a person isn’t a continuous unit, it doesn’t matter how goods are distributed among people, which supports util since util only maximizes benefits, ignoring distribution across people. b. Other theories assume identity matters. Util’s the only possible theory if identity is irrelevant.

#### Second, government must be practical and cannot concern itself with metaphysical questions – its only role is to protect citizens’ interests

Rhonheimer 05 [(Martin, Prof Of Philosophy at The Pontifical University of the Holy Cross in Rome). “THE POLITICAL ETHOS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY AND THE PLACE OF NATURAL LAW IN PUBLIC REASON: RAWLS’S “POLITICAL LIBERALISM” REVISITED” The American Journal of Jurisprudence vol. 50 (2005), pp. 1-70]

It is a fundamental feature of political philosophy to be part of practical philosophy. Political philosophy belongs to ethics, which is practical, for it both reflects on practical knowledge and aims at action. Therefore, it is not only normative, but must consider the concrete conditions of realization. The rationale of political institutions and action must be understood as embedded in concrete cultural and, therefore, historical contexts and as meeting with problems that only in these contexts are understandable. A normative political philosophy which would abstract from the conditions of realizability would be trying to establish norms for realizing the “idea of the good” or of “the just” (as Plato, in fact, tried to do in his Republic). Such a purely metaphysical view, however, is doomed to failure. As a theory of political praxis, political philosophy must include in its reflection the concrete historical context, historical experiences and the corresponding knowledge of the proper logic of the political. 14 Briefly: political philosophy is not metaphysics, which contemplates the necessary order of being, but practical philosophy, which deals with partly contingent matters and aims at action. Moreover, unlike moral norms in general—natural law included,—which rule the actions of a person—“my acting” and pursuing the good—, the logic of the political is characterized by acts like framing institutions and establishing legal rules by which not only personal actions but the actions of a multitude of persons are regulated by the coercive force of state power, and by which a part of citizens exercises power over others. Political actions are, thus, both actions of the whole of the body politic and referring to the whole of the community of citizens. 15 Unless we wish to espouse a platonic view according to which some persons are by nature rulers while others are by nature subjects, we will stick to the Aristotelian differentiation between the “domestic” and the “political” kind of rule 16 : unlike domestic rule, which is over people with a common interest and harmoniously striving after the same good [despotism] and, therefore, according to Aristotle is essentially “despotic,” political rule is exercised over free persons who represent a plurality of interests and pursue, in the common context of the polis, different goods. The exercise of such political rule, therefore, needs justification and is continuously in search of consent among those who are ruled, but who potentially at the same time are also the rulers.

#### Prefer this account of government legitimacy since it avoids falsely starting from the position of anarchy assumed by other frameworks, which is bad since it doesn’t accurately describe the justification of the state since individuals don’t actually have a choice to enter or not enter a state.

#### 2 impacts

#### A. Government actions will inevitably lead to trade-offs between citizens since they benefit some and harm others; the only justifiable way to resolve these conflicts is by benefitting the maximum possible number of people since anything else would unequally prioritize one group over another. This also proves side constraint theories are useless for states since they’ll inevitably violate some constraint. Even if util fails, non-consequentialist moral theories prevent any action which is worse than not being able to use util

#### B. People psychologically prefer util – governments are obligated to use it since it’s more justifiable for citizens

Gino et al 2008 [Francesca Gino Kenan-Flagler Business School, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Don Moore Tepper Business School, Carnegie Mellon University, Max H. Bozman Harvard Business School, Harvard University “No harm, no foul: The outcome bias in ethical judgments” http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/08-080.pdf] AT

The present studies provide strong evidence of the existence of outcome effects in ethically-relevant contexts, when people are asked to judge the ethicality of others’ behavior. It is worth noting that what we show is not the same as the curse of knowledge or the hindsight bias. The curse of knowledge describes people’s inability to recover an uninformed state of mind (Camerer, Loewenstein, & Weber, 1989). Likewise, the hindsight bias leads people to misremember what they believed before they knew an event’s outcome (e.g., Fischhoff, 1975; Fischhoff & Beyth, 1975). By contrast, we show that that outcomes of decisions lead people to see the decisions themselves in a different light, and that this effect does not depend on misremembering their prior state of mind. In other words, people will see it as entirely appropriate to allow a decision’s outcome to determine their assessment of the decision’s quality.

#### This answers standard indicts since it proves util is not counter-intuitive or hard to calculate since most people already believe in it.

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing

### 1AC – Plan

#### The governments of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey should prohibit the production of nuclear power.

Cottee 5/20/16 [Matthew Cottee (research associate for non-proliferation and nuclear policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) and Hassan Elbahtimy, "Russia's Nuclear Ambitions in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs] AZ

A few years ago, the Middle East’s nuclear energy prospects were in decline. Political instability made long-term investments in civil nuclear infrastructure risky. For one, Egypt was in the last stages of considering reactor bids when the popular uprising began in 2011. These plans were soon shelved by subsequent transitional governments. And the 2011 Fukushima Daichii meltdown in Japan had shaken public confidence across the world in the safety of nuclear power and raised questions about the industry's future. But now, at least in the Middle East, it appears that nuclear power is back in style. In April, Russian state nuclear firm Rosatom announced that it had opened an office in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates. The office will help oversee the company’s many nuclear power projects in Egypt, Iran, Jordan, and Turkey. It is also hoped that Russian regional presence would open up new opportunities for its nuclear industry in the region. Rosatom’s new office comes at just the right time. The Middle East is now home to the greatest number of “nuclear newcomers” in the world, with at least six countries in total actively pursuing nuclear power. For one, in 2011, Iran became the first country in the region to operate a nuclear reactor. Tehran’s long-term plans include an ambitious expansion of its nuclear energy capacity by eight additional power reactors, something generally condoned by the recent nuclear deal. For their parts, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates began to pursue nuclear power in 2010 and 2009, respectively. Both countries are driven by efforts to diversify their energy mix, and also use nuclear energy as a status symbol in the context of their strategic competition with Iran. Saudi Arabia has perhaps the most ambitious nuclear plans, with a goal of building 16 reactors by 2032. The United Arab Emirates’ first reactor is under construction, with an expected completion date in 2017. Egypt has also revived its plans to build a series of nuclear power reactors in Dabaa on the coast of the Mediterranean. It is joined by Turkey and Jordan, which are building nuclear power reactors that are expected to be operational by Russia 2020 and 2025, respectively.

### 1AC – Relations [S]

#### Russian nuclear deals are extensions of power – reactors economically suture host countries to Russian hegemony and displace US influence

Armstrong 15 [Ian Armstrong (senior analyst and editor at Global Risk Insights, where he focuses on nuclear policy issues, missile defense), "Russia is creating a global nuclear power empire," Global Risk Insights, 10/29/2015] AZ

Though these economic implications are worth considering, they are far overshadowed by the geopolitical impacts of Russia’s nuclear power expansion strategy. The same local governments that may experience economic upticks as a result of Russian-installed NPPs will also become sutured to the Russian nuclear industry — and therefore the broader Russian government.

To be clear, the influence gained by Russia through each bilateral nuclear agreement should not be understated. For one, the construction timeline for nuclear power plants is typically long-term, ensuring that Russia will have a presence in any country it signs a nuclear contract with for a minimum of several years.

In addition, Moscow has secured special comprehensive contracts with highly strategic countries like Turkey under the premise of “build-own-operate” — a system in which Russia builds, owns, and permanently operates a nuclear power plant.

From this perspective, Russian-built nuclear power plants in foreign countries become more akin to embassies — or even military bases — than simple bilateral infrastructure projects. The long-term or permanent presence that accompanies the exportation of Russian nuclear power will afford President Vladimir Putin a notable influence in countries crucial to regional geopolitics.

Western influence will subsequently be undermined in crucial ally states like Egypt, Turkey, and Algeria. This now-justified Russian presence abroad will also provide Moscow intelligence opportunities that would otherwise be significantly more difficult and risky. Russian nuclear expertise will also be required in some form for maintenance and operational purposes even in countries that do not sign on for the full build-own-operate package.

All of these benefits — significant as stand-alone strategic gains — will be undergirded by the traditional Russian leverage that emerges when nations become dependent on Russia for their energy needs.

At present, it appears that Russia is well-positioned to continue its expansive nuclear power diplomacy in pursuit of a broader sphere of influence. However, competition from other capable nuclear powers may emerge in the medium-term.

#### American diplomacy in the Middle East is key to stability and Arab-Israeli peace

* reduction in military presence is inevitable
* influence declining now
* diplomacy = good governance which reduces terrorism

Serwer 16 [Daniel Serwer (Ph.D from Princeton University, directs the Conflict Management Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a Senior Fellow at its Center for Transatlantic Relations and affiliated as a Scholar with the Middle East Institute. His current interests focus on the civilian instruments needed to protect U.S. national security as well as transition and state-building in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkans. His book, *Righting the Balance: How You Can Help Protect America*, was published in November 2013 by Potomac Books), "Recalculating U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Less Military, More Civilian," Middle East Institute, 4/11/2016] AZ

Our interests are shifting largely in ways that reduce the significance of military means and increase the importance of diplomacy and state-building. The big challenge for the next American administration will be constructing, through diplomacy, a regional security architecture that reduces reliance on military instruments and enables the region to avoid a nuclear arms race as well as future proxy wars. Preventing future generations of Muslims from resorting to terrorism will require a far more active civilian effort to counter extremism and build inclusive good governance than we have mounted so far.

People in the Middle East are convinced that the United States is withdrawing from the region. They view America as smarting from less than successful, but colossally expensive interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. They also think the United States has shifted away from countering the rise of Iran, and know that Washington needs Middle East energy resources less than once it did.

They are correct. The United States needs to reduce its military presence in the Middle East to correspond to its reduced and shifting interests. Some small portion of the savings should be devoted to building up civilian diplomatic efforts. The next administration should end the practice of reassuring our regional allies without extracting a price. If they want the United States to remain committed to their region, they need to begin to behave in a way that makes Americans think it worthwhile.

Withdrawal creates the serious risk of a vacuum that American enemies will try to fill. Iran took advantage of American withdrawal from Iraq to expand its influence there. Russia took advantage of American reluctance to develop an alternative to the Assad regime to intervene on his behalf. The Islamic State took advantage of American unwillingness to intercede in Syria. The Middle East has a way of forcing itself back onto the agenda: energy, proliferation, human rights violations, extremism, and refugees. We need not allow a drawdown of military assets to signal American indifference or retreat. We need instead to get our civilian capacities—for diplomacy, state-building, and international assistance and cooperation—to fill the gap. Less military should mean more civilian.

#### Preemptive Israeli strikes causes escalating conflicts and huge oil shocks

* sparks another intifada
* NATO retaliation
* Proxy wars in other areas
* Arab-Israel war

Rieger & Schiller 12 [Rene Rieger (PhD candidate in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter (UK), as well as a lecturer in international relations at the University of Munich) and Markus Schiller (aerospace engineer and senior analyst at Schmucker Technologie, Munich, and a former RAND Nuclear Security Fellow, with many years of experience in analyzing missile and space programs of various countries of interest), "Preemptive Strikes against Iran: Prelude to an Avoidable Disaster?" Middle East Policy Council, Winter 2012] AZ

A pre-emptive Israeli strike against Iran has the potential to destabilize pro-Western Arab regimes in the Gulf, despite the fact that several Arab Gulf monarchies have pushed the United States to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons capability by all means necessary. A strike on Iran would constitute an attack on a Muslim state. It is likely to evoke at least some sympathy for the Iranian regime among some segments of Arab Gulf population, predominantly the Shia. Iran's longstanding anti-Israeli rhetoric and Tehran's shameless use of the plight of the Palestinian people for propaganda purposes bolstered its reputation and influence on the Arab Street even in the traditionally anti-Iran Arab Gulf states.

It can be expected that, following an Israeli attack on Iran, some in the Arab Gulf monarchies would sympathize with the regime in Tehran and confront their governments with calls for some sort of retaliation — at least of a diplomatic nature — against Israel and the United States, actions that would clearly contradict these regimes' interests. The dimension of popular calls for retaliation would increase with the number of Iranian victims. Those in the Arab Gulf monarchies most likely to sympathize with Tehran are the Shia in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, already in conflict with their governments over issues of discrimination.

Further escalation, possibly instigated by Iranian proxies, would potentially weaken the regime and incur economic instability, particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia, where the Shia minority resides predominantly in the oil-rich Eastern Province, representing roughly half of the local population.

Most advocates of a pre-emptive strike play down the possible economic consequences of an attack on Iran. They argue that the regime in Tehran would not be able to effectively disrupt oil and gas exports through the Strait of Hormuz, and that the loss of supplies to the world market would only be temporary and limited. This hypothesis comprises several significant flaws.

First, while Tehran could at best effect a complete disruption of oil and gas exports through the Strait of Hormuz for a short period of time, it could curtail the oil trade in the Gulf significantly over an extended period. It would be impossible to compensate fully for the loss in oil shipments; and the longer the disruption lasted, the more difficult compensation attempts would become.

Second, the dimensions of global spare oil capacity are obscure; in any case, they are very limited and largely reliant on the Strait of Hormuz for export. The world's spare capacity is held almost entirely by Saudi Arabia, though it is highly likely that it is considerably below the officially claimed 2.5 million barrels per day (mbd).

Third, Saudi Arabia and the other oil-producing Gulf states have only limited capacity to redirect their oil exports away from the Strait of Hormuz. Only 1.5 mbd of Saudi oil (including spare production) could be redirected through the East-West pipeline to the Yanbu al-Bahr port on the Red Sea.23 The United Arab Emirates has recently completed the so-called Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline, which also bypasses the Strait of Hormuz. However, the pipeline's current capacity does not exceed 1 mbd. Compared to the 17 million barrels that pass through the Strait of Hormuz on a daily basis (roughly 20 percent of the world's traded oil), the Gulf countries' compensation capacity is relatively limited.

Fourth, there is the possibility, however remote, that Venezuela, a close ally of the Iranian regime and the fourth-largest oil supplier to the United States (roughly 900,000 bpd), would cut its exports. This would put even more pressure on the international oil market and directly affect the U.S. economy.24

Fifth, to compensate a significant supply shortage provoked by massive curtailment or interruption of trade routes in the Gulf, oil-importing nations could tap their strategic stocks. However, particularly in the early stage of a massive supply crisis, commercial, logistical and political considerations would inhibit countries releasing enough reserve stocks to compensate fully for the shortage.25

Sixth, Iran could commit acts of sabotage against oil installations in the Gulf, also interrupting supply.

Finally, an essential factor in oil pricing is market psychology. Irrespective of actual changes in oil supply, market expectations or fears of supply cuts can have drastic effects on prices. As a significant portion of the global oil supply originates in the Gulf, the oil market is particularly sensitive to developments there. Hence, the mere possibility of a serious disruption of the transit routes in the Gulf following an attack on Iran has the potential to provoke skyrocketing oil prices. The more the conflict then escalates and the longer the crisis lasts, the more enduring would be the effect on the oil prices. In the current global economy a prolonged increase in oil prices would have disastrous consequences.

To attack the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, the Israeli air force would have no feasible alternative to flying through foreign air space. There would be three potential routes, all presenting operational and political risks. The first runs northeast over the Mediterranean Sea along the coastline of Lebanon and Syria, then eastward along the Syrian-Turkish border, and finally through northern Iraq or alongside the Turkish-Iraqi border (northern route). The second runs east through Jordanian airspace or along the Jordanian-Syrian border and then east through Iraqi airspace (central route). The third follows the flight route of the 1981 raid on Iraq's Osirak reactor, entering Saudi Arabia at the tip of the Gulf of Aqaba, then flying northeast through Saudi airspace and eventually east through Iraqi airspace (southern route).

The northern route carries relatively low operational risks as long as the Israeli jets would fly mainly on the Syrian side of the Syrian-Turkish border. However, a violation of Turkish airspace could have significant political consequences. Turkish-Israeli relations have already cooled considerably, particularly since the Gaza Flotilla incident of 2010. Judging from the Erdogan government's recent attitude towards Israel, there is a clear possibility that the Turkish military would attempt to ward off an Israeli intrusion into their airspace. A violation of Turkish airspace would be particularly problematic, moreover as it would constitute aggression against a NATO member.

The central route, too, would involve taking significant risks. Since Jordan would likely not grant Israel overflight rights, an Israeli intrusion into Jordanian airspace would be an act of aggression entailing risks predominantly political in nature (jeopardizing the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty), but potentially also operational (Jordanian attempts to stop the intrusion and provide advance warning to neighboring countries).

Since the early 1980s, Saudi air surveillance has improved so significantly that an Israeli intrusion into Saudi airspace would not go undetected. The Saudi government would be politically bound (both domestically and regionally) to protest with more than rhetoric an Israeli violation of their territorial integrity. Earlier reports suggesting that Saudi Arabia would look the other way while Israel overflew its territory are not credible. Any Saudi military reaction against the Israeli air fleet would cause operational problems for the Israeli mission and provoke a political crisis inimical to both Israeli and Saudi interests.

#### Oil shocks go nuclear

King 08 (Neil, Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, p. 14-17)

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.”7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.”9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. It’s not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty.

#### Nuclear war uniquely likely in the Middle East – overcomes deterrence and causes extinction

**Russell 9**

James A. Russell (Senior Lecturer of National Security Affairs & Naval Postgraduate School). “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East”, IFRI (Proliferation Papers, #26, 2009). <http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf>.

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

### 1AC – Relations [L]

#### Russian funding for nuclear power displaces US influence and increases Russian power

Guzansky et al 15 [Yoel Guzansky (research fellow at INSS. Before he joined the Institute, he was in charge of strategic issues at the National Security Council in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, coordinating work on the Iranian nuclear challenge and specializes in issues of Gulf security and Middle East strategic issues), Zvi Magen, Oded Eran, "Russian Nuclear Diplomacy in the Middle East," Insitute for National Security Studies, 12/29/2015] AZ

The main stumbling block in the way of the project is the question of financing. Egypt’s economic situation does not enable it to carry out a venture of this size, and it is doubtful that Saudi Arabia, which economically supports the el-Sisi regime, can finance this ambitious project, given the considerable budgetary pressures it is experiencing due to the drop in oil prices. El-Sisi declared that Egypt would repay the loan by selling the electricity produced by the reactors after they begin operating in 2022. Moscow is supposed to lend Egypt the money needed to build the reactors as part of a comprehensive agreement, which includes the supply of fuel for the reactors, maintenance, training, and repairs. Against this background, and in addition to Russia’s efforts to end the war in Syria, it is imperative to look at the other Russian diplomatic track in the Middle East –plans to build civilian nuclear reactors. Russia is not a new player in the civilian nuclear market in the Middle East, but the desire of Moscow and countries in the region to cooperate in this sphere clearly has become more acute, as reflected in growing Russian involvement in the sale of nuclear know-how and facilities in the region. This mode of action fits in with the overall Russian efforts to rehabilitate and strengthen its ties with countries in the region, following the freeze in relations during the “Arab Spring.” This effort is intended to serve Russia’s array of objectives in the region as well as in the global theater as they pertain to its rivalry with the United States. Russia’s military intervention in Syria is conducted within the framework of a coalition with Assad’s army and Iran and its satellites, as part of its efforts to preempt the West in establishing diplomatic and economic cooperation with Iran. Russia’s actions in Syria are designed to combat Islamic terrorism, especially the Islamic State, in order to reduce the threat of extremist Islamic groups that are attempting to expand their influence within Russia’s territory. Russia’s major objective, however, is within the international sphere, and this includes influencing the future of Syria and taking a leading role in shaping the region. Indeed, Russia is interested in engaging in dialogue with the West, inter alia by obtaining bargaining chips for promoting a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East (Syria first) and Eastern Europe. For Egypt, and not only for her, the Russian nuclear option is attractive because it does not present the demands and restrictions that are attached to the nuclear cooperation with the West. Relations between the United States and several of its traditional allies in the region have soured in the past five years; it appears that these allies are signaling to the American administration that they have other options, including nuclear ones. Egypt’s desire to develop a nuclear program is also linked to its determination to find long-term solutions for growing energy needs, such as building a civilian nuclear capacity like the one Iran is building, following its nuclear agreement with the major powers. Nuclear cooperation with these countries is a vital interest for Russia, which seeks to use this cooperation to overcome its budgetary distress, which has been aggravated by plunging oil prices. Russia also may fear that the nuclear agreement signed between the major powers and Iran is liable to open up Iran for competition with other western players with relevant capabilities and drive Russia out of the Iranian market. Turning to alternative markets could be one of the Russian responses to the new conditions that are liable to emerge in the region with the ratification of the agreement with Iran.

#### Russian nuclear deals are extensions of power – reactors economically suture host countries to Russian hegemony and displace US influence

Armstrong 15 [Ian Armstrong (senior analyst and editor at Global Risk Insights, where he focuses on nuclear policy issues, missile defense), "Russia is creating a global nuclear power empire," Global Risk Insights, 10/29/2015] AZ

Though these economic implications are worth considering, they are far overshadowed by the geopolitical impacts of Russia’s nuclear power expansion strategy. The same local governments that may experience economic upticks as a result of Russian-installed NPPs will also become sutured to the Russian nuclear industry — and therefore the broader Russian government.

To be clear, the influence gained by Russia through each bilateral nuclear agreement should not be understated. For one, the construction timeline for nuclear power plants is typically long-term, ensuring that Russia will have a presence in any country it signs a nuclear contract with for a minimum of several years.

In addition, Moscow has secured special comprehensive contracts with highly strategic countries like Turkey under the premise of “build-own-operate” — a system in which Russia builds, owns, and permanently operates a nuclear power plant.

From this perspective, Russian-built nuclear power plants in foreign countries become more akin to embassies — or even military bases — than simple bilateral infrastructure projects. The long-term or permanent presence that accompanies the exportation of Russian nuclear power will afford President Vladimir Putin a notable influence in countries crucial to regional geopolitics.

Western influence will subsequently be undermined in crucial ally states like Egypt, Turkey, and Algeria. This now-justified Russian presence abroad will also provide Moscow intelligence opportunities that would otherwise be significantly more difficult and risky. Russian nuclear expertise will also be required in some form for maintenance and operational purposes even in countries that do not sign on for the full build-own-operate package.

All of these benefits — significant as stand-alone strategic gains — will be undergirded by the traditional Russian leverage that emerges when nations become dependent on Russia for their energy needs.

At present, it appears that Russia is well-positioned to continue its expansive nuclear power diplomacy in pursuit of a broader sphere of influence. However, competition from other capable nuclear powers may emerge in the medium-term.

#### Scenario 1 is American primacy

#### American diplomacy in the Middle East is key to stability – withdrawal ensures fill-in by Russia

* reduction in military presence is inevitable
* influence declining now
* diplomacy = good governance which reduces terrorism

Serwer 16 [Daniel Serwer (Ph.D from Princeton University, directs the Conflict Management Program at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is also a Senior Fellow at its Center for Transatlantic Relations and affiliated as a Scholar with the Middle East Institute. His current interests focus on the civilian instruments needed to protect U.S. national security as well as transition and state-building in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Balkans. His book, *Righting the Balance: How You Can Help Protect America*, was published in November 2013 by Potomac Books), "Recalculating U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Less Military, More Civilian," Middle East Institute, 4/11/2016] AZ

Our interests are shifting largely in ways that reduce the significance of military means and increase the importance of diplomacy and state-building. The big challenge for the next American administration will be constructing, through diplomacy, a regional security architecture that reduces reliance on military instruments and enables the region to avoid a nuclear arms race as well as future proxy wars. Preventing future generations of Muslims from resorting to terrorism will require a far more active civilian effort to counter extremism and build inclusive good governance than we have mounted so far.

People in the Middle East are convinced that the United States is withdrawing from the region. They view America as smarting from less than successful, but colossally expensive interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. They also think the United States has shifted away from countering the rise of Iran, and know that Washington needs Middle East energy resources less than once it did.

They are correct. The United States needs to reduce its military presence in the Middle East to correspond to its reduced and shifting interests. Some small portion of the savings should be devoted to building up civilian diplomatic efforts. The next administration should end the practice of reassuring our regional allies without extracting a price. If they want the United States to remain committed to their region, they need to begin to behave in a way that makes Americans think it worthwhile.

Withdrawal creates the serious risk of a vacuum that American enemies will try to fill. Iran took advantage of American withdrawal from Iraq to expand its influence there. Russia took advantage of American reluctance to develop an alternative to the Assad regime to intervene on his behalf. The Islamic State took advantage of American unwillingness to intercede in Syria. The Middle East has a way of forcing itself back onto the agenda: energy, proliferation, human rights violations, extremism, and refugees. We need not allow a drawdown of military assets to signal American indifference or retreat. We need instead to get our civilian capacities—for diplomacy, state-building, and international assistance and cooperation—to fill the gap. Less military should mean more civilian.

#### Nuclear war uniquely likely in the Middle East – overcomes deterrence and causes extinction

**Russell 9**

James A. Russell (Senior Lecturer of National Security Affairs & Naval Postgraduate School). “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East”, IFRI (Proliferation Papers, #26, 2009). <http://www.ifri.org/downloads/PP26_Russell_2009.pdf>.

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

#### Scenario 2 is Arab-Israeli war

#### Spread of nuclear technology sparks Israeli fears of regional prolif – causes preemptive strikes

Cooke 7/21/2016 [Kieran Cooke (former foreign correspondent for both the BBC and the Financial Times, and continues to contribute to the BBC and a wide range of international newspapers and radio networks), "Middle Eastern rush to a nuclear powered future," Middle East Eye]

On the other hand, there are a number of arguments against such a vast nuclear power programme in the region. Israel, which has never disclosed its nuclear capabilities – for power or for military use - has launched air strikes against nuclear facilities in both Iraq and Syria. If war was to break out somewhere in the Middle East would nuclear reactors in the region become targets? The consequences of such action would likely be devastating. There is ongoing controversy about Iran’s nuclear programme and the potential for nuclear power to be used for military purposes. Would other rival states in the region be tempted to use their nuclear knowhow for military means? Or could Islamic State or other terrorist groups seize nuclear material or take over a nuclear reactor, holding a state to ransom? Despite years of building and development, nuclear power is on the decline in many parts of the world with its share of global electricity decreasing from 18 percent in 1996 to around 11 percent today according to the International Energy Agency. Nuclear has become unfashionable in several countries not just because of the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters: New safety requirements mean the cost of building nuclear facilities has been rapidly mounting. The cost of the UAE’s Barakah plant is estimated at between US$25 bn and $32 bn, most of it being paid out of state funds. The initial cost estimate of Saudi Arabia’s nuclear programme – involving French, Chinese, Argentinian and South Korean companies building facilities both for power generation and for desalination - is $80 bn. Egypt and Jordan are not in a position to finance their nuclear projects – the former costing more than $20bn, the latter $10bn. Russia is offering generous loan terms on both projects but that raises other issues. There is speculation that Russia is using its nuclear industry as part of its overall geopolitical strategy in the Middle East. By supplying finance and the fuel and expertise to run nuclear facilities, Moscow can exert considerable political influence over its nuclear clients.

#### Preemptive Israeli strikes causes escalating conflicts and huge oil shocks

* sparks another intifada
* NATO retaliation
* Proxy wars in other areas
* Arab-Israel war

Rieger & Schiller 12 [Rene Rieger (PhD candidate in Middle East Politics at the University of Exeter (UK), as well as a lecturer in international relations at the University of Munich) and Markus Schiller (aerospace engineer and senior analyst at Schmucker Technologie, Munich, and a former RAND Nuclear Security Fellow, with many years of experience in analyzing missile and space programs of various countries of interest), "Preemptive Strikes against Iran: Prelude to an Avoidable Disaster?" Middle East Policy Council, Winter 2012] AZ

A pre-emptive Israeli strike against Iran has the potential to destabilize pro-Western Arab regimes in the Gulf, despite the fact that several Arab Gulf monarchies have pushed the United States to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapons capability by all means necessary. A strike on Iran would constitute an attack on a Muslim state. It is likely to evoke at least some sympathy for the Iranian regime among some segments of Arab Gulf population, predominantly the Shia. Iran's longstanding anti-Israeli rhetoric and Tehran's shameless use of the plight of the Palestinian people for propaganda purposes bolstered its reputation and influence on the Arab Street even in the traditionally anti-Iran Arab Gulf states.

It can be expected that, following an Israeli attack on Iran, some in the Arab Gulf monarchies would sympathize with the regime in Tehran and confront their governments with calls for some sort of retaliation — at least of a diplomatic nature — against Israel and the United States, actions that would clearly contradict these regimes' interests. The dimension of popular calls for retaliation would increase with the number of Iranian victims. Those in the Arab Gulf monarchies most likely to sympathize with Tehran are the Shia in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, already in conflict with their governments over issues of discrimination.

Further escalation, possibly instigated by Iranian proxies, would potentially weaken the regime and incur economic instability, particularly in the case of Saudi Arabia, where the Shia minority resides predominantly in the oil-rich Eastern Province, representing roughly half of the local population.

Most advocates of a pre-emptive strike play down the possible economic consequences of an attack on Iran. They argue that the regime in Tehran would not be able to effectively disrupt oil and gas exports through the Strait of Hormuz, and that the loss of supplies to the world market would only be temporary and limited. This hypothesis comprises several significant flaws.

First, while Tehran could at best effect a complete disruption of oil and gas exports through the Strait of Hormuz for a short period of time, it could curtail the oil trade in the Gulf significantly over an extended period. It would be impossible to compensate fully for the loss in oil shipments; and the longer the disruption lasted, the more difficult compensation attempts would become.

Second, the dimensions of global spare oil capacity are obscure; in any case, they are very limited and largely reliant on the Strait of Hormuz for export. The world's spare capacity is held almost entirely by Saudi Arabia, though it is highly likely that it is considerably below the officially claimed 2.5 million barrels per day (mbd).

Third, Saudi Arabia and the other oil-producing Gulf states have only limited capacity to redirect their oil exports away from the Strait of Hormuz. Only 1.5 mbd of Saudi oil (including spare production) could be redirected through the East-West pipeline to the Yanbu al-Bahr port on the Red Sea.23 The United Arab Emirates has recently completed the so-called Habshan-Fujairah oil pipeline, which also bypasses the Strait of Hormuz. However, the pipeline's current capacity does not exceed 1 mbd. Compared to the 17 million barrels that pass through the Strait of Hormuz on a daily basis (roughly 20 percent of the world's traded oil), the Gulf countries' compensation capacity is relatively limited.

Fourth, there is the possibility, however remote, that Venezuela, a close ally of the Iranian regime and the fourth-largest oil supplier to the United States (roughly 900,000 bpd), would cut its exports. This would put even more pressure on the international oil market and directly affect the U.S. economy.24

Fifth, to compensate a significant supply shortage provoked by massive curtailment or interruption of trade routes in the Gulf, oil-importing nations could tap their strategic stocks. However, particularly in the early stage of a massive supply crisis, commercial, logistical and political considerations would inhibit countries releasing enough reserve stocks to compensate fully for the shortage.25

Sixth, Iran could commit acts of sabotage against oil installations in the Gulf, also interrupting supply.

Finally, an essential factor in oil pricing is market psychology. Irrespective of actual changes in oil supply, market expectations or fears of supply cuts can have drastic effects on prices. As a significant portion of the global oil supply originates in the Gulf, the oil market is particularly sensitive to developments there. Hence, the mere possibility of a serious disruption of the transit routes in the Gulf following an attack on Iran has the potential to provoke skyrocketing oil prices. The more the conflict then escalates and the longer the crisis lasts, the more enduring would be the effect on the oil prices. In the current global economy a prolonged increase in oil prices would have disastrous consequences.

To attack the Iranian nuclear infrastructure, the Israeli air force would have no feasible alternative to flying through foreign air space. There would be three potential routes, all presenting operational and political risks. The first runs northeast over the Mediterranean Sea along the coastline of Lebanon and Syria, then eastward along the Syrian-Turkish border, and finally through northern Iraq or alongside the Turkish-Iraqi border (northern route). The second runs east through Jordanian airspace or along the Jordanian-Syrian border and then east through Iraqi airspace (central route). The third follows the flight route of the 1981 raid on Iraq's Osirak reactor, entering Saudi Arabia at the tip of the Gulf of Aqaba, then flying northeast through Saudi airspace and eventually east through Iraqi airspace (southern route).

The northern route carries relatively low operational risks as long as the Israeli jets would fly mainly on the Syrian side of the Syrian-Turkish border. However, a violation of Turkish airspace could have significant political consequences. Turkish-Israeli relations have already cooled considerably, particularly since the Gaza Flotilla incident of 2010. Judging from the Erdogan government's recent attitude towards Israel, there is a clear possibility that the Turkish military would attempt to ward off an Israeli intrusion into their airspace. A violation of Turkish airspace would be particularly problematic, moreover as it would constitute aggression against a NATO member.

The central route, too, would involve taking significant risks. Since Jordan would likely not grant Israel overflight rights, an Israeli intrusion into Jordanian airspace would be an act of aggression entailing risks predominantly political in nature (jeopardizing the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty), but potentially also operational (Jordanian attempts to stop the intrusion and provide advance warning to neighboring countries).

Since the early 1980s, Saudi air surveillance has improved so significantly that an Israeli intrusion into Saudi airspace would not go undetected. The Saudi government would be politically bound (both domestically and regionally) to protest with more than rhetoric an Israeli violation of their territorial integrity. Earlier reports suggesting that Saudi Arabia would look the other way while Israel overflew its territory are not credible. Any Saudi military reaction against the Israeli air fleet would cause operational problems for the Israeli mission and provoke a political crisis inimical to both Israeli and Saudi interests.

#### Oil shocks go nuclear

King 08 (Neil, Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, p. 14-17)

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.”7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.”9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. It’s not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty.

### 1AC – Prolif [S]

#### Nuclear deals with Russia form the basis for further cooperation on weapons transfers and nuclear expertise – guarantees prolif

Guzansky et al 15 [Yoel Guzansky (research fellow at INSS. Before he joined the Institute, he was in charge of strategic issues at the National Security Council in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, coordinating work on the Iranian nuclear challenge and specializes in issues of Gulf security and Middle East strategic issues), Zvi Magen, Oded Eran, "Russian Nuclear Diplomacy in the Middle East," Insitute for National Security Studies, 12/29/2015] AZ

Russia is therefore increasing its cooperation in this area not only with Egypt, but also with Iran. According to reports, Iran plans to build two more nuclear reactors in Bushehr with Moscow’s assistance, near the site’s existing reactor, which has been active since 2011. In addition to Iran, Russia has signed various agreements, some to build reactors and others to transfer know-how to US allies in the region. Rosatom, the Russian nuclear corporation, has already begun building four reactors with a capacity of 1,200 megawatts each in Akkuyu, Turkey, with the first reactor slated to hook up to the electricity grid in 2023. The future of this project is uncertain, however, given the crisis that broke out between Russia and Turkey after Turkey took down a Russian plane. Jordan is seeking to build civilian nuclear capacity, due to its growing demand for energy, the country’s lack of oil reserves (90 percent of the energy sources Jordan consumes is imported), and the prolonged disruption in the oil supply from Iraq and gas from Egypt. In March 2015, Jordan signed an agreement with Rosatom for the construction of two reactors, the first of which is scheduled to begin operating in 2024, and the second in 2026. The cost of the transaction is approximately $10 billion. Jordan will own 51 percent of the reactors, and the rest will be under Russian ownership. Jordan, which initially asked Washington for assistance, began negotiating with the Russians after rejecting an American demand that it not operate a nuclear fuel cycle on its territory. When this essay was written, the parties had not yet reached agreement on the particulars for financing the project. Saudi Arabia has also launched a civilian nuclear program, which it claims is designed to meet its growing energy needs; at the present rate of consumption, Saudi Arabia is liable to find itself supplying most of the oil it produces for its own internal needs by the end of the next decade. Saudi Arabia is seeking external aid in order to obtain the same capability that the Iranians and others in the region are developing, or are about to develop. For this purpose, a number of ventures have been founded in the kingdom, and agreements have been signed – the most recent one with Russia. In June 2015, the two countries signed an agreement that Russia will build and support a civilian nuclear program in the kingdom. This is not the first agreement between the parties in the nuclear field, and it is not at all clear whether it will improve the relations between them, given the tension that has prevailed in recent years, mainly because of the conflicting positions of the two in the civil war in Syria and the Russian support for Assad. Saudi sources insist, however, that “Russia will play a key role in the kingdom’s ambitious nuclear venture.” Beyond the nuclear cooperation between Egypt and Russia, Egypt is procuring advanced warplanes from Russia, including the S-300 anti-aircraft defense system. Iran is also expected to arm itself with a system of this type, as well as advanced warplanes and other weapons systems. In addition to its nuclear cooperation with Russia, Saudi Arabia is also liable to expand its procurement of advanced Russian systems. Following Russian military intervention in Syria in a coalition with Iran, Israel recently has been faced with the combined forces of the Syrian army, the Iranian army, and Hizbollah, backed by the Russian military presence in Syria. In testimony that has not received much media coverage, Ed Royce, a US congressman and the chairman of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, asserted that the ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the United States had told him that his country “no longer felt bound” to refrain from enriching uranium, following the nuclear agreement signed with Iran. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that the Iranian precedent will encourage other countries in the Middle East to develop a nuclear program below the nuclear military threshold. “He told me, ‘Your worst enemy has achieved this right to enrich. It’s a right to enrich now that your friends are going to want, too, and we won’t be the only country,’” Royce, said, elaborating on his testimony in a phone interview with the Associated Press. Israel cannot ignore the procurement of advanced Russian weapons systems by its neighbors, or their accelerated entry into the nuclear field; these plans are liable to serve as a basis for obtaining greater know-how and as a cover for building nuclear weapons capability, certainly if the transfer of know-how includes enrichment capability. For its part, Russia is being careful to maintain positive relations with Israel, which it regards as an important regional player. Israel also regards Russia as a key player in the region, and the two countries are coordinating their moves in order to prevent a clash between their military forces in Syrian territory. At the same time, Israel expects Russia to take its security interests into consideration. The two countries seemingly are willing to engage in dialogue that will address their spheres of interest, but it is doubtful whether Israel will be able to convince Russia in its agreements with the countries in the region seeking nuclear reactors to include restrictive clauses. Furthermore, even if Israel is able to influence Moscow to some extent, it is highly doubtful whether some of these countries, which have hitherto rejected American demands that they accept conditions and restrictions, will accept such demands from Russia.

#### The spread of nuclear power across the Middle East is primarily motivated by states' desire to proliferate – no other explanation is adequate

Vick 15 [Karl Vick (reporter), "The Middle East Nuclear Race Is Already Under Way," TIME Magazine, 3/23/2015] AZ

While the U.S. and other world powers work to constrain Iran's nuclear program, five rival nations plan atomic programs One of the most important reasons why the U.S. is trying to conclude a nuclear deal with Iran is to prevent an Iranian bomb from triggering a nuclear race in the Middle East. Yet even as talks continue now in Switzerland, Tehran’s regional rivals have already begun quietly acting on their own atomic ambitions. Nuclear power may be on the wane almost everywhere else in the world, but it’s all the rage in the place with all that oil. Egypt’s announcement last month that it was hiring Russia to build a reactor near Alexandria made it only the latest entrant in an emerging atomic derby. Every other major Sunni power in the region has announced similar plans. And though none appear either as ambitious nor as ambiguous as what’s taken place in Iran — which set out to master the entire atomic-fuel cycle, a red flag for a military program — each announcement lays down a marker in a region that, until recently, was notable as the one place on the planet where governments had made little progress on nuclear power. With the exception of Israel, which has never publicly acknowledged its widely known nuclear arsenal, no Middle Eastern country beyond Iran had a nuclear program — peaceful or otherwise — until the wealthy United Arab Emirates began building a reactor in July 2012 (due for completion in 2017). The list now includes, in addition to Egypt, Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia — the last Iran’s archrival, and which last year revealed plans to build 16 nuclear plants over the next two decades. When the President of South Korea — which has 23 nuclear plants of its own — visited the Kingdom earlier this month, leaders of both countries signed a memo of understanding calling for Seoul to build two of the nuclear plants. The Saudis have made similar arrangements with China, Argentina and France. “It’s not just because nuclear power is seen as a first step toward a nuclear-weapons option,” says Mark Fitzpatrick, a former U.S. State Department nuclear expert who now runs the nonproliferation and disarmament program at London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies. “There is also a prestige factor: keeping up with the neighbors.” Middle Eastern nations may have legitimate reasons to invest in nuclear energy. Jordan, for instance, has almost no oil in liquid form, and almost less water. Saudi Arabia and the UAE possess huge crude reserves, but lose potential export revenue when they burn oil at home to create electricity — huge amounts of which are sucked up by desalination plants. Turkey, despite impressive hydroelectric potential, must import oil and natural gas. But all that has been true for decades. What’s changed in recent years is the nuclear capabilities of Iran — a Shi‘ite Muslim country Sunni leaders have come to regard as major threat. Jordan’s King Abdullah II famously warned of a “Shia crescent” of Iran-aligned countries reaching from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. The Saudis have made it clear that they will acquire a nuclear weapon should Iran get one. “This is not the shortest way to a nuclear weapon, by any means,” says Sharon Squassoni, director of the proliferation-prevention program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. “But if I put myself in their shoes, I’d think it probably makes sense to start down this path to see if we can develop a civilian nuclear [program], and if we pick up some capabilities along the way, that’s all right.”‘ Suspicion rises with every new announcement partly because the Middle East is bucking a global trend. Worldwide, the number of nuclear plants has declined since the meltdown at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi plant in 2011. Reactions differed by country. Germany forswore nuclear energy altogether after the disaster, while China pressed ahead, planning more than 100 new reactors. But in most places, the environmental risks and high costs have turned countries off nuclear power. “My beef with nuclear energy is that it’s sort of held up as this very prestigious thing,” Squassoni tells TIME. “We do nuclear deals with our best allies … all this stuff about strategic partnership. And really, it’s this extremely expensive, complicated, slightly dangerous way to boil water. And that’s what you’re doing, right? You’re boiling water to turn those turbines.” The expense alone may prevent some Middle Eastern nations from every actually joining the “nuclear club.” Building an atomic plant costs at least $5 billion, Fitzpatrick notes, and Egypt is desperately poor; Jordan relies heavily on remittances and foreign aid. But the Saudis still have money to burn and, according to former White House official Gary Samore, have consistently rebuffed U.S. imprecations to sign a pledge not to divert any nuclear program toward producing a bomb (a pledge the UAE took). Saudi Arabia has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but then so has Iran, and in the end a race can be run by as few as two: India and Pakistan, bitter neighbors, neither of which are rich, went nuclear in 1974 and 1998, respectively. They’ve gone to war once since, raising anxiety levels around the world.

#### Middle East prolif causes an enormous nuclear war and increases the risk of nuclear terror – deterrence doesn't check

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Along these lines, it seems highly plausible that a major confrontation between Iran and another regional nuclear power could occur by design, due to miscalculation, or as a result of an Iranian proxy taking aggressive action beyond Tehran’s control—a case of the “tail wagging the dog.” If a conflict ensued and one side appeared on the brink of losing, it could execute a latter-day “shot across the bow” of its adversary, or even engage in a significant but limited use of nuclear weapons to restore its position. Any assessment of the military balance in a proliferated Middle East would need to take such scenarios into account. There were other worrisome scenarios that emerged during the Cold War involving accidental or unauthorized use, and catalytic war described earlier in this assessment. Motion pictures such as Dr. Strangelove, The Bedford Incident, and Failsafe, and books such as On the Beach brought such concerns to the public’s attention following traumatic crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the Suez Crisis in 1956. Scenarios in a proliferated Middle East should examine the prospects that all or part of the nuclear arsenal of a new nuclear-armed state could fall under the control of a non-governmental faction in the event of a state failure. Nuclear weapons might be used internally as part of a civil war between factions vying for power, against an external power attempting to back one faction over another, by a radical terrorist element either within the failed state or against targets abroad, or some combination of these. Finally, a proliferated Middle East would be characterized by a geographically tight cluster of nuclear-armed states; a high level of mutual suspicion among these states; the likely absence of effective early warning systems; and the significant potential of cyber weapons to introduce false intelligence into the calculations of state leaders. This combination suggests the region would be a prime candidate for a catalytic nuclear war. A scenario (or perhaps a set of scenarios) should assess the prospects for such a conflict materializing. To sum up, this assessment concludes that a proliferated Middle East will pose significantly greater challenges than did the Cold War in terms of sustaining the U.S. objective of preventing the use of nuclear weapons. The challenge is not simply one of maintaining an “assured destruction” capability for each state; indeed, this Cold War-era metric was of dubious utility then and of no utility in the multipolar regional competition posited here. Rather, a rich menu of scenarios must be examined to inform any U.S. strategy that seeks to maximize the prospects of preserving key national interests in this critical region.

#### ISIS is actively seeking nuclear weapons and possesses the technical expertise needed to launch a major attack – they just need the material

Rudischhauser 15 [Wolfgang Rudischhauser (currently Director of the WMD Non-proliferation Centre at NATO and has a long background in working on non-proliferation in various diplomatic posts for the German Foreign Ministry,) "Could ISIL go nuclear?" NATO Review Magazine, 2015] AZ

But a further particular risk could become a major threat to Western societies. There is a very real - but not yet fully identified risk - of foreign fighters in ISIL’s ranks using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials as “weapons of terror” against the West. One can easily imagine the number of victims created by panic as well as the economic disruption if the ’Charlie Hebdo’ attacks had centred on “Chatelet les Halles”, the biggest Paris metro station, with an improvised explosive device containing radioactive sources or chemical material instead of using Kalashnikovs. The deadly Tokyo attacks in 1995 using toxic chemical material, (the so called “Sarin attack”), could have killed many more people. Had Aum Shinrikyo used all the Sarin they had actually produced, a large part of Tokyo’s population would have died. Thus the attacks led at the time to a complete rethinking of the threat perception, well before 9/11. Until now, the Tokyo attacks have fortunately remained an exception and most terrorist groups have used “conventional” explosives or weapons, simply because they lacked access to know-how and material. This may soon change. And there is a reason. A new threat scenario A lot has been written recently regarding the rising power of an organisation that calls itself the “Islamic State in the Levant” (ISIL) or “Daesh”. ISIL has attracted at least hundreds if not thousands of foreign fighters from Western countries to join its ranks. What makes ISIL different is exactly that. Hundreds of foreign fighters, some with solid academic and educational backgrounds and intellectual knowledge, have joined the cause and continue to do so every day. Furthermore ISIL’s success is based on an effective media strategy of looking at the utmost possible “news effect” of their attacks. Together with their access to high levels of funding, these three elements bear the real risk of the group turning into practice what up to now has been largely a theoretical possibility: to actually employ weapons of mass destruction or CBRN material in terrorist attacks. We might thus soon enter a stage of CBRN terrorism, never before imaginable. Worrying reports confirm that ISIL has gained (at least temporarily) access to former chemical weapons storage sites in Iraq. They might soon do so in Libya. They allegedly used toxic chemicals in the fighting around Kobane. Even more worrying, there are press reports about nuclear material from Iraqi scientific institutes having been seized by ISIL. This demonstrates that while no full scale plots have been unveiled so far, our governments need to be on alert. Generating improved military and civil prevention and response capabilities should be a high priority and should not fall victim to limited budgets in times of economic crisis. Apart from their ideology, an even more fundamentalist and aggressive version of jihad than Al Qaida’s, four unique features make ISIL different: First, their “possession” (or de facto control) of a huge “territory”, stretching from the Turkish border in Syria to close to Baghdad in Iraq and approaching the Lebanese border. Numerous air strikes by the international “Anti-ISIL coalition”, in which a number of NATO Allies are involved, tried to target ISIL and its strongholds. However, despite coalition and Iraqi Armed Forces successes in forcing ISIL to give up some territory, the group remains able to control and find refuge in large parts of Syria and Iraq, most recently by capturing the city of Ramadi. Second, the reported access to extraordinary levels of funding. ISIL is reputed (much more than Al Qaida ever did) to earn money through “economic” and fundraising activities inside their territories, from supporters abroad and from the collection of ransom money. Most recently, the Ambassador of Iraq to the UN even claimed that ISIL was selling human organs from victims to earn money. They are said to be already involved in human smuggling of migrants from Libya to Europe to create funding. Third, ISIL, in addition to its strong ideological motivation, is building its success on the use of social and other media in a way rarely seen before by other terrorist groups. This helps them gain attention at any cost for their atrocities, such as the decapitation or even the burning alive of hostages. Fourth and most dangerously, the hundreds if not thousands of foreign fighters from the Arab world and Western countries in ISIL’s ranks, some of them with solid knowledge including in chemical, physical and computer sciences, makes ISIL special. A full assessment is still very difficult, as only a limited amount of information on the backgrounds of the fighters is publicly available. Notwithstanding that, it is clear that ISIL attracts growing numbers of young foreigners daily from all levels of society. Clearly reported cases show that ISIL actually has already acquired the knowledge, and in some cases the human expertise, that would allow it to use CBRN materials as “weapons of terror”.

### 1AC – Prolif [L]

#### Nuclear deals with Russia form the basis for further cooperation on weapons transfers and nuclear expertise – guarantees prolif

Guzansky et al 15 [Yoel Guzansky (research fellow at INSS. Before he joined the Institute, he was in charge of strategic issues at the National Security Council in the Israeli Prime Minister's Office, coordinating work on the Iranian nuclear challenge and specializes in issues of Gulf security and Middle East strategic issues), Zvi Magen, Oded Eran, "Russian Nuclear Diplomacy in the Middle East," Insitute for National Security Studies, 12/29/2015] AZ

Russia is therefore increasing its cooperation in this area not only with Egypt, but also with Iran. According to reports, Iran plans to build two more nuclear reactors in Bushehr with Moscow’s assistance, near the site’s existing reactor, which has been active since 2011. In addition to Iran, Russia has signed various agreements, some to build reactors and others to transfer know-how to US allies in the region. Rosatom, the Russian nuclear corporation, has already begun building four reactors with a capacity of 1,200 megawatts each in Akkuyu, Turkey, with the first reactor slated to hook up to the electricity grid in 2023. The future of this project is uncertain, however, given the crisis that broke out between Russia and Turkey after Turkey took down a Russian plane. Jordan is seeking to build civilian nuclear capacity, due to its growing demand for energy, the country’s lack of oil reserves (90 percent of the energy sources Jordan consumes is imported), and the prolonged disruption in the oil supply from Iraq and gas from Egypt. In March 2015, Jordan signed an agreement with Rosatom for the construction of two reactors, the first of which is scheduled to begin operating in 2024, and the second in 2026. The cost of the transaction is approximately $10 billion. Jordan will own 51 percent of the reactors, and the rest will be under Russian ownership. Jordan, which initially asked Washington for assistance, began negotiating with the Russians after rejecting an American demand that it not operate a nuclear fuel cycle on its territory. When this essay was written, the parties had not yet reached agreement on the particulars for financing the project. Saudi Arabia has also launched a civilian nuclear program, which it claims is designed to meet its growing energy needs; at the present rate of consumption, Saudi Arabia is liable to find itself supplying most of the oil it produces for its own internal needs by the end of the next decade. Saudi Arabia is seeking external aid in order to obtain the same capability that the Iranians and others in the region are developing, or are about to develop. For this purpose, a number of ventures have been founded in the kingdom, and agreements have been signed – the most recent one with Russia. In June 2015, the two countries signed an agreement that Russia will build and support a civilian nuclear program in the kingdom. This is not the first agreement between the parties in the nuclear field, and it is not at all clear whether it will improve the relations between them, given the tension that has prevailed in recent years, mainly because of the conflicting positions of the two in the civil war in Syria and the Russian support for Assad. Saudi sources insist, however, that “Russia will play a key role in the kingdom’s ambitious nuclear venture.” Beyond the nuclear cooperation between Egypt and Russia, Egypt is procuring advanced warplanes from Russia, including the S-300 anti-aircraft defense system. Iran is also expected to arm itself with a system of this type, as well as advanced warplanes and other weapons systems. In addition to its nuclear cooperation with Russia, Saudi Arabia is also liable to expand its procurement of advanced Russian systems. Following Russian military intervention in Syria in a coalition with Iran, Israel recently has been faced with the combined forces of the Syrian army, the Iranian army, and Hizbollah, backed by the Russian military presence in Syria. In testimony that has not received much media coverage, Ed Royce, a US congressman and the chairman of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, asserted that the ambassador of the United Arab Emirates to the United States had told him that his country “no longer felt bound” to refrain from enriching uranium, following the nuclear agreement signed with Iran. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that the Iranian precedent will encourage other countries in the Middle East to develop a nuclear program below the nuclear military threshold. “He told me, ‘Your worst enemy has achieved this right to enrich. It’s a right to enrich now that your friends are going to want, too, and we won’t be the only country,’” Royce, said, elaborating on his testimony in a phone interview with the Associated Press. Israel cannot ignore the procurement of advanced Russian weapons systems by its neighbors, or their accelerated entry into the nuclear field; these plans are liable to serve as a basis for obtaining greater know-how and as a cover for building nuclear weapons capability, certainly if the transfer of know-how includes enrichment capability. For its part, Russia is being careful to maintain positive relations with Israel, which it regards as an important regional player. Israel also regards Russia as a key player in the region, and the two countries are coordinating their moves in order to prevent a clash between their military forces in Syrian territory. At the same time, Israel expects Russia to take its security interests into consideration. The two countries seemingly are willing to engage in dialogue that will address their spheres of interest, but it is doubtful whether Israel will be able to convince Russia in its agreements with the countries in the region seeking nuclear reactors to include restrictive clauses. Furthermore, even if Israel is able to influence Moscow to some extent, it is highly doubtful whether some of these countries, which have hitherto rejected American demands that they accept conditions and restrictions, will accept such demands from Russia.

#### The spread of nuclear power across the Middle East is primarily motivated by states' desire to proliferate – no other explanation is adequate

Vick 15 [Karl Vick (reporter), "The Middle East Nuclear Race Is Already Under Way," TIME Magazine, 3/23/2015] AZ

While the U.S. and other world powers work to constrain Iran's nuclear program, five rival nations plan atomic programs One of the most important reasons why the U.S. is trying to conclude a nuclear deal with Iran is to prevent an Iranian bomb from triggering a nuclear race in the Middle East. Yet even as talks continue now in Switzerland, Tehran’s regional rivals have already begun quietly acting on their own atomic ambitions. Nuclear power may be on the wane almost everywhere else in the world, but it’s all the rage in the place with all that oil. Egypt’s announcement last month that it was hiring Russia to build a reactor near Alexandria made it only the latest entrant in an emerging atomic derby. Every other major Sunni power in the region has announced similar plans. And though none appear either as ambitious nor as ambiguous as what’s taken place in Iran — which set out to master the entire atomic-fuel cycle, a red flag for a military program — each announcement lays down a marker in a region that, until recently, was notable as the one place on the planet where governments had made little progress on nuclear power. With the exception of Israel, which has never publicly acknowledged its widely known nuclear arsenal, no Middle Eastern country beyond Iran had a nuclear program — peaceful or otherwise — until the wealthy United Arab Emirates began building a reactor in July 2012 (due for completion in 2017). The list now includes, in addition to Egypt, Turkey, Jordan and Saudi Arabia — the last Iran’s archrival, and which last year revealed plans to build 16 nuclear plants over the next two decades. When the President of South Korea — which has 23 nuclear plants of its own — visited the Kingdom earlier this month, leaders of both countries signed a memo of understanding calling for Seoul to build two of the nuclear plants. The Saudis have made similar arrangements with China, Argentina and France. “It’s not just because nuclear power is seen as a first step toward a nuclear-weapons option,” says Mark Fitzpatrick, a former U.S. State Department nuclear expert who now runs the nonproliferation and disarmament program at London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies. “There is also a prestige factor: keeping up with the neighbors.” Middle Eastern nations may have legitimate reasons to invest in nuclear energy. Jordan, for instance, has almost no oil in liquid form, and almost less water. Saudi Arabia and the UAE possess huge crude reserves, but lose potential export revenue when they burn oil at home to create electricity — huge amounts of which are sucked up by desalination plants. Turkey, despite impressive hydroelectric potential, must import oil and natural gas. But all that has been true for decades. What’s changed in recent years is the nuclear capabilities of Iran — a Shi‘ite Muslim country Sunni leaders have come to regard as major threat. Jordan’s King Abdullah II famously warned of a “Shia crescent” of Iran-aligned countries reaching from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf. 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Along these lines, it seems highly plausible that a major confrontation between Iran and another regional nuclear power could occur by design, due to miscalculation, or as a result of an Iranian proxy taking aggressive action beyond Tehran’s control—a case of the “tail wagging the dog.” If a conflict ensued and one side appeared on the brink of losing, it could execute a latter-day “shot across the bow” of its adversary, or even engage in a significant but limited use of nuclear weapons to restore its position. Any assessment of the military balance in a proliferated Middle East would need to take such scenarios into account. There were other worrisome scenarios that emerged during the Cold War involving accidental or unauthorized use, and catalytic war described earlier in this assessment. Motion pictures such as Dr. Strangelove, The Bedford Incident, and Failsafe, and books such as On the Beach brought such concerns to the public’s attention following traumatic crises such as the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the Suez Crisis in 1956. Scenarios in a proliferated Middle East should examine the prospects that all or part of the nuclear arsenal of a new nuclear-armed state could fall under the control of a non-governmental faction in the event of a state failure. Nuclear weapons might be used internally as part of a civil war between factions vying for power, against an external power attempting to back one faction over another, by a radical terrorist element either within the failed state or against targets abroad, or some combination of these. Finally, a proliferated Middle East would be characterized by a geographically tight cluster of nuclear-armed states; a high level of mutual suspicion among these states; the likely absence of effective early warning systems; and the significant potential of cyber weapons to introduce false intelligence into the calculations of state leaders. This combination suggests the region would be a prime candidate for a catalytic nuclear war. A scenario (or perhaps a set of scenarios) should assess the prospects for such a conflict materializing. To sum up, this assessment concludes that a proliferated Middle East will pose significantly greater challenges than did the Cold War in terms of sustaining the U.S. objective of preventing the use of nuclear weapons. The challenge is not simply one of maintaining an “assured destruction” capability for each state; indeed, this Cold War-era metric was of dubious utility then and of no utility in the multipolar regional competition posited here. Rather, a rich menu of scenarios must be examined to inform any U.S. strategy that seeks to maximize the prospects of preserving key national interests in this critical region.

#### Rosatom reactors in particular are vulnerable to infiltration and theft – corruption and management problems

Ulrich et al 14 [Kendra Ulrich (Senior Global Energy Campaigner, Greenpeace Japan), Jehki Harkonen and Brian Blomme, "Rosatom Risks: Exposing the troubled history of Russia’s state nuclear corporation," Greenpeace International, October 2014] AZ

Adequacy of qualified staff In 2006, Rosatom had only approximately 5,000 professional construction workers, well below the number needed to scale up its ambitious programme to build new reactors.100 By 2012, Rosatom managed to considerably expand its construction staff. However, many of these workers were poorly paid migrants from the former Soviet republics. According to a local NGO working at the site of the Leningrad nuclear power plants, the workers were subjected to living conditions akin to slave labour. They lived in unhygienic, cold barracks, were paid very low salaries, and often Rosatom officers confiscated their passports to prevent them from leaving the site.101 Corruption in Rosatom’s activities Rosatom, and its predecessors, have had serious and widespread corruption problems, likely due, at least in part, to the structural lack of transparency and external accountability. Between 2009-2012, Rosatom fired 68 executives and 208 mid-level managers due to corruption charges.102 One recent allegation of corruption relating to the top management at Rosatom was the case of Rosatom’s Deputy Director General, Evgeny Yevstratov. He was responsible for nuclear safety. Yevstratov quit his job at Rosatom in April 2011, and was arrested in July on suspicion of embezzling 50 million roubles (around €1.2mn103).104 In November 2012, Yevstratov was released on bail but the case continued.105 Originally Yevstratov was only accused of collaborating with his staff in claiming that research material was his own rather than copies taken from the internet, and pocketing the money intended for research. Later investigators found that Yevstratov and another high-level Rosatom executive, Mustafa Kashka, the Deputy Director General of the corporation’s subsidiary Atomflot, may have embezzled an additional 60m roubles (around €1.5m106) intended for reprocessing of nuclear waste.107 The court case against Yevstratov is still pending as of June 2014. Besides its own corruption problems, Rosatom has also had serious issues with some of its subsidiaries. For example, in 2010, Transparency International Russia and a Kaliningrad-based NGO, Ecodefense, together conducted a detailed review of 200 orders that had been publicly placed on the Rosatom website. The NGOs found that 83 out of 200, or more than 40%, of the orders violated the Russian procurement standards regarding compliance with order placement processes, transparency, and/or use of public money.108 Some of these cases connected with the violation of procurement standards have gained publicity inside Russia. In December 2010, investigative journalists at the Kommersant newspaper reported that Alexei Votyakov, the Director General of the Rosatom waste subsidiary, RosRAO, and his Managing Director, Maxim Belyaev, had purchased nuclear waste containers at a cost of 450m roubles (around €11m109).110 This was estimated to be several times above the normal market price. Rosatom’s own investigation found that the containers were bought without a legally required tender, and in violation of Rosatom’s internal procedures.111 RosRAO’s archives also had letters of acceptance for some undelivered containers. Both men were subsequently fired and prosecuted.112 As of June 2014, there has been no final ruling in this case. Rosatom’s corruption problems have resulted in potentially serious compromises of nuclear safety both domestically and abroad. One of the cases that gained broader international attention involved Sergei Shutov, the Procurement Director of ZIO-Podolsk, a nuclear construction subsidiary of Rosatom. He was charged in December 2011113 with collaborating to steal more than 145m roubles (€3.47m114) with his cohorts by forging supply certificates for reactors at home and abroad for what was low quality, cheaper steel in order to fake compliance with industry standards while keeping the difference in price for himself.115 Like the Votyakov-Belyaev case, this case is also still pending as of June 2014. Shutov’s case was not the only one of its kind. In 2007, workers at the Kalinin nuclear power plant noticed that some of the recently manufactured power switches had the on and off sides marked the wrong way around. A closer examination showed a number of defects in equipment arriving from the Kharkov Electromechanical Plant. When confronted with the problems, it turned out that the Kharkov plant had not manufactured some of the parts. Instead, an intermediary had been forging the certificates and buying cheaper parts from somewhere else to increase profit margins.116 According to an inspection report on the Kalinin nuclear power plant from February 2014, the current procurement procedures failed to prevent the use of low-quality equipment and components and subpar subcontractors.117 The scale of the alleged and proven corruption cases, and the resulting potential financial and safety risks and costs, raise serious questions about whether Rosatom’s institutional framework can support the large nuclear expansion that its executives proclaim. Given these serious problems at this stage of nuclear operation, Rosatom’s ambition to own and operate multiple reactors across vast distances in other countries certainly raises the potential spectre of exacerbated problems. The corporation could be stretched even thinner and may try to fill in the gaps with cheap, unqualified labour as it has done domestically. It is worth restating, this endemic corruption involving falsified documentation and poor quality control relates to parts necessary for the operation of nuclear power plants. The Shutov case is one clear example of that. And, these are just the reports that have been uncovered; others may have gone undetected.

#### Risk of nuclear terrorism is real and high now – largest threat of extinction

Bunn et al 14 [Matthew, Professor of Practice at the Harvard Kennedy School, with Martin Malin, Executive Director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Nickolas Roth, Research Associate at the Project on Managing the Atom, and William Tobey, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March, “Advancing Nuclear Security: Evaluating Progress and Setting New Goals,” *The Project on Managing the Atom*, pg. 5-9/AKG]

Unfortunately, nuclear and radiological terrorism remain real and dangerous threats.1 The conclusion the assembled leaders reached at the Washington Nuclear Security Summit and reaffirmed in Seoul remains correct: “Nuclear terrorism continues to be one of the most challenging threats to international security. Defeating this threat requires strong national measures and international cooperation given its potential global political, economic, social, and psychological consequences.”2 There are three types of nuclear or radiological terrorist attack: • Nuclear weapons. Terrorists might be able to get and detonate an assembled nuclear weapon made by a state, or make a crude nuclear bomb from stolen separated plutonium or HEU. This would be the most difficult type of nuclear terrorism for terrorists to accomplish—but the devastation could be absolutely horrifying, with political and economic aftershocks reverberating around the world. • “Dirty bombs.” A far simpler approach would be for terrorists to obtain radiological materials—available in hospitals, industrial sites, and more—and disperse them to contaminate an area with radioactivity, using explosives or any number of other means. In most scenarios of such attacks, few people would die from the radiation—but the attack could spread fear, force the evacuation of many blocks of a major city, and inflict billions of dollars in costs of cleanup and economic disruption. While a dirty bomb attack would be much easier for terrorists to carry out than an attack using a nuclear explosive, the consequences would be far less—an expensive and disruptive mess, but not the heart of a major city going up in smoke. • Nuclear sabotage. Terrorists could potentially cause a Fukushima-like meltdown at a nuclear reactor or sabotage a spent fuel pool or high-level waste store. An unsuccessful sabotage would have little effect, but a successful one could spread radioactive material over a huge area. Both the scale of the consequences and the difficulty of carrying out a successful attack would be intermediate between nuclear weapons and dirty bombs. Overall, while actual terrorist use of a nuclear weapon may be the least likely of these dangers, its consequences would be so overwhelming that we believe it poses the most significant risk. A similar judgment drove the decision to focus the four-year effort on securing nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them. Most of this report will focus on the threat of terrorist use of nuclear explosives, but the overall global governance framework for nuclear security is relevant to all of these dangers. The danger of nuclear terrorism is driven by three key factors—terrorist intent to escalate to the nuclear level of violence; potential terrorist capability to do so; and the vulnerability of nuclear weapons and the materials needed to enable terrorists to carry out such an attack—the motive, means, and opportunity of a monstrous crime. Terrorist intent. While most terrorist groups are still focused on small-scale violence for local political purposes, we now live in an age that includes some groups intent on inflicting large-scale destruction to achieve their objectives. Over the past quarter century, both al Qaeda and the Japanese terror cult Aum Shinrikyo seriously sought nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials and expertise needed to make them. Al Qaeda had a focused program reporting directly to Ayman al-Zawahiri (now head of the group), which progressed as far as carrying out crude but sensible conventional explosive tests for the nuclear program in the desert of Afghanistan. There is some evidence that North Caucusus terrorists also sought nuclear weapons—including incidents in which terrorist teams were caught carrying out reconnaissance on Russian nuclear weapon storage sites, whose locations are secret.3 Despite the death of Osama bin Laden and the severe disruption of the core of al Qaeda, there are no grounds for complacency. There is every reason to believe Zawahiri remains eager to inflict destruction on a nuclear scale. Indeed, despite the large number of al Qaeda leaders who have been killed or captured, nearly all of the key players in al Qaeda’s nuclear program remain alive and at large—including Abdel Aziz al-Masri, an Egyptian explosives expert who was al Qaeda’s “nuclear CEO.” In 2003, when al Qaeda operatives were negotiating to buy three of what they thought were nuclear weapons, senior al Qaeda officials told them to go ahead and make the purchase if a Pakistani expert with equipment confirmed the items were genuine. The US government has never managed to determine who the Pakistani nuclear weapons expert was in whom al Qaeda had such confidence—and what he may have been doing in the intervening decade. More fundamentally, with at least two, and probably three, groups having gone down this path in the past 25 years, there is no reason to expect they will be the last. The danger of nuclear terrorism will remain as long as nuclear weapons, the materials needed to make them, and terrorist groups bent on large-scale destruction co-exist. Potential terrorist capabilities. No one knows what capabilities a secret cell of al Qaeda may have managed to retain or build. Unfortunately, it does not take a Manhattan Project to make a nuclear bomb—indeed, over 90 percent of the Manhattan Project effort was focused on making the nuclear materials, not on designing and building the weapons. Numerous studies by the United States and other governments have concluded that it is plausible that a sophisticated terrorist group could make a crude nuclear bomb if it got enough separated plutonium or HEU.4 A “gun-type” bomb, such as the weapon that obliterated Hiroshima, fundamentally involves slamming two pieces of HEU together at high speed. An “implosion-type” bomb, which is needed to get a sub-stantial explosive yield from plutonium, requires crushing nuclear material to a higher density—a more complex task, but still plausible for terrorists, especially if they got knowledgeable help. Many analysts argue that, since states spend billions of dollars and assign hundreds or thousands of people to building nuclear weapons, it is totally implausible that terrorists could carry out this task. Unfortunately, this argument is wrong, for two reasons. First, as the Manhattan Project statistic suggests, the difficult part of making a nuclear bomb is making the nuclear material. That is what states spend billions seeking to accomplish. Terrorists are highly unlikely to ever be able to make their own bomb material—but if they could get stolen material, that step would be bypassed. Second, it is far easier to make a crude, unsafe, unreliable bomb of uncertain yield, which might be delivered in the back of a truck, than to make the kind of nuclear weapon a state would want in its arsenal—a safe, reliable weapon of known yield that can be delivered by missile or combat aircraft. It is highly unlikely terrorists will ever be able to build that kind of nuclear weapon. Remaining vulnerabilities. While many countries have done a great deal to strengthen nuclear security, serious vulnerabilities remain. Around the world, there are stocks of nuclear weapons or materials whose security systems are not sufficient to protect against the full range of plausible outsider and insider threats they may face. As incidents like the intrusion at Y-12 in the United States in 2012 make clear, many nuclear facilities and transporters still grapple with serious problems of security culture. It is fair to say that every country where nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, major nuclear facilities, or dangerous radiological sources exist has more to do to ensure that these items are sustainably secured and accounted for. At least three lines of evidence confirm that important nuclear security weaknesses continue to exist. First, seizures of stolen HEU and separated plutonium continue to occur, including, mostly recently HEU seizures in 2003, 2006, 2010, and 2011.5 These seizures may result from material stolen long ago, but, at a minimum, they make clear that stocks of HEU and plutonium remain outside of regulatory control. Second, in cases where countries do realistic tests to probe whether security systems can protect against teams of clever adversaries determined to find a weak point, the adversaries sometimes succeed—even when their capabilities are within the set of threats the security system is designed to protect against. This happens with some regularity in the United States (though less often than before the 9/11 attacks); if more countries carried out comparable performance tests, one would likely see similar results. Third, in real non-nuclear thefts and terrorist attacks around the world, adversaries sometimes demonstrate capabilities and tactics well beyond what many nuclear security systems would likely be able to handle (see the discussion of the recent Västberga incident in Sweden). Of course, the initial theft of nuclear material would be only the first step. Adversaries would have to smuggle the material to wherever they wanted to make their bomb, and ultimately to the target. A variety of measures have been put in place in recent years to try to stop nuclear smuggling, from radiation detectors to national teams trained and equipped to deal with nuclear smuggling cases—and more should certainly be done. But once nuclear material has left the facility where it is supposed to be, it could be anywhere, and finding and recovering it poses an enormous challenge. The immense length of national borders, the huge scale of legitimate traffic, the myriad potential pathways across these borders, and the small size and weak radiation signal of the materials needed to make a nuclear bomb make nuclear smuggling extraordinarily difficult to stop. There is also the danger that a state such as North Korea might consciously decide to provide nuclear weapons or the materials needed to make them to terrorists. This possibility cannot be ruled out, but there is strong reason to believe that such conscious state decisions to provide these capabilities are a small part of the overall risk of nuclear terrorism. Dictators determined to maintain their power are highly unlikely to hand over the greatest weapon they have to terrorist groups they cannot control, who might well use it in ways that would provoke retaliation that would remove the dictator from power forever. Although nuclear forensics is by no means perfect, it would be only one of many lines of evidence that could potentially point back to the state that provided the materials; no state could ever be confident they could make such a transfer withoutbeing caught.6 And terrorists are unlikely to have enough money to make a substantial difference in either the odds of regime survival or the wealth of a regime’s elites, even in North Korea, one of the poorest countries on earth. On the other hand, serious risks would arise in North Korea, or other nuclear-armed states, in the event of state collapse—and as North Korea’s stockpile grows, one could imagine a general managing some of that stockpile concluding he could sell a piece of it and provide a golden parachute for himself and his family without getting caught. No one knows the real likelihood of nuclear terrorism. But the consequences of a terrorist nuclear blast would be so catastrophic that even a small chance is enough to justify urgent action to reduce the risk. The heart of a major city could be reduced to a smoldering radioactive ruin, leaving tens to hundreds of thousands of people dead. The perpetrators or others might claim to have more weapons already hidden in other major cities and threaten to set them off if their demands were not met—potentially provoking uncontrolled evacuation of many urban centers. Devastating economic consequences would reverberate worldwide. Kofi Annan, while serving as Secretary-General of the United Nations, warned that the global economic effects of a nuclear terrorist attack in a major city would push “tens of millions of people into dire poverty,” creating a “second death toll throughout the developing world.”7

#### ISIS is actively seeking nuclear weapons and possesses the technical expertise needed to launch a major attack – they just need the material

Rudischhauser 15 [Wolfgang Rudischhauser (currently Director of the WMD Non-proliferation Centre at NATO and has a long background in working on non-proliferation in various diplomatic posts for the German Foreign Ministry,) "Could ISIL go nuclear?" NATO Review Magazine, 2015] AZ

But a further particular risk could become a major threat to Western societies. There is a very real - but not yet fully identified risk - of foreign fighters in ISIL’s ranks using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials as “weapons of terror” against the West. One can easily imagine the number of victims created by panic as well as the economic disruption if the ’Charlie Hebdo’ attacks had centred on “Chatelet les Halles”, the biggest Paris metro station, with an improvised explosive device containing radioactive sources or chemical material instead of using Kalashnikovs. The deadly Tokyo attacks in 1995 using toxic chemical material, (the so called “Sarin attack”), could have killed many more people. Had Aum Shinrikyo used all the Sarin they had actually produced, a large part of Tokyo’s population would have died. Thus the attacks led at the time to a complete rethinking of the threat perception, well before 9/11. Until now, the Tokyo attacks have fortunately remained an exception and most terrorist groups have used “conventional” explosives or weapons, simply because they lacked access to know-how and material. This may soon change. And there is a reason. A new threat scenario A lot has been written recently regarding the rising power of an organisation that calls itself the “Islamic State in the Levant” (ISIL) or “Daesh”. ISIL has attracted at least hundreds if not thousands of foreign fighters from Western countries to join its ranks. What makes ISIL different is exactly that. Hundreds of foreign fighters, some with solid academic and educational backgrounds and intellectual knowledge, have joined the cause and continue to do so every day. Furthermore ISIL’s success is based on an effective media strategy of looking at the utmost possible “news effect” of their attacks. Together with their access to high levels of funding, these three elements bear the real risk of the group turning into practice what up to now has been largely a theoretical possibility: to actually employ weapons of mass destruction or CBRN material in terrorist attacks. We might thus soon enter a stage of CBRN terrorism, never before imaginable. Worrying reports confirm that ISIL has gained (at least temporarily) access to former chemical weapons storage sites in Iraq. They might soon do so in Libya. They allegedly used toxic chemicals in the fighting around Kobane. Even more worrying, there are press reports about nuclear material from Iraqi scientific institutes having been seized by ISIL. This demonstrates that while no full scale plots have been unveiled so far, our governments need to be on alert. Generating improved military and civil prevention and response capabilities should be a high priority and should not fall victim to limited budgets in times of economic crisis. Apart from their ideology, an even more fundamentalist and aggressive version of jihad than Al Qaida’s, four unique features make ISIL different: First, their “possession” (or de facto control) of a huge “territory”, stretching from the Turkish border in Syria to close to Baghdad in Iraq and approaching the Lebanese border. Numerous air strikes by the international “Anti-ISIL coalition”, in which a number of NATO Allies are involved, tried to target ISIL and its strongholds. However, despite coalition and Iraqi Armed Forces successes in forcing ISIL to give up some territory, the group remains able to control and find refuge in large parts of Syria and Iraq, most recently by capturing the city of Ramadi. Second, the reported access to extraordinary levels of funding. ISIL is reputed (much more than Al Qaida ever did) to earn money through “economic” and fundraising activities inside their territories, from supporters abroad and from the collection of ransom money. Most recently, the Ambassador of Iraq to the UN even claimed that ISIL was selling human organs from victims to earn money. They are said to be already involved in human smuggling of migrants from Libya to Europe to create funding. Third, ISIL, in addition to its strong ideological motivation, is building its success on the use of social and other media in a way rarely seen before by other terrorist groups. This helps them gain attention at any cost for their atrocities, such as the decapitation or even the burning alive of hostages. Fourth and most dangerously, the hundreds if not thousands of foreign fighters from the Arab world and Western countries in ISIL’s ranks, some of them with solid knowledge including in chemical, physical and computer sciences, makes ISIL special. A full assessment is still very difficult, as only a limited amount of information on the backgrounds of the fighters is publicly available. Notwithstanding that, it is clear that ISIL attracts growing numbers of young foreigners daily from all levels of society. Clearly reported cases show that ISIL actually has already acquired the knowledge, and in some cases the human expertise, that would allow it to use CBRN materials as “weapons of terror”.

## Modules

### 1AC – Meltdowns

#### Rosatom bad

Ulrich et al 14 [Kendra Ulrich (Senior Global Energy Campaigner, Greenpeace Japan), Jehki Harkonen and Brian Blomme, "Rosatom Risks: Exposing the troubled history of Russia’s state nuclear corporation," Greenpeace International, October 2014] AZ

Rosatom, the state nuclear corporation of Russia, is actively pursuing expansion domestically and abroad, despite the decline of the nuclear industry globally.1 Rosatom is a questionable business partner, plagued by concerns over corruption, the safety and quality control standards of its nuclear reactors, its competence at building and operating nuclear plants, its model for financing projects, and concerns over its ability to complete construction on time and on budget. While Rosatom is the focus of this report, Greenpeace has campaigned extensively against other nuclear companies. For years Greenpeace has identified the risks of reactors from Areva in France, General Electric (GE) in the US, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) in Canada, Toshiba and Hitachi in Japan, various reactors in South Korea, India, Turkey, Europe and elsewhere. In addition, Greenpeace takes on the nuclear policies of countries that put their citizens at risk by developing and promoting dangerous nuclear power. Rosatom optimistically projects significant increases in foreign orders at a time when nuclear power is outpaced and overpriced, and is in competition with modern, safe, clean and affordable renewable energy alternatives, such as solar PV and wind power. Although Rosatom has recently broadened its foreign portfolio by bidding on projects in well-established nuclear states, at the heart of its expansion dream is its new business model of “Build-Own-Operate” (BOO). Under this model, Rosatom offers to attend to all aspects of construction and operation of a nuclear project. Theoretically, this model would allow a nation to become a nuclear state even though it has little to no knowledge and infrastructure in place to support operation and oversight of a nuclear reactor. Close examination of Rosatom’s track record shows the Build-Own-Operate model is not an ideal arrangement for foreign clients. The concerns over Rosatom as a business partner, as well as the risks embodied in its offer, under the model, to take back spent nuclear fuel generated at its reactors in other countries raise serious red flags for any country considering doing nuclear business with Rosatom. In addition, not only does the model increase dependency on Rosatom to operate nuclear reactors, it also increases dependency on imported uranium.2 Rather than achieving energy independence and security, countries would be going in the opposite direction. In 1991, when it was created, the Russian Federation inherited the nuclear programme of the former Soviet Union, which had placed the responsibility for both civil and military programmes within the purview of the same agencies. This inheritance brought with it a culture of secrecy and significant safety concerns. PostSoviet disorder resulted in corruption. Although Rosatom is a fairly new entity, it is the successor agency to both Soviet and post-Soviet state nuclear agencies.

#### super expensive and unsafe

Ulrich et al 14 [Kendra Ulrich (Senior Global Energy Campaigner, Greenpeace Japan), Jehki Harkonen and Brian Blomme, "Rosatom Risks: Exposing the troubled history of Russia’s state nuclear corporation," Greenpeace International, October 2014] AZ

As illustrated in the first part of this report, the Russian government has provided significant federal financial support and legal exemptions for the Russian nuclear programme. However, this Russian government support does not seem to have insulated Rosatom from many of the problems plaguing the global nuclear industry. The high costs associated with the construction of new reactors for Rosatom’s flagship series of reactor designs – the Water-Water Energy Reactor (VVER) – are but one example of the problems Rosatom faces. Rosatom promotes its VVER reactor when bidding on new-build projects in foreign countries.62 In 2005, the Russian Society for Nature Conservation and Greenpeace Russia set up an independent scientific committee to conduct an environmental impact analysis on the new-build project at the Russian Balakovo nuclear power plant.63 For comparison, the committee examined the most recent completed nuclear reactor at the time, the VVER-1000 type Unit 3 of the Kalinin nuclear power plant. The expert committee found that while the completion of the reactor project was estimated to cost 8.2bn roubles in 2001 (around €303m64), the final cost of the project in 2005 was 27.3bn roubles (around €801.86m65), over triple the original estimate in roubles.66 The story of the price increases is not limited to Kalinin. In 2000, the predecessor to Rosatom estimated the cost to build two new VVER-1200 reactors at the Leningrad nuclear power plant 2 in Sosnovyi Bor at 46.9bn roubles (€1.74bn67).68 However, by 2011, Rosatom set a target price of 156bn roubles (€3.73bn69) for this type of project, more than tripling the original price in roubles.70 Part of the reason for the higher-than-expected prices may be the pattern of significant delays in Rosatom’s nuclear reactor construction. According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), a global nuclear industry lobby organisation, the completion dates of many Russian reactors have been pushed back – sometimes significantly. For example, at the end of 2012, the Leningrad 2 nuclear power plant was slated to achieve grid connection in October 2013. However, just before the estimated completion date, the grid connection was unexpectedly pushed back to 2016.71 Similarly, the VVER 1200 Baltic-1 project near Kaliningrad has been subject to international opposition as the Environmental Impact Assessment does not comply with Russian norms and has not been adequately discussed with neighboring countries.72 In May 2013, construction of the Baltic-1 was “reported halted”73, “as the possibility to export its power appears less certain”, due to lower-than-expected demand and a lack of investments in transmission infrastructure.74 Rosatom’s experimental projects suffer from significant delays, like many “new” nuclear-reactorconstruction projects around the world, despite generous state funding for research and development. For example, Rosatom began a project to build a floating nuclear reactor on the Academic Lomonosov barge in 2007 with completion estimated for 2010. By June 2013, completion was pushed to 2019.75 The history of the development of the prototype fast breeder reactor BN-800 is an even more aggravated case of significant delay. Construction began in 1985. Rosatom recently announced the first criticality, after nearly three decades of construction.76 The corporation says it plans to connect the reactor to the grid before the end of 2014.77 As mentioned earlier, Rosatom competed in a tender for the expansion of the Czech Temelín nuclear power plant with Areva and Westinghouse. Between 2010 and 2014, Mr. Václav Bartuška served as the Czech government envoy for this expansion. In his final report to the government of the Czech Republic, dated 6 August 2014, Mr. Bartuška characterised his evaluation of Rosatom: Asking about some things – for instance the price of delay – sometimes just made no sense. Otherwise, the fate of both Russian projects of the third generation are quite similar with the story of the others [Areva and Westinghouse]: the construction was agreed well before the final project was in the world; the supply chain fell apart, so that for special parts unique, time- and finance-consuming solutions have to be found; a lack of mid-level project managers. In Russia on top of that still always the splitting rivalry between Moscow and St. Petersburg. When I was last year for the third time at Leningradskaya II, the shift against the original timetable was four years.78 These significant delays are hardly unique to Rosatom, as most other nuclear suppliers and operators worldwide experience similar problems – which is again one of the reasons nuclear has been losing record percentages of its global supply share,79 and will likely continue to do so in light of rapid and cheaper renewable energy development. In addition to the financial risks and costs associated with extended nuclear construction delays, there are also major unresolved safety issues.

#### rosatom not safe – case studies

With regard to the safety of Russian reactors, it is important to keep in mind that Rosatom is the Russiangovernment entity whose predecessors were responsible for some of the worst accidents in the history of nuclear power generation. The most well known is the Chernobyl nuclear disaster of 1986, the world’s worst nuclear catastrophe. The meltdown and explosion in the RBMK nuclear reactor located in Ukraine released 100 times more radiation than the nuclear bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.80 The power of the explosion, fire and reactor meltdown carried the radioactive plume to high enough altitudes that it deposited radionuclides thousands of kilometres away, sweeping across the whole of Europe and contaminating vast tracts of land. Between 125,000 and 150,000km2 of land in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine were contaminated to levels requiring the evacuation of people or the imposition of serious restrictions, including restrictions on land use and food production. The land area affected is roughly equivalent to the area of Bangladesh, or nearly five times the size of the Netherlands.81 From a long-term perspective, the most significant form of contamination is with caesium-137. Given its half-life of 30 years, it will take several centuries for the radioactive pollution to decay.82 The disaster resulted in the evacuation of more than 350,000 people.83 A lesser known, but major nuclear accident, occurred decades earlier. On 29 September 1957, a large storage tank filled with radioactive waste exploded in the waste-processing facility of Mayak in South Urals, contaminating a large area of between 15,000 to 20,000km2 , 84 leading to the evacuation of 10,000 people from 23 settlements. As of today some 180km2 near the site of the explosion is still officially off limits.85 While there have not been events of the extreme severity of either of these incidents in recent years, Rosatom continues to have problems with safety issues in its new power plants – a red flag for potential clients. Although Rosatom claims to have learned from these accidents, a close examination of its safety and qualitycontrol record raises significant doubts. Those issues could result in reactor safety issues with potentially serious consequences.

Case Study 1

Incidents and safety issues in the Kalinin nuclear power plant Rosatom’s most recent reactor start-up of reactor 4 at the Kalinin nuclear power plant highlights the latest safety issues with domestic new-build reactors. Reactor 4 at the Kalinin plant achieved criticality for the first time on 20 October 2011.86 Between 15 November 2011 and 15 January 2012, the new unit experienced 11 incidents87 – including potentially serious issues such as the emergency shutdown of the reactor due to decreasing pressuriser levels and several instances where the primary circulation pump responsible for transferring water through the reactor failed for different reasons.88 These not only raise safety concerns, but also expose the myth that nuclear reactors– even new-build reactors – are a stable source of energy, since such repeated shutdowns significantly compromise reliability. But the worst of these early incidents occurred at another Kalinin NPP unit on 26 November 2011 when a hydrogen explosion inside the nuclear power plant led to a leak of possibly radioactive gases to the reactor containment building.89 The extent of the damage has not been publicly disclosed. These early safety-related incidents foreshadowed the on-going problems with the new Kalinin Unit 4 reactor opened by then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on 12 December 2011, in the middle of the series of incidents.90 It was granted a commercial operating licence in September 2012.91 According to a Rosatom internal inspection report, the reactor experienced five technical failures in 2013, one of them leading to an automatic shutdown of the reactor, and in March 2013, Kalinin 4 was again closed for an overhaul of nearly two months.92 The internal report cited the lack of qualified staff leading to an overall low quality of maintenance as the primary reason for problems.93

Case Study 2

The construction of the Leningrad 2 nuclear power plant Other new reactors in Russia also have potentially serious issues. In July 2010, the prosecutor’s office of Sosnovyi Bor and the Russian nuclear regulator, Rostechnadzor, found that the Leningrad 2 construction site had serious problems with its working conditions. Among the concerns were incidents of noncompliance with fire safety standards, as well as a lack of proper sewers and running water. Since Rosatom failed to react to these concerns, a court suspended work on site on 29 December 2010 by request from the prosecutor’s office.94 However, soon after the court order was overturned on 11 January 2011, a strong wind caused a 14-metrehigh reinforcement structure to collapse at the Unit 1 construction site that same month. Fortunately, a foreman managed to evacuate the workers before the structure fell on them.95 In June 2011, during a visit of a delegation from Baltic Sea countries, the Director General of the Finnish nuclear regulator STUK, Jukka Laaksonen, affirmed that the construction and design of the reactors were of the highest quality.96 This assessment soon proved to be false. On 17 July 2011, a 600-800-tonne reinforcement cage of the containment building fell on its concrete frame97. By a stroke of luck, the workers were having lunch at the time and the incident did not result in any casualties. The weight of the cage caused the concrete frame to crack and the entire structure had to be replaced – causing major additional costs and a delay of approximately one year for the project.98 Following his grossly flawed review of the safety and quality of the Leningrad 2 construction, Laaksonen left his position at the Finnish regulator STUK, and soon after became the Vice President of the Rosatom international sales unit Rusatom Overseas.

## Relations

### A2 Drawdown Inev

#### Diplomacy outweighs military presence

Kenyon 8/29/2016 [Peter Kenyon (NPR's international correspondent based in Istanbul, Turkey), "In A Time Of Middle East Conflict, What's The Role Of U.S. Diplomacy?" NPR] AZ

For more than a decade, U.S. foreign policy has centered on military action in the Middle East. Often overlooked, but still critical, is U.S. diplomacy. It's a slow and often frustrating art. It can also involve unpopular compromises with allies and rivals. But there's no way around it. Consider Turkey, with a strategic location that makes it important in Syria, Iraq, and the migrant crisis. But the U.S. and Turkey have had a roller-coaster relationship that took a sharp downward turn after an attempted coup last month against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Some Turks, including a cabinet minister, accused the U.S. of being behind the uprising, though they provided no evidence. And America watched with dismay as the Turkish government, which it once hailed as a democratic model, arrested thousands, sacked tens of thousands more from their jobs and squashed dissent. But just last week came signs that Ankara and Washington were getting back on the same page, in both military and diplomatic terms. Turkish tanks rolled across the border into Syria with Turkish special forces and Free Syrian Army rebels to clear Islamic State forces away from the border area. The roar of artillery was sweet music to the ears of U.S. military officials, who have long pushed Turkey to do more against the militants next door. Hours later, Vice President Joe Biden was in Ankara, heaping American praise on Turkey's controversial leader, Erdogan, and declaring undying friendship. "Let me say it again: you have no greater friend than the United States of America," said Biden. "We've seen that borne out each time we stand together, face down threats to our shared security and our common values." But few people think the visit did much more than temporarily patch up a complicated relationship. It's a good example of how Washington relies on its allies in troubled regions to help advance its interests. But allies have agendas of their own that make friction all but inevitable.

#### US keeps military presence in bases around the Middle East, but is declining in diplomatic relations – the aff reverses this which ensures strong US ties

## Prolif

### ! –Nuclear Cascade

#### Nuclear power means prolif

Ramana & Mian 16 [M. V. Ramana (currently with the Nuclear Futures Laboratory and the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, where he has been assessing nuclear power programs around the world. Ramana is the author of The Power of Promise: Examining Nuclear Energy in India (Penguin Books, 2012) and co-editor of Prisoners of the Nuclear Dream (Orient Longman, 2003). He is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM) and the recipient of a Guggenheim Fellowship and a Leo Szilard Award from the American Physical Society) & Zia Mian (with the Program on Science and Global Security at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. He is a founding member and as of 2015 co-chair of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, and co-author with Harold Feiveson, Alexander Glaser, and Frank von Hippel of Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation), "Scrambling to sell a nuclear Middle East," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72:1, 39-43, 2016] AZ

Finally, it seems clear that some of the region’s leaders also think of nuclear power plants as a step towards nuclear weapon capability. It is not unexpected that the upsurge in interest in nuclear power in the Middle East coincides with the international crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. Nowhere is this more the case than in Saudi Arabia, where powerful public figures seem to be interested in acquiring nuclear power plants as a way to counter Iran and Israel, to boost standing in the region, and to bolster public support for a troubled regime. Analysts are debating if Egypt and Turkey have similar ideas. The competition among the leading nuclear vendors and their host-government champions to make a sale regardless of proliferation concerns has undercut efforts to reach agreements on national and regional limits on the critical nuclear fuel cycle technologies of uranium enrichment and plutonium separation. Control of these technologies would enable a state to make nuclear weapons material and undermine efforts to achieve a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone. The surge in nuclear power interest and marketing in the Middle East bodes poorly for the people of the region. While profitable for vendors and empowering for nuclear bureaucrats, the construction of nuclear reactors – closely linked to the creation of nuclear weapons and carrying the risk of catastrophic accidents – seems certain to entrap the people of the Middle East in an unnecessarily costly and more dangerous future, when cheaper and safer energy options are available.

#### Extinction

Krepinevich 13 [Andrew Krepinevich (the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, which he joined following a 21- year career in the U.S. Army. He has served in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense, the National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation, and the Defense Policy Board. He is the author of 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century and The Army and Vietnam. A West Point graduate, he holds an M.P.A. and a Ph.D. from Harvard University), "Critical Mass: Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, 2013] AZ

In a Middle Eastern “n-player” competition, all nuclear powers would be challenged to establish an “assured destruction” capability against all the other regional nuclear powers, another Cold War desideratum, given their relatively modest economies. An “assured destruction” capability in an n-state competition would require that each state have weapons sufficient to survive an initial attack by all potential rivals and still be able to devastate the countries of all attackers. It would also require that the source of the attack be reliably identified. As noted earlier, this may prove difficult given likely limitations on these states’ ability to field advanced early warning systems. For example, would Israel be able to determine with confidence the owner of a ballistic missile launched from a location along the Iranian-Turkish border? The origin of any cruise missile launched from a sea-based platform? Even assuming a state could identify the source (or sources) of an attack, could its command and control systems survive the attack sufficiently intact to execute a retaliatory strike? A decapitation strike could preclude an “assured destruction” retaliatory strike even if sufficient weapons survive to execute one. This, in turn, raises the possibility of a “catalytic” war—one that is initiated between two states by a third party. Given a proliferated Middle East as described above, the chances that a regime would incorrectly attribute the source of an attack cannot be easily dismissed. To the extent cyber weapons can introduce false information into a state’s decision-making process, the risks of catalytic war only increase. Further complicating matters, the early warning requirement following a proliferation cascade could be multidirectional, and at some point perhaps 360 degrees, especially if nuclear rivals begin deploying a portion of their nuclear forces at sea. Early warning requirements would be stressed even further (and the costs of such a system increase correspondingly) if a neighboring state (e.g., Iran in the case of Turkey or Iraq; Turkey in the case of Israel; etc.) were to acquire nuclear weapons. In this case warning times would be even more compressed than in an Israeli-Iranian competition. Owing to its proximity to Iran, Saudi Arabia, for example, could have less than five minutes to react to an Iranian ballistic missile attack no matter how advanced its early warning and command and control systems are. As noted earlier in this assessment, regardless of what assumptions are made regarding a regional nuclear power’s early warning system, given the short ballistic missile flight times it seems likely that preserving command and control of the state’s nuclear forces while under attack will prove challenging. States might be tempted to adopt a launch-on-warning posture, but this requires both early warning and a highly responsive command and control system. Should a state determine that it will not be able to launch-on-warning and instead attempt to “ride-out” a nuclear first strike and retaliate, it would still need its command and control system to function effectively in the wake of the nuclear attack. Absent a highly resilient command and control system, a state’s ability to launch a retaliatory nuclear strike may require nuclear release authority to be diffused to lower-level commanders. But again, absent an effective early warning system it may not be possible to determine the attack source with confidence in a region with multiple nuclear powers.

#### Russian deals cause cascade prolif in the Middle East

Saunders 15 [Paul Saunders (columnist for Al-Monitor's Russia Mideast Pulse. He is the executive director of the Center for the National Interest. He was a State Department senior adviser during the George W. Bush administration), "Russia's nuclear diplomacy," Al-Monitor, 2015] AZ

Moscow has already been an active player in the Middle East’s nuclear energy market, signing civil nuclear cooperation agreements with not only Iran, but also Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Syria and Turkey. Seen from the other direction, Moscow has signed agreements not only with countries that are either close US or European partners (Morocco, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates), too small (Bahrain) or politically unstable and/or financially strained (Iraq, Lebanon, Tunisia, Yemen). Russia of course cannot sign an agreement with Israel since Israel is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Besides Iran’s Bushehr plant — long at the center of the nuclear talks — Russia’s state nuclear firm Rosatom is already building a nuclear power plant in Turkey, at Akkuyu, which will eventually have four reactors. Rosatom is also finalizing negotiations to build a nuclear plant in Jordan, too, though company officials note that some financing issues remain unresolved. The company is also pursuing talks in other nations across the Middle East.

The circumstances in these three cases — Iran, Turkey and Jordan — are interesting in considering Moscow’s nuclear diplomacy. After the Iranian revolution, Tehran could not obtain nuclear technology from the West, leaving relatively few options beyond cooperation with Russia (particularly at the time when that cooperation began in earnest, in the early 1990s). For its part, Turkey appears to be carefully balancing its Russian nuclear plant with plans for a Japanese-French plant at Sinop and, curiously, a US-Chinese project at a site yet to be determined. In Jordan’s case, Amman pursued nuclear cooperation with the United States for many years, but apparently gave up due to US insistence on a so-called gold standard agreement that would prevent the country from developing an indigenous enrichment capability.

Jordan’s case is perhaps the most straightforward. The United States has declared Jordan to be a “major non-NATO ally” for the purposes of US law regarding arms transfers, and it has long been a close and important partner in the Middle East. It was thus natural for Amman to turn first to Washington in pursuing its interest in developing nuclear power. Nevertheless, because Washington applied its nonproliferation goals rather dogmatically, and perhaps failed to take Jordan’s preferences seriously, frustrated Jordanian officials turned to Russia instead. If Washington does not take a broader strategic view of nonproliferation in the future, others could follow the same path — creating more opportunities for Russia’s nuclear diplomacy and ultimately leading to more proliferation rather than less.

Relatively few countries in the Middle East have Turkey’s combination of exploding population and energy consumption, requiring planning for more than one nuclear plant in the near term, an economy that ranks in the world’s top 20 and political and geographical circumstances that allow for and even encourage playing great powers off against one another in the nuclear energy sector. Nevertheless, Turkey’s decision to pursue this approach is a significant one that highlights the attractiveness for many of a “Russian option” as a political signal to the United States and European governments. Committing first to Moscow’s project also likely strengthens Ankara’s hand in dealing with others.

The Iran case demonstrates how US and Western efforts to isolate governments in the Middle East (or anywhere else) cannot succeed fully without Russia’s cooperation (or China’s for that matter) — and can actually encourage governments in that situation to turn toward Moscow. Moving forward, nuclear cooperation will remain an important incentive for Moscow in attracting interest from others with whom Washington and European capitals are unwilling to work. Conversely, Russia’s willingness to pursue nuclear projects in countries the West would prefer not to have them virtually guarantees continued US-Russian and European-Russian tension over nuclear matters.

No other case in the Middle East will exactly match circumstances in Iran, Turkey or Jordan. Nevertheless, as a group they illustrate how and why Moscow is likely only to expand its nuclear diplomacy in the Middle East, regardless of the outcome of the Iran talks. US and Western policymakers would do well to prepare themselves.

### Yes Preemptive Strikes

#### Israel is afraid of a nuclear arms race – defense minister's comments

Sanchez 16 [Raf Sanchez (journalist), Arab states are seeking nuclear weapons to counter Iran, Israel warns," The Telegraph, 2/14/2016] AZ

Israel has picked up signs of the beginning of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East as Arab states seek nuclear weapons to counter Iran, the Israeli defence minister has warned. Moshe Ya'alon said Sunni Arab nations were not reassured by last year's nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers and were making their own preparations for nuclear weapons. "We see signs that countries in the Arab world are preparing to acquire nuclear weapons, that they are not willing to sit quietly with Iran on brink of a nuclear or atomic bomb," Mr Ya'alon said. The defence minister gave no evidence to back up his claims but Israel closely monitors the military activities of its Arab neighbours. Israel and the Sunni Gulf countries do not have diplomatic ties but are known to talk through back channels and are united in their opposition to Iran. Advocates of the nuclear deal, including President Barack Obama, argue that the agreement heads off a Middle East arms race as Iran's nuclear capabilities are rolled back. But Mr Ya'alon said Iran was liable to break the agreement as their economic situation improves with the lifting of international sanctions. "If at a certain stage they feel confident, particularly economically, they are liable to make a break for the bomb." Even if the agreement for Iran to limit its nuclear enrichment holds, Mr Ya'alon said its 15-year expiry date was "just around the corner". He did not specify which Arab nations were making nuclear preparations but Saudi Arabia, the leader of the Sunni states, is considered the most likely candidate. Its vast oil wealth could help fund a nuclear programme while its ties with Pakistan, a nuclear power, could provide technical expertise. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) also has oil money and is already building a civilian nuclear power programme, though there is no evidence it is moving to develop weapons. Mr Ya'alon made the claim after meeting the king of Jordan, one of only two Arab states with which Israel has diplomatic ties. While Israel's government tried vigorously to derail the nuclear deal, the Israeli military has acknowledged that the agreement has at least bought time before a confrontation with Iran. Gadi Eisenkot, the head of the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), said earlier this year that the deal contained "many risks" but also "opportunities" for Israel. Israel, which secretly built its own nuclear weapons in the 1960s, is now playing a somewhat constructive role in helping to monitor the implementation of the deal, according to Western diplomats. Israel has helped provide technical knowledge and intelligence as the world tries to make sure Iran is abiding by the terms of the agreement, they said. Mr Ya'alon said Israel was following the implementation closely "because over many years the Iranians have been deceitful about their nuclear programme".

### A2 Egypt Has Reactors

#### These are research reactors, not full scale power plants

NTI 14 [Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Egypt," July 2014] AZ

Egypt's civil nuclear program is relatively sophisticated compared to most other countries in the Middle East, although it remains at the research and development stages. Egypt operates two small research reactors, and has attempted, so far unsuccessfully, to acquire nuclear power reactors. Due to ongoing political unrest and basic governance challenges in the wake of the 2011 Revolution, it remains to be seen whether the most recent attempts to establish a nuclear power program (starting in 2006 and continuing at least rhetorically under the new government), will reach fruition.

### A2 Circumvention

#### Durable fiat solves circumvention – the aff gets to ensure that the plan is implemented – otherwise the debate becomes a question of would the plan pass versus should the plan pass

#### Costs are too high for countries to lie – if a country cheats and is caught, it would be economically and politically shunned by its neighbors and the international community

### A2 Iran Prolif

#### Deal checks – verification prevents cheating and US cred high

Schake 5/27/2016 [Kori Schake (research fellow), "Reasons For Confidence In The Iran Deal," Hoover Institution] AZ

There are historical precedents to justify current American confidence that the treaty with Iran will prevent it from going nuclear. In fact, Iran itself provides the most important precedents. Three factors have in the past caused Iran to curtail its nuclear weapons programs: high likelihood of exposure, belief the United States would destroy their weapons programs, and fear that military conflict with the United States would result in regime change in Iran. I cede the point that the Obama Administration is not utilizing at least two of these three factors, but all three remain available and should all be employed when the nuclear agreement goes into effect. Utilizing these proven tools—which means reestablishing deterrence of Iran—would provide confidence Iran will not continue its nuclear weapons program.

After the United States invaded Iraq in 2003 with the intent of preventing Iraq continuing to develop and stockpile weapons of mass destruction, according to the 2008 National Intelligence Estimate, Iran stopped work on its nuclear weapons programs in 2003. The Iranian government even wrote President Bush offering to negotiate the type of agreement recently reached. It is the only time the Iranian government made offers of arms limitation, rather than reluctantly agreeing to generous offers made by us. Work on the nuclear weapons programs only recommenced when the invasion of Iraq bogged down and the United States started questioning the value of military force and our ability to successfully impose regime change. That strongly suggests the government of Iran feared a similar fate to Saddam Hussein. Restoring Iranian concern—reestablishing the use of military force and threat of regime change as deterrents—will be important in constraining the choices Iran’s leaders make.

Verification provisions are the difference between a gentlemen’s agreement and an arms control agreement. Without verification, there is no control beyond the honor of the contracting parties. Every arms control agreement that has actually prevented proliferation contained explicit protocols outlining how the obligations of the parties would be verified: counting delivery systems in strategic nuclear agreements, agreed notification timelines in the Conventional Forces in Europe agreements. Verification provisions in the Iran agreement are commendably detailed, and we have the means to collect the information necessary to confidence we will know what Iran is doing and they will face a high risk of exposure. Other American governments have withdrawn from arms limits and treaties when they determined them no longer in our interests: Reagan and the SALT II limits, Bush and the ABM treaty.

### A2 Iran Cheats

#### **Iran can’t, and won’t cheat**

Tharoor 15 (Ishaan Tharoor, “How the nuclear deal can keep Iran from ‘cheating,’ according to a former U.N. inspector”, Washington Post, 7/15/15, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/07/15/how-the-nuclear-deal-can-keep-iran-from-cheating-according-to-a-former-u-n-inspector/>, 7/17/15 AV)

After months of negotiations, world powers announced an accord with Iran Tuesday over Tehran's nuclear program that, according to the deal's most ardent [supporters](http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/30/opinions/iran-nuclear-talks-parsi/) and [detractors](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/israel-blasts-iran-deal-as-dark-day-in-history/2015/07/14/feba23ae-0018-403f-82f3-3cd54e87a23b_story.html?hpid=z2), may either pave the way for a historic rapprochement between the Islamic Republic and the West or enable the Iranian leadership to pursue its destabilizing agendas in the Middle East unchecked. The more likely prospect, as most of the deal's proponents seem to realize, is something in between. **The deal,** [they argue](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/14/its-a-damn-good-deal-iran-nuclear-agreement-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action/)**, is the most practical solution to a vexing geopolitical challenge. It places the nuclear program of a regime few trust** [under strict, verifiable controls](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/07/iran_and_united_states_nuclear_deal_why_this_historical_deal_is_what_we.single.html)**, and averts the likelihood of** [yet another military escalation](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-the-iran-nuclear-deal-matters-13327) **in an already fractious region.** The focus now shifts to the implementation of the agreement, which [faces political obstacles](http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/on-capitol-hill-deep-skepticism-persists-as-lawmakers-react-to-iran-deal/2015/07/14/90190bfe-2a27-11e5-a5ea-cf74396e59ec_story.html?hpid=z1) in Washington and, to a lesser extent, Tehran. Questions remain about how ironclad the provisions of the agreement will be in ensuring Iran does not "cheat," or breach any of the terms of the deal. There will be a lot of political debate about this in the weeks ahead, but on Tuesday, it seemed [a good number](http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-33517892) of Western [nonproliferation advocates](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/07/iran_and_united_states_nuclear_deal_why_this_historical_deal_is_what_we.single.html)and [arms control experts](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/14/its-a-damn-good-deal-iran-nuclear-agreement-joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action/) were [satisfied](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran-expected-to-be-announced/2015/07/14/5f8dddb2-29ea-11e5-a5ea-cf74396e59ec_story.html?hpid=z1) with the Vienna agreement. That included [Thomas Shea](http://cgs.pnnl.gov/fois/bios/bios.stm), a veteran former inspector with the IAEA, the U.N.'s atomic agency, who oversaw the design and implementation of safeguards for the world's evolving nuclear facilities. "This is a stunning accomplishment," said Shea, who is now a Vienna-based consultant, speaking to WorldViews in Washington. "I’ve been a part of this business for 40 years at this point and I’ve never seen anything that begins to approach the comprehensiveness of this agreement." WorldViews earlier detailed [the terms of the deal](https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2015/07/14/the-historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran-how-it-works/), which forces Iran to dramatically reduce its number of centrifuges -- devices used to enrich uranium gas into more fissile material -- as well as its stockpile of enriched uranium, and commit to long-term restrictions on the nature of the work that can be carried out in its nuclear facilities. **But what if Iran doesn't abide by the terms of the agreement? The IAEA, says Shea, has since its inception been "preparing for the role" of monitoring this sort of deal, and will be routinely flying in teams of inspectors to verify Iran's continued adherence to the provisions of a final agreement. The deal clinched in Vienna ensures that the IAEA has round-the-clock access to Iran's nuclear facilities and is allowed to maintain state-of-the-art sensors, cameras and other surveillance equipment on site.** The [expectation](http://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-04-20/inspectors-need-full-access-in-any-iran-nuclear-deal-moniz-says) of some for "anywhere, anytime inspections" on Iran's facilities, Shea says, is something of a misnomer, given that's hardly been common verification practice in the past. **It also appears that the** [Iranians have backed down](http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21657654-nuclear-deal-marks-milestone-irans-relations-world-details-matter-wary-hope?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/IranAgreesToHistoricNuclearDeal) **from an earlier position refusing inspections of the country's sensitive military sites.** The Economist [explains](http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21657654-nuclear-deal-marks-milestone-irans-relations-world-details-matter-wary-hope?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/IranAgreesToHistoricNuclearDeal): Inspectors will not be able to conduct “anywhere, any time” visits. Instead, they will have to give grounds for their concerns about prohibited activities and give the Iranians an opportunity to address them before access is made mandatory by the joint commission. All this must take place within two weeks. **Refusal by Iran to provide inspectors access that persisted for more than another week would be deemed a violation of the agreement and therefore subject to re-imposition of sanctions.** My colleagues Carol Morello and Karen DeYoung [offer more detail](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/historic-nuclear-deal-with-iran-expected-to-be-announced/2015/07/14/5f8dddb2-29ea-11e5-a5ea-cf74396e59ec_story.html): Once it submits a request to Iran to visit an “undeclared” facility, the IAEA and Iran will have 14 days to agree on the terms of access. If IAEA concerns are not met within that period, a joint commission made up of the seven negotiating countries — Iran and the United States and its partners — plus the European Union, will have up to seven days to review the dispute and decide what Iran needs to do. Only five of the eight members need to agree, effectively ensuring that Iran, Russia and China cannot prevail if they vote together. Iran then has three days to implement the decision. If it does not, “then we can begin snap-back” of sanctions, a [U.S.] administration official said. The process may seem cumbersome, and another former IAEA official has [expressed concerns](http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/14/how-much-access-will-the-worlds-nuclear-watchdog-have-in-iran/) over the days it may take to wrangle permission for access. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, one of the deal's most outspoken critics, [told NPR](http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/07/15/423139506/netanyahu-this-deal-gives-iran-a-path-to-a-nuclear-arsenal) on Wednesday that this procedure is "like telling a drug dealer: ‘We’re going to check your meth lab in 24 days.'" But the IAEA, argues Shea, with logistical help from other member states, is well positioned to detect whether Iran is in breach of its commitments or conducting clandestine work on a nuclear weapon. It has learned from its shortcomings in the 1990s, when regimes in North Korea and Iraq [exposed weaknesses](https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/IAEAProtoco) in the U.N. agency's safeguards and protocols. It commands a wide spectrum of tools —from highly-sophisticated commercial satellite technology, to infrared and radar imaging to its own laboratories where tests of environmental samples can be carried out — that can be brought to bear. "There's no comparison between the technologies available now and those 20 years ago," says Shea. Combined with the likely cooperation of foreign intelligence organizations with the IAEA, the scrutiny on Iran would make it difficult for the regime to hide the construction of another subterranean nuclear facility like the Fordow enrichment plant, which is perched beneath a mountain near the holy city of Qom. Moreover, the IAEA will have oversight over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from its uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies. As Shea notes in [a June report](https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_06/Features/The-Verification-Challenge-Iran-and-the-IAEA) posted on the Web site of [the Arms Control Association](https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_06/Features/The-Verification-Challenge-Iran-and-the-IAEA), the U.N. agency will be monitoring Iran's potential "use of black markets or front companies" should Tehran attempt to secretly obtain specialized material for its nuclear program. "The beauty of this agreement is that Iran gets to keep its buildings and we get to take out all the furniture," [writes](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/07/iran_and_united_states_nuclear_deal_why_this_historical_deal_is_what_we.single.html) Joe Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, which pushes for nonproliferation, and a proponent of the nuclear deal with Iran. **He** [sums up](http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/foreigners/2015/07/iran_and_united_states_nuclear_deal_why_this_historical_deal_is_what_we.single.html) **the checks in place: Iran might want to set up a covert enrichment plant, but where would it get the uranium? Or the centrifuges? Or the scientists? If a 100 scientists suddenly don’t show up for work at Natanz, it will be noticed. If the uranium in the gas doesn’t equal the uranium mined, it will be noticed. If the parts made for centrifuges don’t end up in new centrifuges, it will be noticed. Iran might be able to evade one level of monitoring but the chance that it could evade all the overlapping levels will be remote. Shea says the IAEA is a scientific institution and will approach the task in "an impassioned way," focused on whether Iran, as a signatory to a raft of agreements (including** [a new "roadmap" with the IAEA itself](https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/iaea-director-generals-statement-and-road-map-clarification-past-present-outstanding-issues-regarding-irans-nuclear-program)**), has set out to undermine the accord.** But he is personally "hopeful" that the current deal will mark the beginning of a less acrimonious phase in the IAEA's dealings with the Islamic Republic. "Iran, through a painstaking negotiated agreement, has established a very formal understanding with six of the most important countries in the planet," said Shea. "**To expect Iran would violate this from the outset is somewhat hard to imagine.**"

### A2 Reactors Peaceful

#### Middle Eastern reactors will be used to proliferate – guarantees extinction

Weinberg 15 [David Weinberg (Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. He previously served as a Democratic Professional Staff Member at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs), "Doomsday: Stopping a Middle East Nuclear Arms Race," The National Interest, 3/31/2015] AZ

Yet virtually every Sunni power in the region is moving to develop its nuclear power infrastructure, in part due to burgeoning domestic demand for electricity, but also in response to Iran’s nuclear program. Saudi Arabia’s former intelligence chief, Prince Turki al-Faisal, explained this month to the BBC that “whatever comes out of these talks, we will want the same.” He noted that in particular, “if Iran has the ability to enrich uranium to whatever level, it’s not just Saudi Arabia that’s going to ask for that.”

In addition to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates are all embarking on nuclear energy crash programs. Experts believe several of these states have concluded that nuclear energy offers opportunities not just for domestic energy production but also for military purposes, so that they can “pick up some capabilities along the way.” Amman just reached a $10 billion deal with Russia to build Jordan’s first nuclear power plant, and the Russians signed a similar agreement to construct the Egyptians’ first plant when Putin visited Cairo in February. No doubt the Emiratis are regretting signing a 2009 U.S. agreement offering to forego the right to enrich uranium in exchange for American nuclear cooperation ever since Iran has effectively been granted a de facto right to domestic enrichment.

But the country that most feels itself in Iranian crosshairs is Saudi Arabia. The late Saudi King Abdullah once urged America to launch military strikes on Iran’s nuclear program to “cut off the head of the snake” and warned the United States point blank that “if they get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons.” Saudi King Salman is currently walking back his predecessor’s regional campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood in order to press the Brotherhood’s regional supporters—Turkey, Qatar, Sudan, and Hamas—to assist with his more immediate priority of confronting Iranian depredations in the region. The new Saudi-led military campaign against Iranian-backed Houthi insurgents in Yemen, code named Operation Decisive Storm, is the latest expression of the king’s resolve.

### A2 ISIS weak

#### ISIS expanding reach across the Middle East

McFate et al 16 [Jessica Lewis McFate (Director of Tradecraft and Innovation at the Institute for the Study of War. She joined ISW after eight years of service on Active Duty as an intelligence officer in the U.S. Army. Her military career includes 34 months deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan, where she provided intelligence support to tactical, operational, and theater commands. She has twice been awarded the Bronze Star Medal for her impact upon operations. She is the author of The ISIS Defense in Iraq and Syria: Countering an Adaptive Enemy, The Islamic State of Iraq Returns to Diyala, Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, and Al-Qaeda in Iraq Resurgent, Parts I and II. Ms. McFate’s work has appeared in The Wall Street Journal and she has made frequent appearances on both television and radio programs, including CNN, Al-Jazeera America, BBC, NPR, and Wall Street Journal Live. Ms. McFate holds a B.S. in Strategic & International History and International Relations from West Point and an M.A. in Strategic Intelligence from American Military University), "ISIS FORECAST: RAMADAN 2016," Institute for the Study of War, May 2016] AZ

ISIS will implement its global strategy with simultaneous and linked campaigns across multiple geographic rings. ISW has refined its previous assessment of these geographic campaigns to identify the following four rings: core terrain, including Iraq, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel, and the Sinai Peninsula; regional power centers, including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt; the remainder of the Muslim world; and the non-Muslim world. ISIS will pursue different strategic objectives in each ring in order to advance its grand strategic objective to expand its caliphate across all Muslim lands while provoking and winning an apocalyptic war against the West. ISIS has suffered numerous losses within Iraq and Syria that it will likely seek to reverse by setting new conditions during Ramadan. ISIS will attempt to exploit an ongoing political crisis in Iraq by targeting demonstrators or other soft targets in a mass casualty event that prompts the mobilization of Iraqi Shi’a and sparks reprisals against Iraqi Sunnis. ISIS will also launch attacks in Homs City, Tartous, and Latakia Provinces in Syria to exploit the current focus of pro-regime elements upon other major cities such as Aleppo and Damascus. ISIS has already demonstrated this capability in early 2016 and will continue to pursue these courses of action in April - May 2016 leading up to Ramadan. ISIS will also seek to generate new conditions in Iraq and Syria by launching attacks within neighboring countries, including Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. ISIS will likely select targets in neighboring states that relieve pressure from the group in Syria while setting conditions for future expansion in those states. Targets that serve this dual purpose include foreign tourists, state security forces, and U.S. military elements in Turkey and Jordan. ISIS has already accelerated its attacks within Turkey and Lebanon since November 2015. Jordanian Special Operations Forces uncovered an operational ISIS presence in Irbid in March 2016, indicating that ISIS is developing the capability to conduct attacks inside Jordan as well. ISIS is similarly organizing campaigns to weaken regional power centers - including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Egypt – in order to eliminate its rivals for leadership within the Muslim world. ISIS has pursued an indirect campaign against Iran that focuses upon its proxies in Iraq and Syria. Meanwhile, ISIS is escalating its attacks against security forces in Saudi Arabia with targets including the capital of Riyadh, Shi’a populations of Eastern Saudi Arabia, and potentially the holy city of Mecca, based upon recent arrests. These attacks may serve to boost regional recruitment for ISIS while signaling its long-term intent to seize control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. ISIS will also likely take advantage of political discontent against Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi to further drive disorder in mainland Egypt and delegitimize the rival version of Islamism espoused by the Muslim Brotherhood. ISIS will likely also announce new global affiliates elsewhere in the Muslim world during Ramadan, continuing a trend from previous years. The group announced a new governorate, Wilayat Sahel, on the northwestern coast of Syria on May 23, 2016. ISIS is particularly likely to announce new governorates in Bangladesh and Southeast Asia over the next forty-five days, although new governorates in the Sahel and Somalia are also possible. ISIS will likely launch attacks during Ramadan in each of these locations in order to claim a presence in the far corners of the Muslim world, where it is directly competing with al-Qaeda and staging for future attacks against the non-Muslims

#### their ev assumes current coalitions will hold – ethnic tensions guarantee civil war in allied forces

Sly 8/12/ 2016 [Liz Sly (the Post’s Beirut bureau chief, and is currently covering the turmoil in the wider Middle East), "With ISIS on the run, new wars could erupt in Iraq," Washington Post] AZ

The manner in which the war has been fought — by an assortment of locally armed groups, often with competing agendas — has compounded the existing problems with new and potentially more intractable disputes. Among them are the questions of who will govern the areas vacated by the Islamic State, also known as ISIS, and how. “The moment there is what you might call victory against ISIS, then you are up against all the problems that caused this crisis in the first place,” said Yezid Sayigh of the Carnegie Middle East Center . In the process of rolling back the Islamic State, Kurdish peshmerga forces have conquered areas that were under Iraqi government control, expanding the zone ruled by the semiautonomous Kurdistan Regional Government by about 50 percent. Shiite fighters under the umbrella of the Hashd al-Shaabi — which includes powerful militias backed by Iran alongside groups of ordinary volunteers — have pushed far north into areas that were wholly Sunni. Syrian Kurdish forces with the People’s Protection Units have crossed the border from Syria to help out in the fight and have occupied positions adjoining those of Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga, their fierce rivals in an even more complex, intra-Kurdish feud. The Sunni grievances that helped fuel the militants’ rise have not been addressed, which means the cycle of Sunni disenfranchisement, alienation and insurgency could begin again, Sayigh said. It is a complicated and messy battlefield that could easily unleash new conflicts as the victors of the war turn on one another in a scramble to control the territories left behind. Filling a vacuum The ethnically and religiously mixed town of Tuz Khurmatu is one place where the tensions have erupted in armed conflict. Late last year and again in April, at least 12 people died in clashes between Kurdish and Shiite fighters. The town, made up mostly of Turkmen Shiites, has a sizable Kurdish and Sunni Arab population. Since Kurds and Shiite militias drove the Islamic State out of nearby villages nearly two years ago, Tuz Khurmatu has been administered by the Kurds. But Shiite militias maintain offices in the town and control most of the surrounding villages. Front lines crisscross the area, and it is not considered safe to traverse them. In recent months, several suicide bombings blamed on the Islamic State have helped keep tensions high. [Ignoring Turkey, U.S. backs Kurds in drive against ISIS in Syria] But the militants are not considered the most serious threat any longer, said Maj. Mahmoud Fares Mahmoud, who commands the Kurdish post on the outskirts of Tuz Khurmatu that was involved in some of the shootouts with the militias. “To be honest, the biggest threat now is the Hashd al- Shaabi,” he said, referring to the Shiite militias, whose flags are visible about a mile away. “It’s very hard to deal with them. They are savage, barbaric people. They don’t recognize any alliances or treaties, so you can’t trust them. “We regret that we invited them here and made an alliance with them,” he added. The Iraqi government and its allies in the Shiite Hashd al- Shaabi are just as mistrustful of the Kurds, whose president, Masoud Barzani, has publicly stated that the borders of a new Kurdistan are being “redrawn in blood” and that he will not relinquish any territory taken by the peshmerga in the fight against the Islamic State. “This is totally nonsense,” said Kareem Nouri, a spokesman for the Badr Organization, one of the Shiite groups around Tuz Khurmatu. “No one has any intention of allowing anyone to redraw the borders.” The central government hopes to reassert its authority over the areas controlled by Kurds after the Islamic State is defeated, according to government spokesman Saad Hadithi. “Any change brought about by any one person taking advantage of the circumstances is a temporary thing,” he said. “It is against the constitution, and we will not accept it.” [Top Islamic State official suggests the militants are feeling the heat] The battle for Mosul may, however, only make things more complicated. For the first time since the war against the Islamic State was launched two years ago, the entire spectrum of forces ranged against it will be joining together, including Kurdish peshmerga, the Hashd al-Shaabi Shiite militias, a selection of small Sunni tribal forces, a couple of Christian forces and U.S. troops, who have begun deploying southeast of Mosul to serve as advisers to the mission. Although the city of Mosul is mostly Sunni Arab, the surrounding towns and villages in the province of Nineveh are populated by the full range of Iraqi ethnicities, including Sunni and Shiite Turkmen, Kurds, Christians, Arabs, Yazidis and a small group called Shabaks whose religion is similar to that of the Shiites. All have conflicting visions of how the province should be run after it is fully liberated, and there are multiple proposals for ways to divide it into smaller provinces. Iraqis are hoping to avoid future conflicts, said Assad al- Asaadi, the spokesman for the Hashd al-Shaabi movement. “We will have a lot of work to do after Daesh, it is true, and it won’t be easier than fighting Daesh,” he said, using an Arabic name for the Islamic State. “But for the coming problems, war will be our last option, because we are sick of war.” The different factions are barely communicating, raising fears of a dash to assert control over the liberated areas, according to a senior Kurdish official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive subjects. “Nobody is talking to one another,” he said. “All anyone cares about is to be the first one to hoist their flag in the center of the city. It’s going to be a huge mess.” U.S. officials acknowledge the concerns and say they are aware of the potential for conflict after Mosul is recaptured. “The fall of Mosul is not if, but when, and when that happens, we want the planning in place to fill the political vacuum and get the people back into the city,” said Col. Christopher Garver, a U.S. military spokesman. “That planning needs to happen.”

## Terror

### ! – Econ

#### WMD acquisition feasible – best data – kills the economy.

Robichaud 14 [Carl, Specialist in Nuclear Policy at the Carnegie Corporation of New York, 2014, “Preventing nuclear terrorism requires bold action,” http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/201395-preventing-nuclear-terrorism-requires-bold-action/AKG]

Nuclear terrorism is one of the most serious threats of the 21st century. Fortunately, the threat is a preventable one: consolidate and lock down weapons-usable materials and you dramatically reduce the risks. At the Nuclear Security Summit this week, President Obama and more than 50 world leaders will gather in The Hague with an opportunity to take a major step forward in doing just that. But taking the next step in this process will require strong leadership and skillful diplomacy. Though they rarely make the headlines, cases of smuggling, theft or loss of nuclear and radiological materials are alarmingly frequent. Over the past few years we’ve seen incidents from Moldova to India, South Africa to Japan. Just a few months ago in Mexico, carjackers unwittingly heisted radiological materials that, in the wrong hands, could have done significant harm. In fact, more than one hundred thefts and other incidents are reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) each year. In many of these instances we still do not know where the material came from, who stole it, or where it was headed. Nuclear technology is widespread, used not only in power production but in medicine, mining, and other industries. As a result, dozens of countries possess radiological materials that could be used in a “dirty bomb.” Beyond that, over 25 countries have highly-enriched uranium or plutonium—enough to build more than 20,000 new weapons like the one that destroyed Hiroshima and almost 80,000 like the one that destroyed Nagasaki. In the wrong hands, it wouldn’t take much plutonium or highly enriched uranium to fashion a nuclear device. You could fit a bombs-worth of this material into a lunch box. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups around the globe have expressed intent to acquire weapons-usable materials. If they succeed there is little doubt they would use such a device. Thus the spread of these materials is a grave threat—not only to the United States but to any country that relies upon the global economy, which would be severely disrupted if an attack ever succeeded. Robert Gates, former U.S. Secretary of Defense, noted that, “Every senior leader, when you’re asked what keeps you awake at night, it’s the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.”

**And, economic collapse causes competition for resources and instability that triggers hotspots around the globe – co-opts all other causes of war**

**Harris and Burrows 9** [Mathew, PhD European History @ Cambridge, counselor in the National Intelligence Council (NIC) and Jennifer is a member of the NIC’s Long Range Analysis Unit “Revisiting the Future: Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis” <http://www.ciaonet.org/journals/twq/v32i2/f_0016178_13952.pdf> Increased Potential for Global Conflict]

Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample Revisiting the Future opportunity for unintended consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, **history may be more instructive than ever.** While we continue to believe that **the Great Depression** is not likely to be repeated, the **lessons** to be drawn from that period **include the harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions** (think League of Nations in the same period). **There is no reason to think that this would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century.** For that reason, the ways in which **the potential for greater conflict could grow** would seem to be even more apt **in a constantly volatile economic environment** as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource issues move up on the international agenda. **Terrorism’s appeal will decline if economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced.** For those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and scientific knowledge will place some of the world’s most dangerous capabilities within their reach. **Terrorist groups** in 2025 **will** likely be a combination of descendants of long established groups\_inheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures necessary to conduct sophisticated attacks\_and newly emergent collections of the angry and disenfranchised **that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would** almost certainly **be the Middle East**. Although Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons is not inevitable, **worries** about a nuclear-armed **Iran could lead states in the region to develop new security arrangements with external powers, acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear ambitions.** It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran. Episodes of low intensity **conflict and terrorism** taking place **under a nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader conflict** if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. **The close proximity of potential nuclear rivals** **combined with underdeveloped surveillance** capabilities **and** mobile **dual-capable** Iranian **missile systems** also **will produce inherent difficulties** in achieving reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth in neighboring states like Israel, **short warning and missile flight times, and uncertainty** of Iranian intentions **may place more focus on preemption** rather than defense, potentially **leading to escalating crises.** 36 Types of **conflict** that the world continues to experience, such as **over resources, could reemerge,** particularly if **protectionism grows and there is a resort to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions** of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this **could result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy resources,** for example, to be **essential for** maintaining domestic stability and the **survival of their regime**. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue water naval capabilities. **If the fiscal stimulus focus for these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may be military. Buildup of regional** naval **capabilities could lead to increased tensions, rivalries, and counterbalancing moves**, but it also will create opportunities for multinational cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. **With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.**

### ! – Nuclear Tsunami

#### Causes a massive nuclear war

Boyle 15 [Darren Boyle, German Journalist. DailyMail.co. Isis planning 'nuclear holocaust' to wipe hundreds of millions from face of the earth', claims reporter who embedded with the extremists”. September 29, 2015.] MSG

Islamic terrorists Isis want to wipe the west off the face of the earth with a nuclear holocaust according to a journalist who spent ten days with the group while researching a book. ¶ The terror group allowed Jürgen Todenhöfer to embed with the group because he has been a high-profile critic of US policy in the Middle East. ¶ The German journalist claimed the terror group wants to launch a 'nuclear tsunami' against the west and anyone else that opposes their plans for an Islamic caliphate.¶ The 75-year-old former German MP wrote up his findings in a new book 'Inside IS - Ten Days In The Islamic State'.¶ He said that upon his arrival in ISIS controlled territory, that he and his son were forced to hand over their mobile phones to their hosts. ¶ He said he spent several months talking to the terror organisation over Skype before he was allowed to travel into their area. ¶ He told Allan Hall in The Express: 'Of course I'd seen the terrible, brutal beheading videos and it was of course after seeing this in the last few months that caused me the greatest concern in my negotiations to ensure how I can avoid this. Anyway, I made my will before I left.¶ 'People there live in shellholes, in barracks, in bombed-out houses. I slept on the floor, if I was lucky on a plastic mattress. I had a suitcase and a backpack, a sleeping bag.' ¶ Mr Todenhöfer said Isis uses its beheading videos to instill terror into the civilian population in order to make it easier for them to take an area under control.'¶ Mr Todenhöfer warned that ISIS was the most dangerous terror organization he ever witnessed. ¶ 'I don't see anyone who has a real chance to stop them. Only Arabs can stop IS. I came back very pessimistic.' ¶ RELATED ARTICLES¶ Previous¶ 1¶ Next¶ Elderly woman seriously injured after BLACK BEAR breaks into...¶ Corbyn's copy and paste politics: Labour leader's first big...¶ SHARE THIS ARTICLE¶ Share¶ He warned that the terror organisation is far more 'dangerous and organised' than people in the West realises. ¶ He said the West has 'no concept of the threat it faces' from the Islamic State and has underestimated the risk posed by ISIS 'dramatically'.¶ The German reporter spent most of his time in Mosul in northern Iraq, but he also traveled to the ISIS-controlled territories of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor in Syria. ¶ He added: 'They are extremely brutal. Not just head-cutting. I'm talking about the strategy of religious cleansing. That's their official philosophy. They are talking about 500 million people who have to die.'¶ Scroll down for video ¶ Mr Todenhöfer said Isis, pictured, were the most 'brutal and dangerous' enemy he has ever seen ¶ +3¶ Mr Todenhöfer said Isis, pictured, were the most 'brutal and dangerous' enemy he has ever seen ¶ He claimed the terror group would try and wipe out hundreds of millions of people if they had the chance¶ +3¶ He claimed the terror group would try and wipe out hundreds of millions of people if they had the chance¶ Hollande confirms jet fighters destroyed ISIS training camp¶ He went on to say that ISIS are 'completely sure they will win this fight'.¶ In a stark warning issued in a detailed post on Facebook, the journalist wrote in German: 'The West underestimated the risk posed by IS dramatically.¶ 'The ISIS fighters are much smarter and more dangerous than our leaders believe. In the Islamic State, there is an almost palpable enthusiasm and confidence of victory, which I have not seen in many war zones.'¶ Mr Todenhöfer went on to say that ISIS have plans for mass genocide, with the aim or eradicating all atheists and religions that are not 'people of the book' or who do not subscribe to their particular brand of Islam.¶ 'The IS want to kill... all non-believers and apostates and enslave their women and children. All Shiites, Yazidi, Hindus, atheists and polytheists should be killed,' he wrote.¶ 'Hundreds of millions of people are to be eliminated in the course of this religious 'cleansing'.¶ 'All moderate Muslims who promote democracy, should be killed. Because, from the IS perspective, they promote human laws over the laws of God.¶ 'This also applies to - after a successful conquest - the democratically-minded Muslims in the Western world.'¶ The reporter describes the Islamic State is currently operating as a functioning totalitarian state - one which, he claims, many Sunni residents in Mosul are unopposed to since it is preferable to the oppression they suffered under the previous regime.¶ He told German television that ISIS wants to 'conquer the world'.¶ 'This is the largest religious cleansing strategy that has ever been planned in human history,' the journalist added. ¶ ISIS executes ten men in blue jumpsuits as suspected spies¶ Read more:¶ ISIS plan Islamic nuclear holocaust to wipe hundreds of millions from face of earth | World | News | Daily Express

### Yes Motive

#### ISIS wants nukes

Cirincione 15 [Joe Cirincione (President, Ploughshares Fund; Author, ‘Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It Is Too Late), "The Risk of a Nuclear ISIS Grows," Huffington Post, 10/08/2015] AZ

ISIS has already shown its willingness to use chemical weapons against civilian targets, so there should be no question that if given the means and opportunity, they would do the same with nuclear or radiological weapons. As I have written before: The risks of ISIS getting a nuclear bomb are small. But they are not zero... it is impossible now for ISIS to build a nuclear bomb from scratch. Doing so would require large, industrial facilities to enrich uranium, billions of dollars and gigawatts of energy. But if they could get the highly-enriched uranium — about 100 pounds would do, about the size of a soccer ball — it is possible that they could assemble the equipment and small technical team to build the bomb. What is far more likely, though, is that ISIS could get its hands on enough radioactive material to produce a dirty bomb. Some of the government stings reported by the AP involved uranium, which the suppliers said could be used for a dirty bomb. While uranium and plutonium are needed for the core of a nuclear weapon, they are not ideal for a dirty bomb. You want something much more radioactive, like cesium or americium. A few grams of these powders could contaminate tens of square blocks, making them uninhabitable for months, until they were scrubbed clean. Unfortunately, cesium was exactly what smugglers were attempting to sell to ISIS agents in February. What is a dirty bomb though? Unlike a nuclear weapon, this is not a nuclear explosion but a conventional explosive, like dynamite, laced with small quantities of highly radioactive material. Few, if any people, would die in a dirty bomb attack. It’s a long-term threat. A true terror weapon that would panic a city with the fear that exposure would cause cancer, birth defects or heavy metal poisoning over the years. Think of it as if somebody sprayed asbestos in your apartment building. No one would die and you could go in and out of it, but nobody would for fear of exposing themselves to cancer-causing agents. It is likely just a matter of time before ISIS — or some other terrorist group — gets some radioactive material. We have been lax in clearing out abandoned radioactive material production sites and increasing the security of remaining ones. Between 1993 and 2013 the IAEA reported that there were almost 2500 confirmed incidents of radiological smuggling worldwide. 664 incidents involved the theft or loss of nuclear or radiological materials. 16 involved highly enriched uranium or plutonium. And these are just the ones that we know about. Ironically, and tragically, the more military success we have against ISIS, the greater the demand may be for theses weapons. ISIS is the first terrorist group that behaves like a state. It has territory to defend, a future to protect. They may want a nuclear bomb for the same reason states do: defense. If our military actions truly threaten them, they will threaten to go nuclear, hoping to deter our attacks. Short of a nuclear explosive bomb, a dirty bomb threat may serve the same function.

## DAs

### U – Renewables Up

#### Renewables growing in MidEast

Majzoub 15 [Hani Majzoub, "Solar Surges in the Middle East and North Africa," Renewable Energy World, 9/18/2015] AZ

Over the last decade the MENA region has really started to harness the abundant natural energy resource which it possesses – the sun. The popularity of solar energy across MENA is largely driven from the UAE. Dubai has awarded a 200 MW Solar PV power plant, introduced solar powered ‘palm trees’ as well as the Dubai Rooftop Solar program, and has increased its target threefold, upping solar’s target contribution to the energy mix from 5 percent to 15 percent, which means it will have 3,000 MW of solar power by 2030.

Meanwhile, last year Jordan awarded 12 solar projects, the most in any country in the region in 2014. Although it traditionally relies on fossil fuel imports to meet around 95 percent of its energy demand, the recent social unrest in the region has highlighted the risks with being over-reliant on a single energy source. To address this, last year, Jordan’s energy minister announced that several renewable energy projects with a total capacity of 1,800 MW will be connected to its national power grid by the end of 2018.

Morocco has the most ambitious clean energy target in the MENA region and is on track to have 42 percent of its installed energy capacity dedicated to renewable sources by 2020. Of that, 2,000 MW will come from solar. Furthermore, the Moroccan Institute for Research on Solar Energy and New Energy (IRESEN) last year financed six R&D solar thermal and CSP projects to drive technological advancements in the country. Last but by no means least, Egypt has also set its sights on solar, with a target of 2.3 GW of solar by 2017.

The Solar Opportunities and Challenges in MENA

This continued drive towards solar, following the reduction in the cost of solar systems, has resulted in it being competitive with the wholesale price of electricity in many regions. The Dubai Electricity & Water Authority (DEWA) recently secured a 25-year electricity tariff of roughly $0.06 per kilowatt hour for a 200MW solar PV power plant. This ground-breaking cost reduction has led solar to become one of the most competitive energy sources in the region and the IEA estimates that solar will become the cheapest form of electricity between 2025 and 2030. The implementation of solar projects throughout the region is also helping to reduce carbon emissions, which, have grown so rapidly in the last decade that the average person in MENA is set to emit more emissions than the average person globally by the end of this year.

### A2 Shift DA

#### Non-unique – nuclear power is declining in all areas of the world except for the Middle East – that's Vick

#### Non-unique – the Middle East doesn't have nuclear power yet, so emissions from current industry should've trigger the DA

#### Investment in renewable tech rapidly growing

Graves 9/14/2016 [LeAnne Graves (energy reporter), "Middle East is ‘Promised Land’ for renewable energy investment," The National] AZ

The Middle East tripled renewable energy investment last year despite fewer energy dollars being spent globally, with industry insiders characterising the region as a hot spot for green investment. The International Energy Agency (IEA) released a report on Wednesday that showed energy investment globally reached US$1.8 trillion last year, down 8 per cent from $2tn in 2014. Investments in renewables made up about 17 per cent of that figure, the highest source of power investment. But as less money is funnelled into the energy sector overall, Mena as a whole has markedly gained speed in renewables over the past 12 to 18 months, according to David Charlier, a partner based in Dubai at law firm Ashurst. The firm, which was awarded an advisory position on Dubai’s newest solar project, said that the growth in the region’s renewable energy sector has resulted in more inquiries from clients spanning from governments to developers and financiers. "The proportion of our utilities sector work which relates to renewable energy has grown from around 20 per cent five years ago to well over 50 per cent now," said Mr Charlier. This can be seen in the movements made by the UAE in both Abu Dhabi and Dubai, but also with other GCC countries such as Kuwait procuring the Kabd waste to energy project and Saudi Arabia’s recent renewable energy commitments. Mr Charlier pointed to Jordan and Morocco actively expanding both wind and solar plans, and while Egypt is facing currency issues, some projects are still moving ahead. For ata renewables of Spain, the region has taken on a whole new meaning. Belen Gallego, head of business development at ata, said that the company – which currently has 17 gigawatts of projects under its belt – had been watching this region for a while. "Much has been said over the years and a lot of promises made, but it seemed like one of those markets that took a long time to solidify," she said. "It seems that now in the past couple of years things are getting built," characterising the region as a hot spot for green investment. Ata is waiting for a couple of projects to materialise and once that happens, it will make moves to open an office in the UAE. Ms Gallego said that this could happen as soon as the start of next year. The IEA said that outside Asia, non-OECD countries in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East accounted for only 8 per cent of renewable energy investment last year. However, it is important to note that these areas have some of the world’s lowest global power purchase prices, which means less money is needed for investment. In June, Dubai beat world records again with the lowest prices of solar energy at 2.99 US cents per kilowatt hour (kWh) – cheaper than the International Renewable Energy Agency’s calculation of power generation via natural gas at 5 cents. Chile came in over a month later, announcing solar power at 2.91 cents per kWh.

#### Not cost competitive and renewables better

Lovins 15 [Amory B. Lovins, cofounder and chief scientist, Rocky Mountain Institute “The experts on nuclear power and climate change” The Bulletin, Dec 8 2015] AT

As this climate perversity becomes evident, nuclear advocates fall back on two mystical claims: that “baseload” (by which they mean big thermal) power stations are needed to keep the lights on despite the variability of photovoltaic and wind power, and that renewables can’t grow much without cheap bulk storage of electricity. These linked claims lack foundation. More than 15 sophisticated stud­ies—in the United States for centralized renewables or half-distributed renewables, and in Europe and China—show that largely or wholly renewable electricity can sustain reliability and improve resilience at reasonable cost with little or no bulk storage. Eighty-percent-renewable US electricity by 2050 costs the same as business-as-usual, even at renewable costs far above today’s. Or if you don’t believe the models, consider the data. Four EU countries not rich in hydropower got half their 2014 electricity use from renewables (Spain 46 percent, Scotland 50 percent, Denmark 59 percent, and Portugal 64 percent) without increasing bulk storage or reducing reliability. Italy achieved 33 percent, as Germany is expected to do in 2015 (when the former East German utility 50Hertz is already about 46 percent variable-renewable). These countries’ grids work as a conductor leads a symphony orchestra: No instrument plays all the time, but the ensemble continuously produces beautiful music. Empirical evidence also disproves claims that nuclear power deploys faster than renewables. From 1997, the year of the Kyōto Protocol, through 2014, world nuclear output rose 147 terawatt-hours per year, photovoltaics 185, and wind power 694. In 2013 alone, China added more photovoltaic capacity than the US had added since developing photovoltaics 59 years earlier. For the past three years, China has produced more wind power than nuclear power, as has India for the past two. In 2014, China was building nearly two-fifths of the world’s new reactors, yet invested nine times more in renewables. Every energy technology has issues. Ground-mounted photovoltaics and nuclear power both use about the same amount of land—far more than wind power, which if run or sited poorly can kill modest numbers of birds and bats. Some people consider turbines or solar panels ugly; some dislike nuclear power’s wastes, risks, and proliferation. Renewables are popular; nuclear power isn’t. Renewables thrive on democracy and free markets, which both shrivel nuclear power. But what­ever your preferences, nuclear power fell hard at the first hurdle—cost—and can’t get up again. The latest elixir proposed to revive it—small modular reactors—can’t, even if reactor designs rejected decades ago had the magical properties claimed for them. Today’s reactors are big precisely because reactors don’t scale down well. That’s why initial small modular reactors are expected to cost about twice as much per kilowatt. But their proposed mass production, hoped to offset that handicap, must also overcome big reactors’ at least threefold higher electricity price today than small modular renewables, which meanwhile will about double that gap. Do the math. Mass production would need to make small modular reactors roughly twelvefold cheaper. That’s too big for even a thousandfold production scaleup to overcome, even if small modular reactors achieved the learning curve that big reactors have never demonstrated. Other challenges aside, nuclear power of any kind is so many decades behind in cost and scaling that it can never catch up. Climate imperatives only reinforce the need to invest judi­ciously, not indiscriminately. It’s time to stop diverting more taxpayer billions to the well-intentioned but commercially failed nuclear dream (the decoded meaning of “keeping nuclear power on the table”), and to do what works, makes sense, and makes money. Just follow the first rule of holes: When you’re in one, stop digging.

#### Nuclear power worsens warming

Mez 16 [Lutz Mez, Berlin Centre for Caspian Region Studies, Freie Universität Berlin. “The experts on nuclear power and climate change” The Bulletin, Feb 18 2016] AT

The electrical power production sector accounts for about 28 percent of global anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions and constitutes by far the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions. That is why supposedly carbon dioxide-free nuclear power plants have frequently been praised as a panacea for addressing climate change. However, in 2013 nuclear electricity contributed just 10.6 percent of global electricity generation, and because electricity represents only 18 percent of total global final energy consumption, the nuclear share is just 1.7 percent of global final energy consumption. Even if generation in nuclear power plants could be increased significantly, nuclear power will remain a marginal energy source. Therefore, the turnaround in energy systems has to prioritize energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy technologies and cogeneration plants, which do not cause any more carbon dioxide emissions than nuclear power plants. From a systemic perspective, nuclear power plants are by no means free of carbon dioxide emissions. Today, they produce up to one third of the greenhouse gases that large modern gas power plants produce. Carbon dioxide emissions connected to production of nuclear energy amounts to (depending on where the uranium used in a reactor is mined and enriched) between 7 and 126 grams of carbon dioxide equivalent per kilowatt hour, according to an analysis by International Institute for Sustainability Analysis and Strategy co-founder Uwe Fritsche. For a typical nuclear power plant in Germany, the specific emission estimate of 28 grams has been calculated. An initial estimate of global carbon dioxide emissions through the generation of nuclear electricity in 2014 registered at about 110,000,000 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent—or roughly as much as the carbon dioxide emissions of a country like the Czech Republic. And this data does not even include the emissions caused by storage of nuclear waste. In the coming decades, indirect carbon dioxide emissions from nuclear power plants will increase considerably, because high-grade resources of uranium are exhausted and much more fossil energy will have to be used to mine uranium. In view of this trend, nuclear power plants will no longer have an emissions advantage over modern gas-fired power plants, let alone in comparison to the advantages offered by increased energy efficiency or greater use of renewable energies. Nuclear power plants may also contribute to climate change by emitting radioactive isotopes such as tritium or carbon 14 and the radioactive noble gas krypton 85. Krypton 85 is produced in nuclear power plants and released on a massive scale in the reprocessing of spent fuel. The concentration of krypton 85 in Earth's atmosphere has soared over the last few years as a result of nuclear fission, reaching a new record. Krypton 85 increases the natural, radiation-induced ionization of the air. Thus the electrical balance of the Earth's atmosphere changes, which poses a significant threat to weather patterns and climate. Even though krypton 85 is “one of the most toxic agents for climate,” according to German physicist and political figure Klaus Buchner, these emissions have not received any attention in international climate-protection negotiations down to the present. As for the assertion that nuclear power is needed to promote climate protection, exactly the opposite would appear to be the case: Nuclear power plants must be closed down quickly to exert pressure on operators and the power plant industry to redouble efforts at innovation in the development of sustainable and socially compatible energy technologies and especially the use of smart energy services.

#### No uniqueness for their impact – their card says warming is occurring now – proves that nuclear power can't solve emissions

### A2 Desal DA

#### Desalination is too expensive and kills more than it saves

Fried 09

Kate Fried, Food and Water Watch, Ocean Desalination No Solution to Water Shortages, 02/04/2009

Washington, DC–Food & Water Watch today released a new report that reveals that ocean desalination, an emerging technology often promoted by private corporations as a solution to drought and water shortages, creates a myriad of environmental and social problems. Desalination: An Ocean of Problemsfinds that desalination–the process of removing salt from seawater to make it drinkable, carries a high price tag, releases unregulated chemicals into drinking water supplies, uses large amounts of energy, pollutes waterways, and threatens fisheries and marine environments, among other drawbacks. “Private companies are marketing desalination as a long-term solution to water shortages. In reality, they are taking advantage of communities where impending water crises are leading water managers to believe they must adopt extreme measures,” said Wenonah Hauter, executive director, Food & Water Watch. “Desalination is a risky water supply option that actually creates more problems than it solves.” Desalination: An Ocean of Problems reports the following findings: Desalination is expensive. Although the price tag varies by region and is often obscured by corporate underestimates and government subsidies, it is more often two to four times as costly as traditional options. Desalination is bad for the environment and human health. The by-products of desalination include coagulalants, bisulfates, and chlorines. When concentrated waste is dumped into the ocean as it is with desalination, it is harmful to marine life and environments. Furthermore, power plants’ intake mechanisms, which are often teamed with desalination plants, kill at least 3.4 billion fish and other marine organisms annually. In addition to upsetting marine environments, desalination causes fishermen to lose at least 165 million pounds of fish a year today and 717.1 million pounds of potential future catch. Desalted water also puts drinking water supplies at risk because seawater contains chemicals such as boron, that freshwater does not. Boron, only 50 to 70 percent of which is removed through the desalination process, has been found to cause reproductive problems and developmental problems in animals and irritation of the human digestive track. Current drinking water regulations do not protect the public from boron. Desalination contributes to global warming and requires large amounts of energy. Removing salt from large volumes of water takes nine times as much energy as surface water treatment and 14 times as much energy as groundwater protection. Emissions created by desalination plants contribute to climate change, a leading factor of the droughts and water shortages the process is intended to mitigate. Desalination turns water into a commodity. Private corporations are investing in desalination because it is a leading growth area in the global water market. As water becomes a scarcer commodity, global corporations are setting themselves up to sell water for a profit. Furthermore, private control of water makes in much harder to ensure public safety. “Policy makers can better provide the public with safe, affordable water by implementing conservation measures to protect water supplies. It is up to the government to ensure the integrity of this vital natural resource. It should not be left to private corporations more concerned with revenue than service delivery,” said Hauter.

#### Solar power desalinization is more cost effective, better for the most drought affected, and is currently on the rise – prefer our ev, it’s from an international energy analytics organizations. ETSAP 12

The Energy Technology Systems Analysis Programme (ETSAP) is an Implementing Agreement of the International Energy Agency (IEA), fi rst established in 1976. It functions as a consortium of member country teams and invited teams that actively cooperate to establish, maintain, and expand a consistent multi-country energy/economy/environment/engineering (4E) analytical capability, Water Desalination Using Renewable Energy, March 2012

Desalination based on Renewable Energy – Desalination based on the use of renewable energy sources can provide a sustainable way to produce fresh water. It is expected to become economically attractive as the costs of renewable technologies continue to decline and the prices of fossil fuels continue to increase. Using locally available renewable energy resources for desalination is likely to be a cost-eff ective solution particularly in remote regions, with low population density and poor infrastructure for fresh water and electricity transmission and distribution. The present deployment of renewable-based desalination – i.e. less than 1% of desalination capacity based on conventional fossil fuels (EU, 2008) – does not refl ect the advantages of this technology option. Renewable desalination is mostly based on the RO process (62%), followed by thermal processes such as MSF and MED. The dominant energy source is solar photovoltaics (PV), which is used in some 43% of the existing applications, followed by solar thermal and wind energy (EU, 2008). The right combination of a renewable energy source with a desalination technology can be the key to match both power and water demand economically, effi ciently and in an environmentally friendly way. Assessing the technical feasibility and cost eff ectiveness of renewable desalination plants requires a detailed analysis, including a variety of factors, such as location, quality (salinity) of feed-water input and fresh-water output, the available renewable energy source, plant capacity and size, and the availability of grid electricity. Operation and maintenance requirements, feed-water transportation and pre-treatment needs are also part of the decision-making process. Some technology solutions are better suited to large size plants, while others are better for small-scale applications (EU, 2008). Most common renewable options are shown in Table 2. Renewable desalination is growing especially in arid regions with huge solar energy potentials such as the MENA region. Many of the existing renewable desalination systems are implemented in small capacities from a few m3 up to 100 m3 /d. Only a few medium-size applications exist in the MENA region. The world’s largest solar PV desalination plant using novel nano-membrane technology is under construction in the city of Al Khafji, in Saudi Arabia. It is part of the project launched by KACST (King Adbulaziz City for Science and Technology) in cooperation with IBM. It will be implemented in three stages over nine years. In the fi rst phase, a desalination plant with a production capacity of 30,000 m3 /d will meet the needs of some 100,000 people. According to Arab News, Saudi Arabia uses1.5 million barrels of oil per day at its desalination plants, which provide between 50% and 70% of the country’s drinking water (Oxford Business Group, 2010). Other desalination plants powered by renewable energy can be seen in Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Turkey, Abu Dhabi and the Canary Islands.

#### Saudi Arabia proves and takes out intermittency

Harrisson 15: (October 2015, Kent Harisson - <http://www.aiche.org/chenected/2015/10/saudi-arabia-creates-new-solar-powered-desalination-technology>, AIChE – newpaper for chemical engineers, accessed 9/10/16)IG

After rejiggering cultural habits left over from the days of cheap oil, the Kingdom, which already produces 24 million cubic meters of water every day from desalination — half the world’s total — has started to reign in oil-burn by building the world's largest solar-powered seawater desalination plant. Advanced Water Technology (AWT), the commercial arm of the King Abdulaziz City of Science and Technology, has contracted with Abengoa, the Spanish renewable energy group, to incorporate a solar plant into the $130 million facility they're building, which will produce 60,000 cubic meters of water a day for city of Al-Khafji on the the Persian Gulf (see the press release). The solar-powered plant has been designed to reduce power consumption and a has pre-treatment phase that will reduce the high level of salinity and the oil and fats that are present in the region’s sea water. Abengoa expects solar to provide all the plant’s energy needs during peak output, which in Saudi Arabia will be for much of the daylight hours. If the project hits its productions goals, the plant will be commissioned in 2017.

#### No water wars---zero empirical support

David Katz 11, Director of the Akirov Institute for Business and Environment at Tel Aviv University and Adjunct Lecturer at Tel Aviv University’s Recanati School of Management and Porter School of Environmental Studies, February 2011, “Hydro-Political Hyperbole: Examining Incentives for Overemphasizing the Risks of Water Wars,” Global Environmental Politics, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 12-33

Reference to linkages between natural resource scarcity and the potential for violent conflict is now commonplace. Perhaps the most highlighted and most studied such linkage is that between freshwater scarcity and conflict. Predictions of looming water wars—such as former Egyptian Foreign Minister and later United Nations Secretary-General Boutrous Boutrous Ghali’s statement that “The next war in the Middle East will be fought over water, not politics,” or former World Bank Vice President Ismail Serageldin’s declaration that “the wars of the next century will be over water”1—have been cited extensively by a variety of sources over the past three decades. More recently, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stressed reports that water scarcity has created “a high risk of violent conflict.”2 Those who make claims regarding the possibility of future water wars range from people who present such a scenario as a possibility that can be avoided with cooperation and proper planning,3 to those who predict that such wars are likely,4 to those who confidently assert that such outcomes are “certain”5 and only a matter of time.6

While the claim that increasing water scarcity will lead to increased outbreaks of wars—often dubbed the “water war hypothesis”—is widespread in public discourse, a growing body of literature has challenged both the empirical [End Page 12] and theoretical foundations of such a hypothesis.7 Critics note, for instance, that proponents of the water war hypothesis often rely on a very limited number of case studies or statements from a handful of prominent figures,8 that relatively little systematic empirical evidence exists of past wars over water, and that there is scant evidence that violent conflict over water is becoming more frequent.9

Despite weak supporting evidence and numerous theoretical challenges to the water wars hypothesis, proclamations that water wars are imminent remain prevalent. Much of the academic literature on the topic has attempted to promulgate, refute, or test the water war hypothesis. Little has attempted to explain why the predictions of water wars remain so popular despite questionable empirical support. This study addresses this gap. It outlines various incentives different types of key actors have to emphasize, and even exaggerate, the likelihood of water wars. Moreover, it demonstrates that relationships between several of these actors serve to mutually reinforce these incentives. This confluence of incentives to stress such risks is likely to have contributed to the persistence of such warnings in public discourse at levels and profiles far beyond what appears justified by empirical evidence. While this article specifically addresses violent conflict over water, its premises and conclusions are likely relevant to much of the discourse in the field of environmental security.

### A2 MENA Econ DA

#### Renewables key to Middle East growth

Stratfor 16 [Stratfor Intelligence, "A Bright Future for Solar Power in the Middle East," 4/22/2016] AZ

Jordan and Morocco: Energy Importers

Jordan, a relatively stable kingdom in a largely tumultuous region, is vulnerable to demographic challenges. The nation imports more than 95 percent of its energy at a cost of roughly 16 percent of its gross domestic product. Its energy dependence makes it somewhat vulnerable: In 2011 and 2012, disruptions in natural gas supplies from Egypt caused Jordan to deplete its energy reserves entirely. The problem arose again in 2013, when oil imports from Iraq were interrupted. Uncertain energy supplies have the potential to stoke unrest in the country, where energy costs are heavily subsidized by the monarchy. After all, an erratic domestic electricity supply has been among the main aggravators of social upheaval in nearby Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt. Jordan subsequently made efforts to diversify its sources of electricity by increasing solar capacity, and in recent years it added wind and nuclear generation. If Jordan is to meet its goal of relying on renewables for a full 20 percent of its generation capacity by 2018, solar will play a major role.

Numerous projects, large and small, are underway in Jordan, from installing solar panels on the rooftops of homes to building large solar parks with 200-megawatt capacities. Jordan has made the bidding process for renewable energy projects relatively easy, which has attracted companies from around the world. Jordan will be unable to reach its lofty goals on its own; public-private partnerships will be crucial to the growth of the renewable energy sector.

Much like Jordan, Morocco imports most of its energy — about 90 percent. The similarly stable nation is also looking to renewables, especially solar power, to increase energy security and lower energy costs. But Morocco is taking the idea a step further by building what will be the world's largest power plant using concentrated solar technology, which employs mirrors or lenses to focus sunlight that generates heat to power turbines. The first phase of the project, the Noor Solar Complex near the city of Ouarzazate, opened earlier this year. Morocco has set a lofty goal: to have renewables account for half its electricity production by 2025 (solar would satisfy about a third of the demand). The nation even aims to become an electricity exporter. Of course, the scale of its projects requires large tenders, requiring international investment and limiting the participation of domestic companies.

Morocco's burgeoning solar sector still faces some challenges, not least of which is the need for a reliable storage method, all the more important since sunlight is a naturally fluctuating power source. Still, with its geographic advantages and relative social stability, Morocco appears to be in prime position to exploit its solar power potential.

Egypt: Growing Demand

Egypt's political, security and financial institutions are not as stable as those of Morocco or Jordan, and in Egypt the threat of social unrest is more potent. But industry publications still tout the country as a potential hot spot for renewable energy investment. Egypt's massive population creates an enormous energy demand, which may strain the government's budget but also opens up opportunities to invest in technologies to meet the growing need.

Egypt's energy woes are not new. Production has steadily declined because of a lack of investment in domestic oil and natural gas operations. Meanwhile, domestic energy demand has risen. But President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi has implemented reforms that have attracted renewed investment to the natural gas sector, with projects such as Eni's Zohr natural gas field being fast-tracked.

Renewable energy will not necessarily meet all of the public's most urgent needs. Cooking fuel, for instance, has sometimes been in short supply, and solar power will not directly resolve that problem. Still, preventing summer brownouts (now all too common in Egypt) is a priority for the government, which has lost much of its popular support. Improved natural gas production can help provide a more consistent electricity supply, but with demand expected to climb, there is room for additional forms of power generation. Recent agreements signed with Japan and South Korea to develop solar power and associated projects indicate that Egypt is looking beyond traditional relationships to further the renewables energy sector, though both European and regional players such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are still active investors.

Saudi Arabia, UAE and Algeria: Exporters Remain Exporters

Saudi Arabia relies on oil for electricity production, and it faces rising domestic demand for electricity at a time when low oil prices have put significant financial strain on the government. Its domestic fuel consumption is following an unsustainable trend. Using over 3 million barrels of oil per day domestically, Saudi Arabia is already the largest global consumer of petroleum for power production. About a third of its daily oil consumption is used to fuel power plants. Without additional sources of generation to satisfy climbing electricity demand, the share of oil consumed by electricity generation would climb.

Although Saudi Arabia is gradually implementing subsidy reforms designed to reduce domestic energy demand, it still will develop energy alternatives, which is where solar power could come into play. Under current goals, renewables would account for 8 percent of electricity production by 2020 and 15 percent by 2030, with solar power accounting for the majority of that increase. In the past, however, Saudi Arabia has lengthened the timelines for such targets.

Yet Riyadh has made significant strides in exporting solar technology. Saudi company ACWA Power is involved in multiple projects in the region (Morocco and Jordan) and farther away (South Africa and Turkey). Saudi Arabian Oil Co., the national oil company, has even expressed interest in developing solar export capability. With plans to add solar technology production facilities, Riyadh could maintain its role as a regional solar exporter, especially as its domestic solar power sector continues to develop. ACWA Power has gained a regional reputation as having sufficient economies of scale to underbid other major solar power firms, mostly Western or East Asian companies. This helped ACWA Power win large bids such as the first phase of Morocco's Noor plant and the Mohammed bin Rashid solar park in the United Arab Emirates.

The United Arab Emirates, meanwhile, has positioned itself as a renewable energy financier and development hub. It is the home of the International Renewable Energy Agency, and it hosts important conferences focused on both renewable and nonrenewable energy. Furthermore, it has used its ample hydrocarbon largesse to develop unique large- and small-scale renewable projects in ways that less resource-rich countries such as Morocco, Jordan and Egypt cannot match. The United Arab Emirates has established itself as a regional leader in solar power in part because of its greater ability to adopt the technology (both domestically and through partnerships with other countries) and to fund projects throughout the world. Masdar, the country's renewable energy arm, is connected with the Mubadala Development Co., one of the country's smaller sovereign wealth funds. Masdar is involved in projects throughout the Middle East, Africa, South America and Europe and on islands in the Pacific.

Algeria, a leading natural gas producer, has ambitious plans to follow a similar path with solar energy. Renewable power installations totaling 22 gigawatts of capacity — 13 gigawatts of that solar — are proposed to go online by 2030. That is enough power to meet nearly a quarter of domestic needs while still reserving a significant portion for exports. But exporting renewable power will require substantial research and investment into solving the problem of insufficient energy storage, which is a barrier to incorporating large amounts of variable renewable power worldwide. Algeria will require foreign investment and cooperation to meet its grand plans. While Algeria is more stable than some of its neighbors, such as Libya, its government is in a slow leadership transition, and the risk of instability caused by protests relating to development and distribution of energy resources is high. Nonetheless, the country has made strides toward attracting the necessary investment to build out its solar capacity. With over 250 megawatts of capacity installed in 2015 and work occurring at additional sites in 2016, Algeria is moving toward its target of 15 percent of electricity being generated by solar by 2020.

#### Renewables key to growth

Ennaji 16 [Moha Ennaji ( Moroccan linguist, author, political critic, and civil society activist. He is a university professor in the Department of English Language and Literature at Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University[1] at Fes), "Opinion: Renewable energy is at the heart of Middle East economic growth," 2/20/2016] AZ

FEZ, Morocco (Project Syndicate) — The global oil-price bust has devastated economies across the Middle East and North Africa. Having seen severe price declines in the past, many leaders in the region may be tempted to wait for prices to rise again. But this collapse is different, and governments need new energy and development strategies. Morocco’s drive to become a regional renewable-energy powerhouse offers a real option for economic development in other Arab countries.

Morocco has been investing in large-scale renewable-energy projects for some time; but only now are these investments coming online. Perhaps the most impressive is the gigantic Noor-1 solar-energy compound, located in the Moroccan desert near Ouarzazate. Opened on Feb. 4, Noor-1 uses highly advanced technology to store energy for use at night and on cloudy days.

### 2AR – A2 Intermittency

#### Their renewables fail args don't apply to the Middle East – solar is viable

Stratfor 16 [Stratfor Intelligence, "A Bright Future for Solar Power in the Middle East," 4/22/2016] AZ

Deserts are seemingly obvious places to locate solar technology. In fact, the swath of desert stretching from the Atlantic Ocean, across North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, to the Persian Gulf has vast solar potential. But until recently it has not been economically feasible, or even necessary, to develop the renewable resource. In many areas, geographic constraints such as rough terrain have made solar projects impractical.

Only now has a combination of demographic pressure, low oil prices and technological readiness primed Middle Eastern and North African states for more investment in solar power. For countries such as Jordan and Morocco, renewable energy may offer a path toward greater energy independence. Others, such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, are interested in exporting renewable energy technology and financing solar projects abroad.

The steady price decline of solar power generation infrastructure, especially photovoltaic cells, is making the renewable option more viable for North African and Middle Eastern states, a region where the sun shines in abundance. Not only is the technology becoming more affordable, but operational costs after construction are also minimal when compared with hydrocarbon-based generation. As a result, several countries in the Middle East and North Africa are focusing on solar power as a means to satisfy rising electricity demand, make cuts to unsustainable government subsidy programs and reduce dependence on energy imports.

### A2 Russia Econ DA

#### No link – Russia's also selling nuclear power to other countries around the world, in Southeast Asia and Africa

#### Russian economy resilient – nuclear power not key

Aleksashenko 7/1/2016 [Sergey Aleksashenko (former first deputy chairman of Russia's Central Bank and a former deputy finance minister), "Is Russia's Economy Doomed to Collapse?," The National Interest] AZ

For many the biggest mystery of the past year was the relatively moderate drop in the Russian economy. In early 2015, many experts predicted an inevitable 8–10 percent decline, basing their projections on the fall of the ruble, falling imports and expectations of falling investment. However, nothing of the sort happened. Why? I see three reasons for this.

First, the base of the Russian economy is the production and export of raw materials and commodities. Unlike 2008–09, there is no crisis in the global economy, and the main consumers of Russian raw materials (Europe, China and Middle East) continue to grow, albeit unevenly; there has been no reduction in demand for Russian raw materials this time, as opposed to six years ago. Moreover, the key product of Russian exports—oil and refined products—recorded a slight increase, both in production and in exports. The stability of the Russian raw-material sector entailed the stability of railway cargo (more than 70 percent of its turnover is raw materials and commodities) and pipeline transportation volumes (which in terms of its effect on GDP is equal to railway-cargo turnover).

Taxation of the Russian oil and gas sector is structured such that the main part of the increase in world oil prices benefits the budget. And, vice versa, the decrease in oil prices hits the financial situation of oil companies at a much smaller scale than the revenue base of the federal budget. Moreover, all export-oriented industries benefited from the devaluation of the ruble (local production costs paid in rubles devalued in currency terms) and from the government's policy of freezing wages in the public sector; workers’ pressure to raise wages plummeted. All this has allowed the raw-materials sector to maintain production and keep the necessary investments.

Second, by 2015, the Russian government launched a full-throttle program to finance ambitious military procurement and reinvestment into the defense industries, which are mainly state-owned. On this basis, the production of military products in 2013–15 grew by 15–20 percent annually, and approximately the same growth should continue in 2016. The rapid growth of the military industry evidently benefited many industrial sectors and prevented the decline in industry as a whole.

Third, thanks to the reforms of the nineteen-nineties, the Russian economy became a market one, that is, it is inclined to restore equilibrium using a free-floating ruble exchange rate. We must acknowledge the Russian authorities, who not only did not freeze prices during the crisis, but did not even discuss this idea. As a result, the economy was able to quickly adjust to shocks both external (decline of oil prices and 50 percent devaluation of the ruble) and internal (a ban on food imports from Western countries). However, the price of this adjustment was the rise in inflation to 17 percent in spring 2015, a 10 percent decrease in the level of private consumption and 40 percent reduction in imports.

#### Link turn – Rosatom's nuclear reactors sap resources and manpower away from Russia – they draw nuclear experts away from the Russian workforce and embezzle money to private funds overseas – that's Ulrich 14

#### No impact--communications check US-Russia war

Ford 8 [Christopher, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. former U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation and former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation “Dilemmas of Nuclear Force ‘De-Alerting,’” <http://www.hudson.org/files/documents/De-Alerting%20FINAL2%20%282%29.pdf>]

The United States and Russia have also worked for years to improve communications, reduce misunderstandings, and develop ways to lessen the risk of inadvertent launch or other errors in their strategic relationship. Most readers will be familiar with the Direct Communications Link (the famous “hotline”) established in 1963. 27 In 1971, however, Washington and Moscow also signed an agreement establishing basic procedures to increase mutual consultation and notification regarding relatively innocent but potentially alarming activities – thereby reducing the risk of accidental nuclear war. 28 Since 1987, the two parties have also operated securely linked 24-hour communications centers – the U.S. node of which is the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) operated by the State Department 29 – which specialize in transmitting such things as the notifications required under arms control treaties. Pursuant to a 1988 memorandum, NRRC transmittals, which go directly to the Russian Ministry of Defense, include ballistic missile launch notifications. This link also proved useful to help prevent strategic tensions after the terrorist assault of September 11, 2001 – at which point U.S. officials used the NRRC to reassure their Russian counterparts that the sudden American security alert in the wake of the Manhattan and Pentagon attacks was not in any way an indication of impending U.S. belligerence vis-à-vis Russia.

#### Our defense doesn't apply to the Middle East scenario – lack of institutional cooperation and communication prevents deterrence

### A2 Energy Dependence DA

dependent on uranium prices

## Kritiks

### A2 Security K

#### 1. Framework – the debate should center on whether the action of the plan is good or not – that's key to engagement with the topic– pure focus on reps moots 1ac offense and shifts the debate on an unpredictable basis since there are an infinite number of assumptions they could criticize – *at worst, you should let us weigh the aff against the K – that preserves the benefits of both critical education and policy focus by including both*

#### 2. Judge choice – you should allow the aff to kick advantages and force the neg to only get links to the advantage we go for – ensures focused debates by allowing the aff to collapse to one advantage in the last speech rather than shallow discussion of every issue

#### 3. Strategically deploying security discourse overcomes mutual enmity in the context of the Middle East

Bilgin 2000 [(Pinar, University of Wales, Aberystwyth) “Inventing Middle Easts? The making of regions through security discourses” 13-16 August 1998] AT

As emphasised in the introduction, the argument put forward in this paper is that the answers peoples of the region (this part of the world formerly known as the Middle East) give to the questions Who are we? and Which region do we belong to? are very important in terms of what they do with their future. Through the creation of a regional identity and strengthening the sense of belonging, for instance, cooperation and interdependence may take root. They may choose to define insecurity as their common enemy by way of conceiving themselves as part of a 'security complex'. [105] In the remainder of the paper I will discuss how viewing this group of states as a 'security complex' may constitute a first step on the way to saw the seeds of regionalism towards the establishment of a 'security community'. Barry Buzan, in People, States and Fear introduced the concept of 'security complex' as an analytical tool when studying security. His contention was that when conceptualising the regional level, one should do away with territoriality and voluntarism (which turned out to be problematic as seen in the first two parts of this paper) but emphasise the present patterns of amity and enmity. This, argues Buzan, would enable the analyst to treat a group of states together in a 'security complex', i.e. as an intermediate level between the levels of states and the international system, whether or not those states recognise themselves to be operating as part of one whole. Accordingly, he defines a 'security complex' as 'a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.' [106] By way of this definition, Buzan re-introduces the role of external actors when he argues that a Middle Eastern security complex might exist whether indigenous actors recognise it or not. [107] It is in this sense that the 'security complex' as an analytical tool is useful in bringing together a group of states to show their securities are interdependent upon one another's policies. Coming to see the fact that their securities are interdependent and that they have to cooperate towards achieving stable security might constitute a first, but nevetheless crucial step towards sawing the seeds of regionalism in the 'Middle East'. However, although external actors' (including analysts) view (and perhaps encouragement and support) is important, what is also very important is the creation of a distinct identity within the construct -regardless of what we come to call it, a 'security complex' or a 'region'- if it is to become a 'security community' in Karl Deutsch's terms. Deutsch and his associates defined a security community as 'one in which where there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each either physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way.' [108] As Wæver also indicates, security complex as a concept does not contain the standards for change towards a security community. Rather security complex is an analytical tool for analysing the processes and explaining the dynamics of security in a given area; it does not show or attempt to change the quality of relationships at a given time within a given area. [109] Still, given the lack of enthusiasm for regionalism (as a way of establishing security) in the 'Middle East', the 'Middle Eastern security complex' as a concept is a good place for the analyst to start with. Some Arab regimes and non-governmental organisations may not include Iran, Israel and Turkey in their definitions of the region they live in; Turkey and Israel, on the other hand may view themselves as belonging to Europe rather than the 'Middle East'. Nevertheless, when viewed in security terms, they are all parts of a Middle Eastern (in)security complex; they all take each other into account when making their calculations, especially when it comes to buying military equipment. Then, although the concept of security complex in itself may not involve standards for change, as Wæver has rightly pointed out, to convince regional actors that they are all involved within the same security complex may arguably be a first step towards the creation of a security community. A second step might be taken when they begin to see themselves not as victims of each other (or the past) but of insecurity which has to be overcome through cooperative efforts. [110] A third step may be the creation of security regimes on a number of issue areas, as Ken Booth has suggested, so that a complex web of different regimes would help establish and maintain security in this part of the world. This may allow the co-existence of all these four visions presented above; each helping address the issues they are most concerned with. The involvement of non-governmental organisations may also help bring out issues that are not usually met by states' policies. In the long-run, with possible spill-over effects, these security regimes may contribute towards building a security community. [111] Viewed from the lens of Critical Security Studies, it is the issues of water, food, population, productivity, environment, and education in addition to those of arms proliferation, the introduction of weapons of mass destruction, and expansionist regimes, that are the main problems in the region; for it is these very issues that cause insecurity for peoples lives. Hence the Critical Security Studies call to understand and practice security at different levels in reference to multiple referents (subjects of security) and by way of multiple agents (actors that act for security, i.e. social movements, non-governmental organisations, international organisations, individuals as well as states). Our understanding and practices of security, then, should be informed by a view of security that is cognisant of the complexities involved in human affairs. The insecurity in the 'Middle East' attests well to this.

#### 4. Threats real – strong incentives against inflation

Ravenal 9 [(earl, distinguished senior fellow in foreign policy studies at Cato, is professor emeritus of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. He is an expert on NATO, defense strategy, and the defense budget) “What's Empire Got to Do with It? The Derivation of America's Foreign Policy.” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society 21.1 (2009) 21-75]

The underlying notion of “the security bureaucracies . . . looking for new enemies” is a threadbare concept that has somehow taken hold across the political spectrum, from the radical left (viz. Michael Klare [1981], who refers to a “threat bank”), to the liberal center (viz. Robert H. Johnson [1997], who dismisses most alleged “threats” as “improbable dangers”), to libertarians (viz. Ted Galen Carpenter [1992], Vice President for Foreign and Defense Policy of the Cato Institute, who wrote a book entitled A Search for Enemies). What is missing from most analysts’ claims of “threat inflation,” however, is a convincing theory of why, say, the American government significantly(not merely in excusable rhetoric) might magnify and even invent threats (and, more seriously, act on such inflated threat estimates). In a few places, Eland (2004, 185) suggests that such behavior might stem from military or national security bureaucrats’ attempts to enhance their personal status and organizational budgets, or even from the influence and dominance of “the military-industrial complex”; viz.: “Maintaining the empire and retaliating for the blowback from that empire keeps what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex fat and happy.” Or, in the same section:¶ In the nation’s capital, vested interests, such as the law enforcement bureaucracies . . . routinely take advantage of “crises”to satisfy parochial desires. Similarly, many corporations use crises to get pet projects— a.k.a. pork—funded by the government. And national security crises, because of people’s fears, are especially ripe opportunities to grab largesse. (Ibid., 182)¶ Thus, “bureaucratic-politics” theory, which once made several reputa- tions (such as those of Richard Neustadt, Morton Halperin, and Graham Allison) in defense-intellectual circles, and spawned an entire sub-industry within the field of international relations,5 is put into the service of dismissing putative security threats as imaginary. So, too, can a surprisingly cognate theory, “public choice,”6 which can be considered the right-wing analog of the “bureaucratic-politics” model, and is a preferred interpretation of governmental decision- making among libertarian observers. As Eland (2004, 203) summarizes:¶ Public-choice theory argues [that] the government itself can develop sepa- rate interests from its citizens. The government reflects the interests of powerful pressure groups and the interests of the bureaucracies and the bureaucrats in them. Although this problem occurs in both foreign and domestic policy, it may be more severe in foreign policy because citizens pay less attention to policies that affect them less directly.¶ There is, in this statement of public-choice theory, a certain ambiguity, and a certain degree of contradiction: Bureaucrats are supposedly, at the same time, subservient to societal interest groups and autonomous from society in general.¶ This journal has pioneered the argument that state autonomy is a likely consequence of the public’s ignorance of most areas of state activity (e.g., Somin 1998; DeCanio 2000a, 2000b, 2006, 2007; Ravenal 2000a). But state autonomy does not necessarily mean that bureaucrats substitute their own interests for those of what could be called the “national society” that they ostensibly serve. I have argued (Ravenal 2000a) that, precisely because of the public-ignorance and elite-expertise factors, and especially because the opportunities—at least for bureaucrats (a few notable post-government lobbyist cases nonwithstanding)—for lucrative self-dealing are stringently fewer in the defense and diplomatic areas of government than they are in some of the contract-dispensing and more under-the-radar-screen agencies of government, the “public-choice” imputation of self-dealing, rather than working toward the national interest (which, however may not be synonymous with the interests, perceived or expressed, of citizens!) is less likely to hold. In short, state autonomy is likely to mean, in the derivation of foreign policy, that “state elites” are using rational judgment, in insulation from self-promoting interest groups—about what strategies, forces, and weapons are required for national defense.¶ Ironically, “public choice”—not even a species of economics, but rather a kind of political interpretation—is not even about “public” choice, since, like the bureaucratic-politics model, it repudiates the very notion that bureaucrats make truly “public” choices; rather, they are held, axiomatically, to exhibit “rent-seeking” behavior, wherein they abuse their public positions in order to amass private gains, or at least to build personal empires within their ostensibly official niches. Such sub- rational models actually explain very little of what they purport to observe. Of course, there is some truth in them, regarding the “behavior” of some people, at some times, in some circumstances, under some conditions of incentive and motivation. But the factors that they posit operate mostly as constraints on the otherwise rational optimization of objectives that, if for no other reason than the playing out of official roles, transcends merely personal or parochial imperatives.¶ My treatment of “role” differs from that of the bureaucratic-politics theorists, whose model of the derivation of foreign policy depends heavily, and acknowledgedly, on a narrow and specific identification of the role- playing of organizationally situated individuals in a partly conflictual “pulling and hauling” process that “results in” some policy outcome. Even here, bureaucratic-politics theorists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999, 311) allow that “some players are not able to articulate [sic] the governmental politics game because their conception of their job does not legitimate such activity.” This is a crucial admission, and one that points— empirically—to the need for a broader and generic treatment of role.¶ Roles (all theorists state) give rise to “expectations” of performance. My point is that virtually every governmental role, and especially national-security roles, and particularly the roles of the uniformed military, embody expectations of devotion to the “national interest”; rationality in the derivation of policy at every functional level; and objectivity in the treatment of parameters, especially external parameters such as “threats” and the power and capabilities of other nations. Sub-rational models (such as “public choice”) fail to take into account even a partial dedication to the “national” interest (or even the possibility that the national interest may be honestly misconceived in more parochial terms). In contrast, an official’s role connects the individual to the (state-level) process, and moderates the (perhaps otherwise) self-seeking impulses of the individual. Role-derived behavior tends to be formalized and codified; relatively transparent and at least peer-reviewed, so as to be consistent with expectations; surviving the particular individual and trans- mitted to successors and ancillaries; measured against a standard and thus corrigible; defined in terms of the performed function and therefore derived from the state function; and uncorrrupt, because personal cheating and even egregious aggrandizement are conspicuously discouraged.¶ My own direct observation suggests that defense decision-makers attempt to “frame” the structure of the problems that they try to solve on the basis of the most accurate intelligence. They make it their business to know where the threats come from. Thus, threats are not “socially constructed” (even though, of course, some values are). A major reason for the rationality, and the objectivity, of the process is that much security planning is done, not in vaguely undefined circumstances that offer scope for idiosyncratic, subjective behavior, but rather in structured and reviewed organizational frameworks. Non-rationalities (which are bad for understanding and prediction) tend to get filtered out. People are fired for presenting skewed analysis and for making bad predictions. This is because something important is riding on the causal analysis and the contingent prediction. For these reasons, “public choice” does not have the “feel” of reality to many critics who have participated in the structure of defense decision-making. In that structure, obvious, and even not-so-obvious,“rent-seeking” would not only be shameful; it would present a severe risk of career termination. And, as mentioned, the defense bureaucracy is hardly a productive place for truly talented rent-seekers to operatecompared to opportunities for personal profit in the commercial world. A bureaucrat’s very self-placement in these reaches of government testi- fies either to a sincere commitment to the national interest or to a lack of sufficient imagination to exploit opportunities for personal profit.

#### 5. Extinction outweighs –

1. reversibility – humanity is ended forever
2. future generations

#### 6. No endless war

Gray 7—Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is not at all convincing. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, must be nothing if not pragmatic.

#### 7. Alt doesn't solve the case – realism is inevitable since states don't know each other's intentions – individual orientation towards violence doesn't deny that states desire to protect themselves

#### 8. Perm do both – net benefit is threats real

#### 9. Perm do the aff and the alt in other instances

#### 10. No root cause of war – we have to address the circumstances that allow underlying aggressions to be expressed

Moore 4 – Dir. Center for Security Law @ University of Virginia, 7-time Presidential appointee, & Honorary Editor of the American Journal of International Law, Solving the War Puzzle: Beyond the Democratic Peace, John Norton Moore, pages 41-2

If major interstate war is predominantly a product of a synergy between a potential nondemocratic aggressor and an absence of effective deterrence, what is the role of the many traditional "causes" of war? Past, and many contemporary, theories of war have focused on the role of specific disputes between nations, ethnic and religious differences, arms races, poverty or social injustice, competition for resources, incidents and accidents, greed, fear, and perceptions of "honor," or many other such factors. Such factors may well play a role in motivating aggression or in serving as a means for generating fear and manipulating public opinion. The reality, however, is that while some of these may have more potential to contribute to war than others, there may well be an infinite set of motivating factors, or human wants, motivating aggression. It is not the independent existence of such motivating factors for war but rather the circumstances permitting or encouraging high risk decisions leading to war that is the key to more effectively controlling war. And the same may also be true of democide. The early focus in the Rwanda slaughter on "ethnic conflict," as though Hutus and Tutsis had begun to slaughter each other through spontaneous combustion, distracted our attention from the reality that a nondemocratic Hutu regime had carefully planned and orchestrated a genocide against Rwandan Tutsis as well as its Hutu opponents.I1 Certainly if we were able to press a button and end poverty, racism, religious intolerance, injustice, and endless disputes, we would want to do so. Indeed, democratic governments must remain committed to policies that will produce a better world by all measures of human progress. The broader achievement of democracy and the rule of law will itself assist in this progress. No one, however, has yet been able to demonstrate the kind of robust correlation with any of these "traditional" causes of war as is reflected in the "democratic peace." Further, given the difficulties in overcoming many of these social problems, an approach to war exclusively dependent on their solution may be to doom us to war for generations to come.

#### 11. Finding one underlying explanation that universally motivates Middle Eastern actors is exactly the reductionist/orientialist approach to IR they critique – it ignores contingent circumstances in favor of one-size-fits-all assumptions about their behavior and motivations to explain their actions

### A2 Reps 1st

#### Discourse isn’t the primary shaper of reality and material change from the plan outweighs

Thierry Balzacq 5, Professor of Political Science and IR @ Namar University, “The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context” European Journal of International Relations, London: Jun 2005, Volume 11, Issue 2

However, despite important insights, this position remains highly disputable. The reason behind this qualification is not hard to understand. With great trepidation my contention is that one of the main distinctions we need to take into account while examining securitization is that between 'institutional' and 'brute' threats. In its attempts to follow a more radical approach to security problems wherein threats are institutional, that is, mere products of communicative relations between agents, the CS has neglected the importance of 'external or brute threats', that is, threats that do not depend on language mediation to be what they are - hazards for human life. In methodological terms, however, any framework over-emphasizing either institutional or brute threat risks losing sight of important aspects of a multifaceted phenomenon. Indeed, securitization, as suggested earlier, is successful when the securitizing agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development. In this scheme, there is no security problem except through the language game. Therefore, how problems are 'out there' is exclusively contingent upon how we linguistically depict them. This is not always true. For one, language does not construct reality; at best, it shapes our perception of it. Moreover, it is not theoretically useful nor is it empirically credible to hold that what we say about a problem would determine its essence. For instance, what I say about a typhoon would not change its essence. The consequence of this position, which would require a deeper articulation, is that some security problems are the attribute of the development itself. In short, threats are not only institutional; some of them can actually wreck entire political communities regardless of the use of language. Analyzing security problems then becomes a matter of understanding how external contexts, including external objective developments, affect securitization. Thus, far from being a departure from constructivist approaches to security, external developments are central to it.

#### Reps don’t shape policy

Richardson ‘8

Alexia -- “Traces of terror : photography and memory of political violence in Argentina and Peru” –as part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. This was the her Dissertation to gain her PhD in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures University of Durham. While pursuing her PhD at Durham University, Alexia Richardson gained much traction on the international conference scene – presenting a paper titled 'Ni un paso atrás: Resistance and Emotion in Images of Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo' at the ‘Public Displays of Affection’ conference at the University of Rochester, New York. Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1898/

Despite the ubiquitous nature of photographic images, their pervasive influence may be hard to pin down. In a sceptical analysis, David Perlmutter (1998) questions the logic of 'visual determinism', which argues for the role of images in policy decisions - the so-called 'CNN effect' which draws elected officials to the television set as they evaluate their ever-changing position in the public eye. According to Perlmutter, icons are selected and confirmed by a small section of society he calls 'discourse elites' - politicians, academics, and workers in the media. Because such privileged professionals work daily with images, control them, study them in broadsheet newspapers and believe in their effects, they tend to assume that the general public does likewise, often overestimating the familiarity of even the most famous images to the untrained or uninterested viewer. Choosing specific examples including Adams' image of General Loan in Tet and other'icons of outrage', he argues that the measurable effect of visual images is small and they do not usually overturn policy, although, by contrast, some examples of decisions influenced by images are given in Taylor (1998: 136). So, while many blamed photographs like those made by Adams for influencing public opinion in the United States against the war in Vietnam, Perlmutter argues for the reverse: that because public opinion was already turning against the war, it seized on the image of Loan as a confirmation of its new values. Perlmutter's warning against an exaggerated or naive trust in the power of the image is important, and he is correct in stating that an objective measurement of the influence of images on policy decisions is hard to find. Nevertheless, his analysis does not preclude a more general awareness of certain regularly circulated photographs in society, and influence may also have more general effects than government policy decisions. Accordingly, Hariman and Lucaites (2001: 19) believe that, 'visual practices have long been important yet undervalued constituents of democratic culture precisely because they are media for emotional representation that lead to performative identification rather than rational deliberation'. I would concur that the value accorded to written documents and the official archive of materials is often denied the photographic image which, nevertheless, is so regularly witnessed that its pull on the emotions should not be dismissed. 5

#### No prior questions – material should be combined with the abstract

Self explanatory

Cochran 99 - Molly Cochran, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the material (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

### Alt Deflates [Schweller]

#### They deflate threats and their authors are biased – under-balancing is more likely than overreacting which means err aff

Schweller 4 [Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, “Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201, Muse]

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival. There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do one harm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on under reactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy—relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about—and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than under responding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war that nobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under—and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce under balancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the under reaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.

#### Their alt also prevents responding to true threats – ISIS and World War 2 prove some threats are real

### A2 Prolif Link

#### Acting to stop proliferation is a moral imperative – pragmatic action is necessary and overwhelms problematic discourse

Ford 11 [Chris Ford, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He previously served as U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1/10/11, Havea and Have-Nots: "Unfairness in nuclear Weapons possession," www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=658]

First, however, let’s provide some context. As I noted above, it is fascinating that in the long history of military technological have/have not dynamics, the international politics of nuclear weaponry has acquired such a strong flavor of moral critique. To my knowledge, after all, one did not see Xiongnu politics emphasizing how darned unfair it was of those nasty Chinese Emperors to monopolize the presumed secrets of China’s bingjia strategic literature. Nor does the unfairness of Byzantine efforts to control the recipe for Greek Fire seem to have become a prevalent trope of Frankish or Persian diplomacy. “**Have nots” have** surely **always coveted powerful tools possessed by the “haves,” or at least wished that the “haves” did not possess them**. **It seems** pretty **unusual**, however, for **non-possessors to articulate** such **understandable** envy and **resentment in the moral language of “unfairness,” and to assume that this presumed injustice should motivate the “haves” to change their behavior**. This argument seems to be a curiously modern phenomenon. One might respond that the very specialness of nuclear weapons makes such a position appropriate. After all, while a local monopoly on iron swords may have given the Vikings some advantage in skirmishes with Native Americans in what the Norsemen called Vinland, such technological asymmetry was not strategically decisive. (Indeed, the Vikings seem ultimately to have been pushed out of the New World entirely.) If iron had threatened to offer the Vikings an insuperable advantage, would the Skraelings have been justified in developing a moral language of “have/have not” resentment that demanded either the sharing of iron weaponry or Viking disarmament in the name of achieving a global “iron zero”? I’m skeptical, but for the sake of argument let’s say “maybe.” **The argument that nuclear weapons are “special**,” however, **is a two-edged sword**. **Perhaps they are** indeed so peculiarly potent and militarily advantageous that their asymmetric possession is sufficiently “**unfair**” to compel sharing or disarmament. **Such an argument**, however, **sits only awkwardly** – to say the least – with the simultaneous claim by many advocates of the “have/have not” critique that nuclear weapons have no real utility in the modern world and can therefore safely be abandoned by their possessors. **After all, it is hard to paint nuclear weapons as being strategically decisive and useless at the same time**. (**If they are indeed useless, the conclusion of “unfairness” hardly sounds very compelling. If they aren’t useless**, however, **it may be appropriately hard to abolish them**.) **More importantly, any argument about the destructively “special” character of nuclear weaponry cuts against the “unfairness critique**” in that it is **this very specialness** that seems to **rob the “have/have not” issue of its moral relevance**. Unlike iron swords, the bingjia literature, Greek Fire, or essentially all other past military technologies the introduction of which produced global control/acquisition dynamics, **nuclear weapons** have **introduced existential questions about the future of human civilization which utterly swamp the conventional playground morality of unfair “have/have not” competition. No prior technology held the potential to destroy humanity, making nuclear weapons** – with the possible exception of certain techniques of biological weaponry – **a sui generis case to which the conventional “unfairness” critique simply does not very persuasively apply.** III. Implications Let me be clear about this. **The moral critique of nuclear weapons possession** may yet **speak to the issue of whether anyone should have them**. (This is not the place for a discussion of the feasibility of the remedies proposed by the disarmament community, but let us at least acknowledge the existence of a real moral issue.) **But this matter has nothing to do with “unfairness**” per se **– and to the extent that it purports to, one should give it little credence. If indeed nuclear weapons do menace the survival of humanity, it is** essentially **irrelevant whether their possession is “unfairly” distributed** – **and it is** certainly **no solution to make the global balance of weaponry more “fair” by allowing more countries to have them.** (Disarmament advocates hope to address the fairness problem by eliminating nuclear weapons, of course, but this is just icing. Disarmament is almost never articulated as being driven primarily by fairness; the critical part of that argument is instead consequentialist, stressing the dangers that any nuclear weapons are said to present.) As a moral critique, in other words, **the fair/unfair dichotomy fails to speak intelligibly to the world’s nuclear dilemma.** It isn’t really about “fairness” at all. **Given the entanglement of nuclear weapons issues with** quasi-**existential questions** potentially **affecting the survival of** millions or perhaps even **billions** of people, moreover, **it stands to reason that an “unfair” outcome that nonetheless staves off such horrors is a perfectly good solution**. On this scale, one might say, **non-catastrophe entirely trumps accusations of “unfairness.” Questions of stability are far more important than issues of asymmetric distribution**. **This**, of course, has powerful implications for nonproliferation policy, because **pointing out the hollowness of the “unfairness” argument as applied to nuclear weapons suggests the moral sustainability of nonproliferation even if complete nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved** **and the world continues to be characterized by inequalities in weapons possession**. **We forget this at our collective peril**. Don’t get me wrong. “Unfairness” arguments will presumably continue to have a political impact upon the diplomacy of nuclear nonproliferation, either as a consequence of genuine resentment or as a cynical rationalization for the destabilizing pursuit of dangerous capabilities. (Indeed, one might even go so far as to suspect that the emergence of the “unfairness” critique in modern diplomatic discourse is in some sense partly the result of how morally compelling nonproliferation is, in this context, irrespective of the “fairness” of “have/have not” outcomes. Precisely because **the moral case for nonproliferation-driven inequality is** so **obvious and** so **compelling if** such **imbalance serves the interests of strategic stability**, perhaps it was necessary to develop a new rationale of “fairness” to help make proliferation aspirations seem more legitimate. **Skraelings**, one imagines, **did not need an elaborate philosophy of “fairness” in order to justify trying to steal** iron **weapons**; the desirability of such tools was simply obvious, and any effort to obtain them unsurprising and not in itself condemnable.) But even in this democratic and egalitarian age, merely to incant the mantra of “unfairness” – or to inveigh against the existence of “haves” when there also exist “have nots” – is not the same thing as having a compelling moral argument. Indeed, I would submit that **we lose our moral bearings if we allow “unfairness” arguments to distract us from what is really important here: substantive outcomes in the global security environment**. “Unfairness,” in other words, is an overrated critique, and “**fairness” is an overrated destination**. At least **where nuclear weapons are concerned, there are more important considerations in play**. Let us not forget this.

### A2 Terror Link [ISIS]

#### ISIS is HORRIBLE – moral condemnation is necessary to combat their ideology

Linker 15 [(Damon, senior correspondent at TheWeek.com and a consulting editor at the University of Pennsylvania Press) “How Liberals Missed the True Threat of ISIS” The Week Feb 18] AT

But really: Is this even remotely controversial? Of course not. Virtually every single American believes that killing is wrong, and that killing someone over religious differences is indefensible, beyond the pale of civilization, an act of madness, insanity, and the purest barbarism. There are no protests supporting Hicks. No organizations forming to encourage others to gun down Muslims. Now let’s think about ISIS. The Islamic State is an organization devoted to instituting the most literalistic, draconian form of Muslim fundamentalism imaginable. It not only permits but positively insists on imposing severe punishments for a long list of moral and theological crimes; the punishments include slavery, lashes for drunkenness and fornication, stoning for adultery, and amputation for theft. It considers crucifixion a fitting punishment for those deemed enemies of Islam. Homosexuals are regularly hurled to their deaths from the roofs of buildings, with the executions filmed and promoted online. As the world knows all too well, the group also delights in beheading, on video, any infidel or apostate who fails to show adequate level of “submission” to the Islamic State. (This would include the 21 Egyptian Coptic Christians who were beheaded on a Libyan beach this past weekend.) As Wood explains, all of this grows out of ISIS’s goal of establishing a caliphate modeled on the military conquests of Islam’s founding 1,400 years ago. It is a vision of politics as a brutal theocracy in a state of constant war. It even denies the legitimacy of fixed borders and views both its victories and defeats, including a forthcoming bloody battle between the caliphate and the “army of Rome,” as hastening the end of the world. ISIS, in sum, is an apocalyptic death cult, “the realization of a dystopian alternative reality,” as Wood aptly puts it, “in which David Koresh or Jim Jones survived to wield absolute power over not just a few hundred people, but some 8 million.” That’s pretty chilling. But here’s something even worse: Tens of thousands of foreign Muslims are thought to have immigrated to the Islamic State. Recruits hail from France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Holland, Australia, Indonesia, the United States, and many other places. Many have come to fight, and many intend to die. [The Atlantic] Think about that: tens of thousands living in countries spread across the globe, many of them in free societies, have heard about this group, its aims, and its actions, and they have responded not with horror but with an enthusiasm so intense that it has motivated them to leave their homes to join the battle. In the context of America today, where most people (even those who consider themselves religious) devote their lives to the preeminently liberal goals of making money, winning social approval, entertaining themselves with technological toys, and avoiding death at all costs, such behavior sounds an awful lot like mass psychosis. But is it? On the contrary, it is the behavior of people who are eager to devote their lives to a very different set of profoundly illiberal ideals. Ideals like honor. Like fighting and dying for a noble cause. Like severely punishing and killing those who offend the One True God (Allah) and his Prophet (Mohammed). Like submitting oneself to a divinely sanctioned way of life. Like playing a leading role in the sacred drama of the Last Days. Obama was right: this is not entirely unlike the motives behind the Crusades (which of course were known in their day as Christian Holy Wars). But of course the First Crusade was launched over 900 years ago. The European Wars of Religion came to an end over 350 years ago. The intervening centuries have seen real if halting progress in the effort to create a less savage, less cruel, more civilized, more peaceful, more humane world. Which isn’t to say there haven’t been setbacks and rearguard actions to revive older, harsher ways of life and synthesize them with the modern state. Fascism, especially in its German (National Socialist) variant, may have been the most potent. Wood is wise to conclude his article by quoting Orwell on its appeal: Whereas Socialism, and even capitalism in a more grudging way, have said to people, “I offer you a good time,” Hitler has said to them, “I offer you struggle, danger, and death,” and as a result a whole nation flings itself at his feet. We ought not to underrate its emotional appeal. [The Atlantic] Nor should we deny the yawning moral gap that separates such an outlook from the way the vast run of contemporary Americans view themselves and the meaning of their lives. Recognizing that gap doesn’t have to become cause for the self-congratulation of which Americans are so inordinately fond and which the president and many liberals seem so eager to short-circuit, with their keen focus on exposing double standards and highlighting the dangers of rendering harsh judgments. It merely requires that we acknowledge the truth about ourselves and the profoundly different character of our Islamist enemies.

#### Referring to the threat as radical Islamism is more accurate – strong research of motives confirms – anything else is inaccurate and makes counterterrorism impossible

Lohman 15 [(Walter, Director of The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center) “Call It What It Is: Islamist Extremism and Terrorism” Daily Signal January 16, 2015] AT

The initiative has produced a number of major research projects. Analysts initially looked at religious liberty in the largest Muslim-majority countries in the world, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Additionally, we have published other reports to expand on our policy recommendations and to address changing circumstances and trends in particular countries. Heritage has hosted multiple speakers and guest researchers over the years, Muslim and non-Muslim, on the topic. Most recently, Heritage released Pursuing a Freedom Agenda Amidst Rising Global Islamism and held a related public program to promote it. The report itself took more than a year of consultation to produce. It was thoroughly reviewed by a range of experts both internally and externally. Very early on in the Islam and Liberty initiative, we wrestled with what to call the threat. We settled on “Islamist extremism and terrorism.” We did so because, on the one hand, through our experience with Muslim friends and colleagues over the years we know that the threat to liberty is not from Muslims because they are Muslims. The threat emanates from a particular extreme interpretation of the faith – essentially a violent political ideology cast in religious terms. On the other hand, the threat cannot be honestly separated from its religious context. ISIS and al-Qaeda and the myriad of other violent Muslim extremist groups around the world may well be cults of murder masquerading as piety. However, we are not theologians. It is not up to us to say what Islam is and what it is not. When people kill or tyrannize populations in the name of religion, we must take them at their word. We must because we are engaged in a war of ideas. One cannot combat a tactic, terrorism. “Extremism” alone is meaningless. Calling the threat “Islamist” allows us to distinguish friend from foe and empower the good guys. There are Muslims among our friends in this fight and enemies among non-Muslims. In the end, we only aid our enemies by not calling the threat what it is.

#### Case turns the K – radical terror results in targeting Muslims at large – ending ISIS decreases Islamaphobia

Yahya 15 [(Harun, Turkish author referred to as "the biggest propagator of ijaz literature" as well as an Islamic creationist) “When Will the Radical Terror in the Western World End?” 6/30] AT

Acts of terror in various parts of Europe following the killing of the 12 Charlie Hebdo personnel at the beginning of this year set the whole continent on guard. Intensive security precautions were brought in around places through to be priority terrorist targets, such as government buildings, newspapers and magazines, metro stations and shopping malls, as well as synagogues, mosques, charities and kosher shops. The latest terror attack on a meeting held in the Danish city of Copenhagen in remembrance of those who lost their lives in the Charlie Hebdo attack once again revealed the scale of the problem Europe is facing. Two police and one civilian bystander were injured in the second attack on a synagogue which followed the first attack in which one person died and three police were injured. Intensive security measures were then introduced across Denmark, while terror warnings were issued in several other European countries, particularly Belgium and Germany, and measures were brought in against possible attacks. As all this is happening and terror continues turning into a spiral of hatred across the world, it is ordinary, innocent people who are most harmed and affected by events. Terror, anarchy and violence, the worst scourge of the century, target not only the security forces, but also innocent people, depriving them of their rights and lives, setting brother against brother, turning them into enemies, and breaking apart nations and countries. It is without doubt Muslims who have been most affected by terror in both material and psychological terms. Acts of radical terror, which have become one of the main items on the global agenda since September 11 and are incorrectly referred to as ‘Islamist terror,’ are causing grave concern to the whole world, especially the U.S. and Europe, and is putting societies strongly on the defensive. The inhuman actions of radical terror organizations with a fanatical mindset that has nothing to do with the true Islam, and that portray themselves as representatives of Islam, are causing Muslims to be regarded as potential suspects across the West. Their rights are then circumscribed and they are exposed to humiliating treatment. So what does the world need to do to put an end to the radical terror that is making the world uninhabitable? The fact is that while security measures are sometimes instrumental in successes against terror organizations, they cannot eliminate those organizations entirely. It is actually the perception of the fight against terror that needs to change, with the realization that the problem cannot be solved by force alone. The only way of eliminating a false ideology is by teaching the true one. And the way to eliminate radical terror is by the intellectual demolition of the idea that represents the basis of violence and hatred. What is particularly essential is to differentiate between radicalism and Islam. There is no room in the radical conception of religion based on false hadiths and superstitions for anything that encourages love, brotherhood, affection, compassion, the valuing of women, the superiority of women, or arts and science. To put it another way, there is no room in the fanatical and radical way of thinking for anything that brings people joy and brightens their world. In contrast, if anything, there is repression, compulsion, violence and ruthlessness. Radicalism and fanaticism are a system that literally puts people in the grave before they are dead and deprives them of all beauty. However, like all the other revealed faiths, the aim of Islam is to bestow love on people. There is no place for hatred, anger or killing in the Qur’an, the holy book of Islam. There is only peace, brotherhood and living together in love and a spirit of solidarity and unity. In order for the violence and hatred that derive from radicalism to come to an end, there needs to be a move to an education policy that explains how radicalism has nothing to do with Islam and that the values espoused by the radical conception of religion are incompatible with the Qur’an. So long as fanatical ideas persist, bombing Islamic lands with drones, sending troops to the region and killing the leaders of terror organizations, responding to violence with violence in other words, will never put an end to terror. On the contrary, it will incite it and make it even more of a threat. What is needed is a climate in which ideas do the struggle, not weapons. Islamic communities need to be told that the supposed hadiths based on violence are false and that Muslims have a duty to abide by the loving, rational and moderate values in the Qur’an. When young people are brought up with an education based on the true conception of Islam that commands love and peace, radicals who turn to violence will no longer be able to say ‘We are speaking for Islam,’ and fanatical philosophy can soon be eradicated by an intensive educational mobilization. Only then will the peace, brotherhood and love for which we long prevail across the world.

### A2 Islamophobia K

#### Framework – the kritik needs to prove that Arab countries should not prohibit nuclear power production – that's key to engagement and fairness – anything else moots 1ac offense and shifts the debate on an unpredictable basis

#### Judge choice – the judge can choose the reason to vote aff – ensures focused debates by allowing the aff to collapse to one advantage in the last speech rather than shallow discussion of every issue since we have to defend every advantage read in the 1AC

#### Link turn – we advocate a peaceful solution that allows Arab countries to combat the real risk of terrorism without US intervention or military action –we never defended the "War on Terror" or American foreign policy in the Middle East.

#### Link turn – we are the opposite of Islamophobia – the plan advocates a domestic policy by Arab countries to combat radical terrorists – rather than lumping all Muslims together as terrorists, the aff actively combats the stereotype of Islam as evil

#### If we win that ISIS really is trying to craft a nuclear weapon for use, it’s proof we should prohibit nuclear reactors in the region to prevent theft of nuclear materials. This disproves their hidden motive argument and proves the case outweighs the K

#### We don't say that all Muslims are terrorists, but we also don't invert the error and avoid any discussion of religion in the context of terrorism

#### It is undeniable that ISIS uses fundamentalist Islamic appeals to recruit fighters – ignoring the role of religion magnifies violence

Rychlak 10 (Ronald, Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Mississippi School of Law; adviser to the Holy See's delegation to the United Nations., http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/panelists/ronald\_rychlak/2010/07/the\_language\_of\_counter-terrorism.html)

What we call terrorists may not matter very much, but a restriction on what we can call them is of enormous importance. In order to get to the truth of any issue, people have to be free to talk about it without fear of repercussion. Unfortunately, one of the issues around which many problems revolve - religion - is also a topic that is particularly hard to discuss freely. In our day-to-day life, we may avoid the topic with only minimal inconvenience. When it comes to global terrorism, restricting what we say about religion can lead to devastating results. Next month I will start the new semester by teaching a course called "Terrorism and the Law." On the very first day, I will explain to the students that we will be talking about religion even though we are at a state law school. Islam, or at least the way some people interpret Islam, is an important issue when it comes to modern terrorism. I will, of course, explain that not all Muslims agree with the terrorist tactics - or even their long term aims - and not all terrorists are Muslim, but we can't really study modern terrorism without developing an understanding of the motivations. Unfortunately, religion is a significant motivation underlying much modern terrorism. Four or five years ago I traveled with a group to Israel. Instead of studying the holy sites, however, the focus of our trip was on counter-terrorism. Most members of my group were college educators who taught courses on terrorism. One of them had authored a major textbook. He told me that his publisher forbid him from any discussion of religion in the book. He said that was common. Publishers were afraid that books would not be used if they ventured into that area. He also said that most experts in the field lacked the knowledge to write about religion anyway. By keeping religion out of these textbooks and the related courses we were knowingly providing an insufficient education to our next generation of counter-terror experts. The author said that when the book came out in its next edition (which was going to be its third), he planned to demand inclusion of religious issues. He felt that by then the book would be well enough established that he would be able to make that demand. Still, the very idea that we had been intentionally excluding important issues when discussing this topic was shocking. Of course, a private entity might fear a violent reaction such as the riots that followed the publication of those Danish political cartoons. It is not, however, only private publishing interests that feel unable to talk about religion. The United States government also has a very hard time doing it. After all, as an inclusive society, we can't really argue that a Christian or Judeo-Christian outlook is better than even "hard-line" Islam, can we? The government's inability to talk about religion reached almost comical proportions in 2003, when the Department of State launched a "cultural magazine" for young men and women in Arab-speaking countries. A special coordinator for public diplomacy in the State Department explained: "This is a long-term way to build a relationship with people who will be the future leaders of the Arab world.... This is, in a very subtle way, a vehicle for American values." "Hi" magazine focused on things like entertainment, technology, and sports. Among the early articles that I remember was one about sand-surfing and another about protecting against over-exposure to the sun. There was, of course, no direct discussion of religion or religious values. The magazine floundered for a year or two, added an English version, went online, and finally died a quiet death. It was a phenomenal waste of time and money. I don't know how we are going to resolve issues that surround our very different world views, but I am quite certain that restricting what we say - whether that means barring topics from textbooks or rejecting the use of terms like 'Islamic terrorist' and 'jihad' - is not a good start. Let's first be honest in our language and our discussions. That will be hard, but it is the surest way to the truth. If we get to the truth, let's hope that we can also find peace.

### A2 Terror Talk K

#### 1. Framework – the kritik needs to prove that Egypt should not prohibit nuclear power production – that's key to engagement and fairness – anything else moots 1ac offense and shifts the debate on an unpredictable basis

#### 2. Judge choice – the judge can choose the reason to vote aff – ensures focused debates by allowing the aff to collapse to one advantage in the last speech rather than shallow discussion of every issue since we have to defend every advantage read in the 1AC

#### 3. Labeling and condemning the term “terrorism” is vital to stigmatizing terrorist legitimacy and to eliminating violence against civilians as a means to attain political goals

#### 4. Even if we don’t view them as an enemy- they view us as one

#### 5. Link turn – we advocate a peaceful solution that allows Egypt to combat the real risk of terrorism without US intervention or military action –we never defended the "War on Terror" or American foreign policy in the Middle East.

#### 6. Link turn – we are the opposite of Islamophobia – the plan advocates a domestic policy by Egyptto combat radical terrorists – rather than lumping all Muslims together as terrorists, the aff actively combats the stereotype of Islam as evil

#### 7. If we win that ISIS really is trying to craft a nuclear weapon for use, it’s proof we should prohibit nuclear reactors in the region to prevent theft of nuclear materials. This disproves their hidden motive argument and proves the case outweighs the K

#### Alt fails – critically reflecting on our relation to Egypt doesn't solve ISIS

#### No prior questions – they paralyze action

### A2 Nuclear Racism K

#### 1. Framework – the kritik needs to prove that Egypt should not prohibit nuclear power production – that's key to engagement and fairness – anything else moots 1ac offense and shifts the debate on an unpredictable basis

#### 2. Judge choice – the judge can choose the reason to vote aff – ensures focused debates by allowing the aff to collapse to one advantage in the last speech rather than shallow discussion of every issue since we have to defend every advantage read in the 1AC

#### 3. No link – the aff advocates preventing ISIS from acquiring nuclear weapons, not Egypt – equating terrorists to states is poor analysis

#### 4. Acting to stop proliferation is a moral imperative – pragmatic action is necessary and overwhelms problematic discourse

Ford 11 [Chris Ford, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, D.C. He previously served as U.S. Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and General Counsel to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 1/10/11, Havea and Have-Nots: "Unfairness in nuclear Weapons possession," www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=658]

First, however, let’s provide some context. As I noted above, it is fascinating that in the long history of military technological have/have not dynamics, the international politics of nuclear weaponry has acquired such a strong flavor of moral critique. To my knowledge, after all, one did not see Xiongnu politics emphasizing how darned unfair it was of those nasty Chinese Emperors to monopolize the presumed secrets of China’s bingjia strategic literature. Nor does the unfairness of Byzantine efforts to control the recipe for Greek Fire seem to have become a prevalent trope of Frankish or Persian diplomacy. “**Have nots” have** surely **always coveted powerful tools possessed by the “haves,” or at least wished that the “haves” did not possess them**. **It seems** pretty **unusual**, however, for **non-possessors to articulate** such **understandable** envy and **resentment in the moral language of “unfairness,” and to assume that this presumed injustice should motivate the “haves” to change their behavior**. This argument seems to be a curiously modern phenomenon. One might respond that the very specialness of nuclear weapons makes such a position appropriate. After all, while a local monopoly on iron swords may have given the Vikings some advantage in skirmishes with Native Americans in what the Norsemen called Vinland, such technological asymmetry was not strategically decisive. (Indeed, the Vikings seem ultimately to have been pushed out of the New World entirely.) If iron had threatened to offer the Vikings an insuperable advantage, would the Skraelings have been justified in developing a moral language of “have/have not” resentment that demanded either the sharing of iron weaponry or Viking disarmament in the name of achieving a global “iron zero”? I’m skeptical, but for the sake of argument let’s say “maybe.” **The argument that nuclear weapons are “special**,” however, **is a two-edged sword**. **Perhaps they are** indeed so peculiarly potent and militarily advantageous that their asymmetric possession is sufficiently “**unfair**” to compel sharing or disarmament. **Such an argument**, however, **sits only awkwardly** – to say the least – with the simultaneous claim by many advocates of the “have/have not” critique that nuclear weapons have no real utility in the modern world and can therefore safely be abandoned by their possessors. **After all, it is hard to paint nuclear weapons as being strategically decisive and useless at the same time**. (**If they are indeed useless, the conclusion of “unfairness” hardly sounds very compelling. If they aren’t useless**, however, **it may be appropriately hard to abolish them**.) **More importantly, any argument about the destructively “special” character of nuclear weaponry cuts against the “unfairness critique**” in that it is **this very specialness** that seems to **rob the “have/have not” issue of its moral relevance**. Unlike iron swords, the bingjia literature, Greek Fire, or essentially all other past military technologies the introduction of which produced global control/acquisition dynamics, **nuclear weapons** have **introduced existential questions about the future of human civilization which utterly swamp the conventional playground morality of unfair “have/have not” competition. No prior technology held the potential to destroy humanity, making nuclear weapons** – with the possible exception of certain techniques of biological weaponry – **a sui generis case to which the conventional “unfairness” critique simply does not very persuasively apply.** III. Implications Let me be clear about this. **The moral critique of nuclear weapons possession** may yet **speak to the issue of whether anyone should have them**. (This is not the place for a discussion of the feasibility of the remedies proposed by the disarmament community, but let us at least acknowledge the existence of a real moral issue.) **But this matter has nothing to do with “unfairness**” per se **– and to the extent that it purports to, one should give it little credence. If indeed nuclear weapons do menace the survival of humanity, it is** essentially **irrelevant whether their possession is “unfairly” distributed** – **and it is** certainly **no solution to make the global balance of weaponry more “fair” by allowing more countries to have them.** (Disarmament advocates hope to address the fairness problem by eliminating nuclear weapons, of course, but this is just icing. Disarmament is almost never articulated as being driven primarily by fairness; the critical part of that argument is instead consequentialist, stressing the dangers that any nuclear weapons are said to present.) As a moral critique, in other words, **the fair/unfair dichotomy fails to speak intelligibly to the world’s nuclear dilemma.** It isn’t really about “fairness” at all. **Given the entanglement of nuclear weapons issues with** quasi-**existential questions** potentially **affecting the survival of** millions or perhaps even **billions** of people, moreover, **it stands to reason that an “unfair” outcome that nonetheless staves off such horrors is a perfectly good solution**. On this scale, one might say, **non-catastrophe entirely trumps accusations of “unfairness.” Questions of stability are far more important than issues of asymmetric distribution**. **This**, of course, has powerful implications for nonproliferation policy, because **pointing out the hollowness of the “unfairness” argument as applied to nuclear weapons suggests the moral sustainability of nonproliferation even if complete nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved** **and the world continues to be characterized by inequalities in weapons possession**. **We forget this at our collective peril**. Don’t get me wrong. “Unfairness” arguments will presumably continue to have a political impact upon the diplomacy of nuclear nonproliferation, either as a consequence of genuine resentment or as a cynical rationalization for the destabilizing pursuit of dangerous capabilities. (Indeed, one might even go so far as to suspect that the emergence of the “unfairness” critique in modern diplomatic discourse is in some sense partly the result of how morally compelling nonproliferation is, in this context, irrespective of the “fairness” of “have/have not” outcomes. Precisely because **the moral case for nonproliferation-driven inequality is** so **obvious and** so **compelling if** such **imbalance serves the interests of strategic stability**, perhaps it was necessary to develop a new rationale of “fairness” to help make proliferation aspirations seem more legitimate. **Skraelings**, one imagines, **did not need an elaborate philosophy of “fairness” in order to justify trying to steal** iron **weapons**; the desirability of such tools was simply obvious, and any effort to obtain them unsurprising and not in itself condemnable.) But even in this democratic and egalitarian age, merely to incant the mantra of “unfairness” – or to inveigh against the existence of “haves” when there also exist “have nots” – is not the same thing as having a compelling moral argument. Indeed, I would submit that **we lose our moral bearings if we allow “unfairness” arguments to distract us from what is really important here: substantive outcomes in the global security environment**. “Unfairness,” in other words, is an overrated critique, and “**fairness” is an overrated destination**. At least **where nuclear weapons are concerned, there are more important considerations in play**. Let us not forget this.

#### 5. No link – the aff doesn't oppose nuclear acquisition on the basis of race, but on the development of command-and-control systems and security resources in new states

#### 6. They deflate threats and their authors are biased – under-balancing is more likely than overreacting which means err aff

Schweller 4 [Randall L. Schweller, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Ohio State University, “Unanswered Threats A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing,” International Security 29.2 (2004) 159-201, Muse]

Despite the historical frequency of underbalancing, little has been written on the subject. Indeed, Geoffrey Blainey's memorable observation that for "every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one page directly on the causes of peace" could have been made with equal veracity about overreactions to threats as opposed to underreactions to them.92 Library shelves are filled with books on the causes and dangers of exaggerating threats, ranging from studies of domestic politics to bureaucratic politics, to political psychology, to organization theory. By comparison, there have been few studies at any level of analysis or from any theoretical perspective that directly explain why states have with some, if not equal, regularity underestimated dangers to their survival. There may be some cognitive or normative bias at work here. Consider, for instance, that there is a commonly used word, paranoia, for the unwarranted fear that people are, in some way, "out to get you" or are planning to do one harm. I suspect that just as many people are afflicted with the opposite psychosis: the delusion that everyone loves you when, in fact, they do not even like you. Yet, we do not have a familiar word for this phenomenon. Indeed, I am unaware of any word that describes this pathology (hubris and overconfidence come close, but they plainly define something other than what I have described). That noted, international relations theory does have a frequently used phrase for the pathology of states' underestimation of threats to their survival, the so-called Munich analogy. The term is used, however, in a disparaging way by theorists to ridicule those who employ it. The central claim is that the naïveté associated with Munich and the outbreak of World War II has become an overused and inappropriate analogy because few leaders are as evil and unappeasable as Adolf Hitler. Thus, the analogy either mistakenly causes leaders [End Page 198] to adopt hawkish and overly competitive policies or is deliberately used by leaders to justify such policies and mislead the public. A more compelling explanation for the paucity of studies on under reactions to threats, however, is the tendency of theories to reflect contemporary issues as well as the desire of theorists and journals to provide society with policy—relevant theories that may help resolve or manage urgent security problems. Thus, born in the atomic age with its new balance of terror and an ongoing Cold War, the field of security studies has naturally produced theories of and prescriptions for national security that have had little to say about—and are, in fact, heavily biased against warnings of—the dangers of underreacting to or underestimating threats. After all, the nuclear revolution was not about overkill but, as Thomas Schelling pointed out, speed of kill and mutual kill.93 Given the apocalyptic consequences of miscalculation, accidents, or inadvertent nuclear war, small wonder that theorists were more concerned about overreacting to threats than under responding to them. At a time when all of humankind could be wiped out in less than twenty-five minutes, theorists may be excused for stressing the benefits of caution under conditions of uncertainty and erring on the side of inferring from ambiguous actions overly benign assessments of the opponent's intentions. The overwhelming fear was that a crisis "might unleash forces of an essentially military nature that overwhelm the political process and bring on a war that nobody wants. Many important conclusions about the risk of nuclear war, and thus about the political meaning of nuclear forces, rest on this fundamental idea."94 Now that the Cold War is over, we can begin to redress these biases in the literature. In that spirit, I have offered a domestic politics model to explain why threatened states often fail to adjust in a prudent and coherent way to dangerous changes in their strategic environment. The model fits nicely with recent realist studies on imperial under—and overstretch. Specifically, it is consistent with Fareed Zakaria's analysis of U.S. foreign policy from 1865 to 1889, when, he claims, the United States had the national power and opportunity to expand but failed to do so because it lacked sufficient state power (i.e., the state was weak relative to society).95 Zakaria claims that the United States did [End Page 199] not take advantage of opportunities in its environment to expand because it lacked the institutional state strength to harness resources from society that were needed to do so. I am making a similar argument with respect to balancing rather than expansion: incoherent, fragmented states are unwilling and unable to balance against potentially dangerous threats because elites view the domestic risks as too high, and they are unable to mobilize the required resources from a divided society. The arguments presented here also suggest that elite fragmentation and disagreement within a competitive political process, which Jack Snyder cites as an explanation for overexpansionist policies, are more likely to produce under balancing than overbalancing behavior among threatened incoherent states.96 This is because a balancing strategy carries certain political costs and risks with few, if any, compensating short-term political gains, and because the strategic environment is always somewhat uncertain. Consequently, logrolling among fragmented elites within threatened states is more likely to generate overly cautious responses to threats than overreactions to them. This dynamic captures the under reaction of democratic states to the rise of Nazi Germany during the interwar period.97 In addition to elite fragmentation, I have suggested some basic domestic-level variables that regularly intervene to thwart balance of power predictions.

#### 7. Perm do both

### A2 Cap K

### A2 Daesh K

#### Center the debate on whether or not the policy of the plan is a good idea – the aff is bound by topicality to defend a policy action and reps focus shifts the debate on an unpredictable basis. That's also key to topic education – anything else moots aff offense and ensures every debate about the infinite number of assumptions of the 1AC

#### At worst, let us weigh the aff against the kritik – preserves discussion of the aff and the K

#### Referring to the threat as radical Islamism is more accurate – strong research of motives confirms – anything else is inaccurate and makes counterterrorism impossible

Lohman 15 [(Walter, Director of The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center) “Call It What It Is: Islamist Extremism and Terrorism” Daily Signal January 16, 2015] AT

The initiative has produced a number of major research projects. Analysts initially looked at religious liberty in the largest Muslim-majority countries in the world, Egypt, Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Additionally, we have published other reports to expand on our policy recommendations and to address changing circumstances and trends in particular countries. Heritage has hosted multiple speakers and guest researchers over the years, Muslim and non-Muslim, on the topic. Most recently, Heritage released Pursuing a Freedom Agenda Amidst Rising Global Islamism and held a related public program to promote it. The report itself took more than a year of consultation to produce. It was thoroughly reviewed by a range of experts both internally and externally. Very early on in the Islam and Liberty initiative, we wrestled with what to call the threat. We settled on “Islamist extremism and terrorism.” We did so because, on the one hand, through our experience with Muslim friends and colleagues over the years we know that the threat to liberty is not from Muslims because they are Muslims. The threat emanates from a particular extreme interpretation of the faith – essentially a violent political ideology cast in religious terms. On the other hand, the threat cannot be honestly separated from its religious context. ISIS and al-Qaeda and the myriad of other violent Muslim extremist groups around the world may well be cults of murder masquerading as piety. However, we are not theologians. It is not up to us to say what Islam is and what it is not. When people kill or tyrannize populations in the name of religion, we must take them at their word. We must because we are engaged in a war of ideas. One cannot combat a tactic, terrorism. “Extremism” alone is meaningless. Calling the threat “Islamist” allows us to distinguish friend from foe and empower the good guys. There are Muslims among our friends in this fight and enemies among non-Muslims. In the end, we only aid our enemies by not calling the threat what it is.

#### Reps irrelevant to combating ISIS

Littlefield 16 [Heather Littlefield (associate teaching professor in linguistics at Northeastern University), "3Qs: What using the name ‘Daesh,’ rather than ‘ISIS’ or ‘ISIL,’ really means" Northeastern News, 2016] AZ

Using the word Daesh seems to be an effort to re-define the group from the outside. The group known by ISIS or ISIL is not happy with that. It wants to be taken as an Islamic state, which both ISIS and ISIL reference. But many have suggested that these terms are inaccurate and even offensive: ISIS/ISIL is not a legitimate nation-state, and it doesn’t represent Islam. The French government made the shift to Daesh in September 2014, adopting the term used by much of the Arab world. Now we in the U.S. are becoming aware of the term because of recent events in France. Emotionally, the choice of a name may help populations rally to a cause and help people feel like they are fighting against ISIS/ISIL, at least symbolically. But an individual word by itself can’t really alter the course of a war.

#### Daesh means the exact same thing as ISIS – it's an acronym for their full name

The majority of the media and government refer to the group as ISIS – forcing us to use Daesh decreases public understanding

#### CX proves it's not an effective substitute for policy – it doesn't increase empathy for Arabs or decrease Islamophobia

## Counterplans

### A2 PIC – TL

#### A blanket ban is key – a single country gaining a weapon means other countries will fear attack – ensures preemptive strikes

#### Only two countries are needed to run a nuclear arms race – states seek to one-up each other – that's Vick

### A2 Egypt PIC

#### Egypt’s nuclear deal makes it as a target—political instability and civil unrest.

Follett 16 [Andrew Follett, energy and environment reporter. “Egypt Gets $25 billion From Russia To Build Nuclear Reactors, Despite Terror Risk.” The Daily Caller News Foundation. May 23, 2016. http://dailycaller.com/2016/05/23/egypt-gets-25-billion-from-russia-to-build-nuclear-reactors-despite-terror-risk/] MSG

Egypt’s president announced Sunday the country will accept a Russian loan of $25 billion in order to build a nuclear power plant, despite recent terrorism and civil unrest in the country.¶ The loan will finance longstanding Egyptian plans to build a new reactor in Dabaa, despite long running terrorism concerns in the region. Egypt’s current president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, signed a nuclear power plant deal with Russia last November, just days after the Kremlin announced a Russian aircraft was downed by an act of terrorism, killing all 224 people on board. The plane was heading from an Egyptian resort city to St. Petersburg in Russia.¶ Groups tied to the Islamic State (ISIS) have made repeated attacks in Egypt, even killing nine people, six of whom were police officers, with a bomb in Cairo in January. Egypt is also politically unstable, and has changed presidents three times since 2011. The country’s former president, Mohamed Morsi, was removed from office by a military coup in 2013 and sentenced to death last May.¶ Egypt has planned to build a nuclear reactor since 1955, but aborted most of its plans after the Chernobyl accident. Egyptian interest in nuclear power was renewed after the country signed nuclear cooperation agreements with Russia in 2004 and 2008, according to the World Nuclear Association. Egypt currently operates two extremely small and old reactors with technical assistance from Russia and Argentina.¶ ¶ Sponsored Content¶ ¶ I Was Voting for Hillary, Until I Read This...¶ LifeDaily¶ ¶ After Losing 100lbs Mama June is Actually Gorgeous¶ Look Damn Good¶ ¶ 25 Unseen Photos Of Bill The Clintons Don't Want You To See¶ Frank151¶ Sponsored Links by¶ The proposed Egyptian reactors would not produce the weapons-grade plutonium necessary for a nuclear bomb, but materials from the planned reactors could be used to create dirty bombs.¶ A dirty bomb combines radioactive material with conventional explosives that could contaminate the local area with high radiation levels for long periods of time and cause mass panic. ISIS has expressed interest in stealing radioactive material for a dirty bomb — though it would be millions of times weaker than an actual nuclear device.¶ Russia has supported the development of nuclear power in other countries with terrorism issues, such as Algeria.¶ Serious issues with terrorist groups in Algeria, like al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) — a group of Islamist militants aimed to overthrow the Algerian government and create an Islamic state — have also not hampered Russia’s desire to build nuclear reactors. AQIM is designated as a terrorist organization by U.S. officials. The group even pledged allegiance to the ISIS in late Feburary.¶

### A2 Turkey PIC

#### Turkey key – ISIS supply routes

Lin 16 [Christina Lin (Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University), "The risk of nuclear terrorism via ISIS’ supply line through Turkey," Asia Times, 4/1/2016] AZ

Nuke guard murdered During the attacks, a guard who worked for G4S security at a Belgian nuclear research center was also murdered, raising the prospect of an ISIS plot to attack the facility and release radioactive waste into the atmosphere, or to steal radioactive material for a dirty bomb. Now, two Belgian nuclear power plant workers at Doel have joined ISIS, with important knowledge of the nuclear sites that could be exploited by the terrorist group.[3] As a result, Brussels has stepped up security and posted armed guards at the country’s nuclear facilities. Meanwhile, the fear of ISIS and nuclear terrorism looms large at the nuclear summit, where leaders from more than 50 countries have gathered to wrestle with this daunting prospect. The havoc a nuclear terrorist attack could wreak in an urban area like New York, London, or Berlin is urgent enough that the leaders scheduled a special session on this threat during the two-day summit. CIA chief fingers Turkey route However, a key remedy to address this threat was already underscored back in February by CIA Chief John-Brennan — cutting off ISIS supply line through Turkey. On Feb. 11, during a taped interview on CBS News’s 60 Minutes, Brennan disclosed ISIS has acquired WMD attack capability, used chemical weapons on the battlefield a number of times, and may attempt to sell them to conduct attacks on western and other countries. As such Brennan warned that “it’s so important to cut off the various transportation routes and smuggling routes that they have used.” These routes go through Turkey; however, Erdogan is opposed to sealing ISIS’ supply line. In a Guardian article last November entitled “Turkey could cut off Islamic State’s supply lines. So why doesn’t it?,” David Graeber questioned Ankara’s motives in keeping the supply line open through Turkey. [4] This week, it was revealed that in a closed-door meeting with US politicians back in January, Jordan’s King Abdullah accused Turkey of exporting terrorists to Europe.[5] The King informed US congressional members that the AKP sought a “radical Islamic solution” to the Middle East and that exporting terrorists to Europe is “part of Turkish policy,” while stoking the refugee crisis as a form of hybrid warfare to extract concessions from the EU. He also pointed out how Turkey profits from sale of ISIS oil, an issue Russia has highlighted the past months. China aware of threat China shares this suspicion. Writing in CCTV, Professor Han Xudong from PLA National Defense University observed that Turkey’s invasion of northern Iraq in October was likely to keep borders open for Turkish “convoys” to enter Turkey from Iraq, since “with the increase of air power by the Russian air force, it has become more difficult for the “convoys” to enter Turkey from Syria.”[6] By deploying troops, Turkey can thus protect the convoys entering from the Iraq side, and Han surmised “Turkey’s action may appear to the international community that Turkey intends to protect and expand the Islamic State.” All this takes place against the backdrop of allegations that Erdogan is using ISIS as a proxy force to fight Assad and the Kurds. It’s also alleged that Erdogan’s family personally profits from sale of ISIS oil. Despite such suspicions, the US and EU in the past, have appeased the Turkish leader’s demands to shift the anti-ISIS campaign to one that is anti-Assad and anti-Kurd. However, the specter of ISIS acquiring WMD capability to conduct nuclear terrorism is a game changer. As such, the major powers need to double down to seal the border between ISIS and Turkey. They must no longer accommodate Erdogan and hold the world’s safety hostage to his personal agenda for the Middle East.

#### Turkey uniquely likely to have meltdowns

Demircan 15 [Pinar Demarican (Turkish activist-researcher, working on climate and energy issues at Yesil Gazete. She is Project coordinator of Nukleersiz.org. Particularly after the Fukushima accident, she has been focusing on anti-nuclear struggles, where her earlier decade-long experience of working with Japanese companies has helped. She has undertaken several initiatives recently to spread awareness about Fukushima in Turkey and mobilise opinion against the proposed Japan-Turkey nuclear agreement), “Turkey’s nuclear obsession is dangerous and entirely misplaced," DiaNuke, 10/27/2015] AZ

Turkey is a country who signed Atom for Peace in 1955 as the first country in the world. In 1962 Turkish Atom Energy Agency were established for the first time but later it became Turkish Atomic Energy Institution (TAEK) in 1965 . Since then, Turkey have had the desire of establishing nuclear power plants strong and has tried bidding process 4 times but never succeeded (1965, 1972, 1982, 1993) to build a nuclear plant, but they were all resulted without success One reason to the failure was strong public opposition against nukes but there was also some other reasons such as political and economic crisis repeating every 10 year. Turkey does not have a good record about nuclear, including its ineffective response to the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Chernobyl Effects Turkey is one of the countries who have been suffering from Chernobyl nuclear accident in 1986. The radioactive cloud from Chernobyl flew over Turkey for mainly ten days. Five days after the Chernobyl accident, the radiation Western Black Sea measured was 20 times higher than the norm, and it was 1000 times higher Thrace (Western Turkey) . Unfortunately iodine tablets were not distributed for the people of Black sea same as it was done for the people in Eastern Europe regions. Due to radioactive contamination of tea plant in 1986 in May 48,000 tons of tea widely contaminated with cesium-137 were mixed with 130 000 tons of previous year’s tea. In Turkey tea is consumed approximately 10 thousand tonnes of tea per year. Knowing that a packet of tea weighs 1 kilo, it means they drank a mixture contaminated for 13 years. “Everything is under control! Drink Tea and Eat nuts! Nuts also is a product of Blacksea. A little radiation is even good for health! “said Minister of Health to television after the Chernobyl accident. Three years after the first cases of cancer have appeared in the region of the Black Sea. 28 years later, the hospitals are still filled with people of cancer disease. In the 20 years since Chernobyl, the number of cancer cases has increased dramatically, especially in the Black Sea region , but no scientific studies in this area could be performed. Mortality accident in a country without nuclear power plant Although not possessing atomic power plant, Turkey has already undergone radiation accidents mortals. In December 1998, the radioactive material was thrown into a single discharge from a hospital. Turkish Atomic Energy Institution (TAEK) which was established to regulate radioactive issues in 1962 , was convicted for not inspecting the safety conditions of the hospital properly. There was one fatal case and it was estimated that 19 people were hospitalized within total 300 people who had radioactive illness. Lead factory causing cancer cases in Izmir In December 2012, another scandal has been revealed: An old lead factory, Aslan Avcı Ltd, was storing radioactive waste since 2007 in Izmir. Following the investigation of a journalist alerted by local residents who faced a resurgence cancer and malformations, Antinuclear Platform and the lawyers made scientific analysis and made public visits. TAEK did not accept its responsibility not to be guilty but confirmed that there has been radioactive pollution, and it will be cleaned up by May 2015. Unfortunately the company who was selected to make decontamination of radioactivity did not apply for CED and started its process without receiving CED approval although it is legally forced to do so, as a result radioactivity is spread into the air, soil,water and surroundings where people are living.The Gaziemir case is still at court to force the decontamination company to apply CED. Even Change.org campaign is released by opponents from public to avoid such radioactivity contamination. Moreover, the bay of Akkuyu marked for construction of a nuclear power plant is only 25 km from an active seismic fault. An earthquake of magnitude 7.5 occurred in Akkuyu in 1872. Today the situation is delicate when we know that he did not produce earthquake6-7 magnitude in the last half-millennium: this suggests that tensions have steadily accumulate within in this period. Another active fault starting from Mersin to the west, that of Kozan, joins the sea Akkuyu Bay.

#### Turkey uranium is used for prolif and vulnerable to terrorists

Demircan 15 [Pinar Demarican (Turkish activist-researcher, working on climate and energy issues at Yesil Gazete. She is Project coordinator of Nukleersiz.org. Particularly after the Fukushima accident, she has been focusing on anti-nuclear struggles, where her earlier decade-long experience of working with Japanese companies has helped. She has undertaken several initiatives recently to spread awareness about Fukushima in Turkey and mobilise opinion against the proposed Japan-Turkey nuclear agreement), “Turkey’s nuclear obsession is dangerous and entirely misplaced," DiaNuke, 10/27/2015] AZ

Military dimension has always a part of nuclear power plant projects since uranium enrichment processes are used to make nuclear bomb and also nuclear waste is a resource to produce it. Actually we see “uranium enrichment” as a statement in the agreement signed between Japanese and Turkish governments for Sinop. It is frightening to see uranium enrichment and fuel processing was mentioned and Turkey was enabled to produce plutonium for Turkey itself. In Mersin /Akkuyu there is no information about where the nuclear waste storages will be and which party (Turkish/Russian) will be responsible party to take the wastes after cooling processes of 10 years and how will it be performed.

### A2 UAE PIC

#### UAE is key – that's where Russia is setting up their offices

#### UAE is key

Hibbs 14 [Mark Hibbs, (Senior Associate in Nuclear Policy Program), Vietnam is Not a Nuclear Proliferation Problem," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 5/12/2014] AZ

Because uranium enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) can be used for both peaceful and non-peaceful aims, the future expansion of these capabilities should be limited. But the contexts for the UAE and Vietnam agreements are very different. Congress should not stand in the way of the Vietnam agreement on nonproliferation grounds.

The UAE is one of a tiny number of countries which is immensely endowed with energy fuels, and its nuclear power aims therefore prompted suspicions because conflicting states in its neighborhood for decades secretly developed ENR capabilities. In light of this background, it made sense for the UAE to formally forego ENR in persuading foreign technology holders that it could be trusted with nuclear power.

The State Department’s architects of the U.S.-UAE agreement understood that the UAE case was unique and did not argue that its terms should be a global template for all future such agreements. Vietnam shows why.

### A2 Saudi Arabia PIC

#### Saudi Arabia and UAE vulnerable to terrorist attack

Follett 6/27/2016 [Andrew Follett, "Arab World Is About To Finish Its First Nuclear Reactor," Daily Caller]

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is on the verge of completing the Arab world’s first nuclear reactor. The UAE is merely the first Arab country to embrace nuclear energy and many new reactors are planned in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia plans to construct 16 nuclear power reactors over the next 20 years at a cost of more than $80 billion, with the first reactor coming on line in 2022. The country has planned to build a nuclear reactor since 2006, thanks to financial help from Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Muslim countries, as well as technical assistance from France and Iran. The UAE’s first nuclear plant will also house three other reactors, which should be completed in 2018, 2019 and 2020. When the plant is finished, it will provide a quarter of the country’s electricity, generating 5,600 megawatts of power. The reactors would not produce the weapons-grade plutonium necessary for a nuclear bomb, but materials from the reactors could be used to create dirty bombs. A dirty bomb combines radioactive material with conventional explosives that could contaminate the local area with high radiation levels for long periods of time and cause mass panic. The Islamic State (ISIS) has expressed interest in stealing radioactive material for a dirty bomb — though it would be millions of times weaker than an actual nuclear device. The UAE is relatively stable by Middle Eastern standards, but has sent numerous fighters to ISIS, is at a risk of terrorism and two of the 9/11 hijackers were from the country — Saudi Arabia is even more unstable, as the country produced fifteen of the nineteen hijackers. America currently operates 99 nuclear reactors across 61 commercially-operated nuclear power plants, according to the Energy Information Administration. Of the 66 new nuclear reactors under construction worldwide, only four of them are being built in the U.S. — just enough to compensate for shutting down older reactors. Instead of building more modern reactors, the government is planning to simply extend the operating licenses — which is against the advice of its own technical staff. America could get less than 10 percent of its electricity from nuclear by 2050, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

#### Nuclear power plants would have been targeted

Raman 08 – Director of the Institute For Topical Studies [B. Raman (Additional Secretary (retired ), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, “MUMBAI TERRORIST STRIKE: THE ANTI-ISRAELI ANGLE,” INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM MONITOR, PAPER NO. 476, 4-Dec-2008

9. As mentioned in my book titled “Terrorism---Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow” (www.lancerpublishers.com ), in a travel advisory on its Hebrew language Web site, posted on December 13,2006, Israel's Foreign Ministry had said: "Within the framework of al Qaeda's terror threats in India, there is now a concrete threat focusing on the Goa region where multitudes of visitors, including Israelis, gather ... in late December. Israel's Counter-Terrorism Authority has recommended that Israeli citizens stay away from sites in Goa popular with Westerners and Israelis over the next few weeks." 10. On December 15, 2006, DEBKA, a non-governmental Israeli think-tank, which disseminates information and analyses relating to terrorism, posted the following comments on its web site (www.debka.com): "Information has reached Jerusalem that al Qaeda is in an advanced stage of preparing coordinated attacks on the big, end-of-year seasonal parties held by Western and Israeli tourists in the Indian province. Israeli travelers are advised to cancel their trips to Goa or at least stay away from the big parties. Some 4,000 Israelis have booked flights to India for the winter season. They will be joining the thousands living there. A standing terror warning is still in force for Egyptian Sinai and Turkey." 11. Ever since the terrorist strikes by pro-Al Qaeda Jemmah Islamiya (JI) in the Indonesian tourist resort of Bali in October, 2002, and again in October, 2005, the Indian security agencies in their plans for strengthening physical security have been taking into account the vulnerability of the Indian tourism infrastructure---and particularly in places such as Goa. A greater physical security alert is maintained in places such as Goa, even in the absence of specific information of a planned terrorist strike. 12. There was a greater alert during 2006 following the reported arrest on March 11, 206, of Tarique Jalal alias Tarique Batlo, a Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen cadre, from the Margoa railway station. It was reported that one kg of RDX, two Russian-made hand-grenades, two electronic detonators, two cameras and a mobile phone were seized from him. This was followed by the arrest on March 30, 2006, at Jelenabad in Gulbarga, Karnataka, of Shamim Ahmad, a suspected activist of the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), who was reportedly a resident of Goa. An AK-47, two hand grenades, a mobile phone, maps of dams and power grid installations in Andhra Pradesh, some audio-video cassettes and printed material in Urdu were reportedly seized from him. These arrests indicated the possibility of the presence of sleeper cells of Pakistani and Kashmiri jihadi terrorist organisations in Goa---not necessarily for organising terrorist strikes in Goa itself, but for providing back-up support to jihadi terrorist strikes in other parts of India. 13. In the beginning of November, 2006, the Goa police reportedly sought reinforcements of para-military forces to enable them to provide effective security during the International Film Festival at Goa and during the holiday season. Their reported threat perceptions particularly related to the LET and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), both Pakistani jihadi terrorist organisations aligned with Al Qaeda in the International Islamic Front (IIF). 14. Media reports dated November 2, 2006, had quoted Shri D. K. Sawant, Superintendent of Police, North Goa, as saying: "There is no specific threat to IFFI (the international film festival). The police department is taking major precautions as the intelligence agencies have indicated a possible threat of suicide bombing which can target pubs, Army camps and nuclear plants." He was referring to threat possibilities all over India and not specifically in Goa.

#### Saudi Arabia has the greatest financial resources and political opaqueness – it's most likely to proliferate and fund other Sunni proliferation in the region

### A2 Jordan PIC

#### ISIS is strong in Jordan

### A2 Thorium PIC

#### 1. Perm – do the counterplan – Egypt has no thorium reactors yet, so banning energy minus thorium is consistent with banning nuclear energy outright

#### 2. Doesn’t solve relations – CP leaves open ties between Russia and Egypt, but merely changes which reactors Russia will attempt to provide Egypt with – only the plan’s complete ban of nuclear energy renounces Russian energy influence in Egypt

#### [CP makes Russian relations worse – Egypt would be indebted to Russia for providing novel new technology that bolsters national pride]

#### 3. Be highly skeptical of their solvency – scientists and pundits have an incentive to overstate the benefits of new technology to gain readers and funding – thorium lacks testing outside the laboratory and can’t be trusted

#### **4. Their solvency assumes proper use of reactors – but insider threats allows ISIS to infiltrate and misuse the reactors to weaponize them**

Touran, 3/22 – PhD in Nuclear Engineering, BSE and MSE in nuclear engineering, and working as a reactor physicist on the design of an advanced nuclear reactor for a nuclear innovation company since 2009 (Nick, “Myths about Thorium nuclear fuel,” What is Nuclear? 2014, http://www.whatisnuclear.com/articles/thorium\_myths.html)//vivienne

Dear Internet, we need to have a talk about Thorium. It has many good attributes as a nuclear fuel, but the things being said on the internet have become largely misleading, if not all-out inaccurate. Every internet person I meet in real life who finds out that I am a nuclear engineer asks me why we aren’t using the end-all, be-all that is thorium. Every post regarding nuclear energy on reddit is packed full of comments claiming that Thorium will end all concerns about nuclear energy and that Uranium is only in use due to some dark dark conspiracy. Example: "So why did they go down the Uranium path? Because it was the military running the program, and Thorium reactors aren’t weaponizable." Misleading and half false! Yes, Uranium fuel was certainly developed because it was the easist path to weapons at the time, but these days, the owner of a thorium reactor could certainly make a bomb from it. So they are weaponizable. The internet has become an echo-chamber for this kind of thing and we need to stop it. This page will try to point people in the right direction if they get lost, using things like references and whatnot. And we’ll make a wall of shame where anyone who perpetuates a myth will get to be displayed. To learn about Thorium for real, we feature a page about Thorium as nuclear fuel, as well as a big page about the fluid fueled molten salt reactors (MSRs) that are good at using it. If you think we’re too negative-nancy here, go check out those pages. We love Thorium and think it has a bright future, both in solid and fluid fueled reactors. I personally have studied it a huge amount and many years ago considered getting a THORIUM vanity plate. As we claim elsewhere and throughout comment posts abound, we just think that people need to remain calm and accurate when discussing its merits and demerits. Thorium Myth #1: Development of Thorium-based molten salt reactors got cancelled because they couldn’t make bombs! Quite False. Not only can they be used to make bombs (see Myth #3), but they also were not canceled for any weapons-related reason. One of the most lucid descriptions of what happened to molten salt reactors like the LFTR can be found on page 49 of WASH-1222 [1]. There, they describe a few privately-funded working group studies of the MSBR, including the Molten Salt Breeder Reactor Associates (consisting of the engineering firm Black & Veatch and five midwestern utilities) and the Molten Salt Group, headed by Ebasco Services, Inc. (with 5 other industrial firms and fifteen utilities involved). These groups concluded that the MSBR (basically the LFTR) is attractive and potentially cheaper than LWRs. They said that a demonstration plant is warranted, but the performance cannot be predicted with confidence. Then, a list of factors that limit industrial involvement is given. They include (verbatim): The existing major industrial and utility commitments to the LWR, HTGR, and LMFBR. The lack of incentive for industrial investment in supplying fuel cycle services, such as those required for solid fuel reactors. The overwhelming manufacturing and operating experience with solid fuel reactors in contrast with the very limited involvement with fluid fueled reactors. The less advanced state of MSBR technology and the lack of demonstrated solutions to the major technical problems associated with the MSBR concept. It had nothing to do with weapons. Weapons were produced with graphite or heavy-water moderated production reactors and with gas centrifuge enrichment. Oh, and thermonuclear weapons require tritium as well, which is something that many Thorium MSR designs excel in producing (darn that lithium!). The commercial LWRs had nothing to do with making bomb material. Stop the nonsense. Earlier history will point you to Rickover’s USS Nautilus, which acted as the engineering demonstration of the light water reactor. Since the Navy had already developed the LWR, the commercial industry was much more comfortable going with it and scaling it up. Thorium Myth #2: Thorium reactors never need enrichment! Misleading at best. The nice thing about any breeder reactor (using Th-U or U-Pu) is that eventually they can become fissile self-sufficient, meaning they breed more (or equal) fissile material than they consume. The first electricity-producing reactor in the world (EBR-I in Idaho, 1951) was created to demonstrate that breeding was possible (in a liquid-metal cooled fast breeder reactor, or LMFBR). Any breeder reactor concept on the planet can run without additional enrichment (or some other external source of fissile material) after their initial startup by breeding fissile material out of fertile material like Th-232 or U-238. But you have to start your reactor up with fissile material from somewhere. If you take a vat of Thorium and try to turn it on, you'll be sorely disappointed because it cannot possibly sustain a chain reaction, under any circumstances. So you start it up with denatured bombs or enriched U-235 and then it becomes self-sufficient on Th-232 or U-238. I occasionally read misleading things that say Thorium will just fire right up. Alas. It should be noted, however, that the key advantage of Th fuel is that it allows thermal breeding. This means that you can start up a Th-based breeder with substantially less fissile material than you need to start an equivalent-powered fast breeder reactor. Once started, the fast breeder will make far more fissile material (because they make have a better breeding neutron economy), but the amount of fissile in fast spectrum reactors is always more than in thermal reactors. TL;DR: They do to start up, and U-Pu breeders like the LMFBR can do the same so it’s not Thorium specific. Thorium Myth #3: Thorium reactors cannot make bombs! False! They can indeed make bombs. Thorium reactors work by breeding Th-232 through Protactinium-233 (27.4 day half life) and into Uranium-233, which is fissile. Pa-233 is a pretty strong neutron absorber, so the MSBR (basically the LFTR) has to extract it from the core once it is produced and let it decay to U-233 away from the neutrons. Once the U-233 is created, it gets fed back into the reactor. Well, if you went rogue, you could build up a little excess reactivity (maybe add some low-enriched U235?) and then divert the freshly-bred U-233 into a weapons stream to make U-233 nuclear bombs. It may be difficult to do this several times without going subcritical, but it certainly could be done. A U-233-filled bomb has been tested before, and it worked just fine. Here’s a quote from a Frank von Hippel paper on the subject [2]: "On the one hand, gamma radiation from U-232 makes the U-233 from high- burnup U-233-thorium fuel cycles more of a radiation hazard than plutonium. On the other hand, because of its low rate of spontaneous-neutron emission, U-233 can, unlike plutonium, be used in simple gun-type fission-weapon designs without significant danger of the yield being reduced by premature initiation of the fission chain reaction" And another (also [2]): "In the case of the molten-salt U-233 breeder reactor, it was proposed to have continual chemical processing of a stream of liquid fuel. Such an arrangement also offers a way to completely bypass the U-232 contamination problem because 27-day half-life Pa- 233 could be separated out before it decays into U-233." Options to make bomb-making less favorable include fostering substantial U-232 contamination in the reactor and denaturing the U-233 with U-238 that keeps the in-reactor inventory safe. Both of these options can conceptually be bypassed in the Pa separation route though. Besides, U-232 isn’t releasing the gammas, its decay products are, and it has a 70 year half-life. So you can just chemically purify your stolen goods and then make the bomb anytime within the next decade or so. There are about a dozen other ways people try to amp up the proliferation resistance of various fuel cycles. But they always forget that the owner of such a plant can secretly install a chemical cell that does Pa separation. Really, most civilian power to bombs proliferation paths are mythical, in any reactor! But since the consequences of proliferation are so dire, nuclear power plants need to have baseline proliferation safeguards in place. Thorium-powered reactors, whether fluid fueled or not, are no exception.

#### Weaponized thorium is worse – easier to build and literally short-circuits safety checks

Edwards, 13– Ph.D., President at the Canadian Coalition for Nuclear Responsibility (Gordon, “Thorium Reactors and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: “The Promise and Peril of Thorium”,” Pressenza Hong Kong, 2014, http://www.pressenza.com/2013/08/thorium-reactors-and-nuclear-weapons-proliferation-the-promise-and-peril-of-thorium/)//vivienne

Any type of HEU is weapons-usable, even if it is not weapons-grade. Most commercial power reactors use only Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) as fuel; LEU cannot be used as a nuclear explosive due to the excessive amount of uranium-238 that it contains. It is a slow, difficult, time-consuming process to enrich uranium — but once weapons-grade uranium is produced, it is rather easy to make a powerful atomic bomb with it. All that is needed is a “gun-type” mechanism to bring two pieces of HEU together very rapidly, by firing a uranium “bullet” into a uranium “target”. The Hiroshima bomb was made in this fashion. The gun-type mechanism is so simple there is no need to test it. It was guaranteed to work the very first time it was tried. As indeed it did…. If weapons-grade uranium falls into criminal hands, the construction of a powerful atomic bomb is a relatively simple matter. No testing is needed. That is why the civilian use of HEU is being phased out — it’s just too dangerous to allow this material to remain in commercial circulation. B. Plutonium — Created from Uranium-238 Plutonium does not exist in nature; but it is created inside every reactor that uses natural uranium or low-enriched uranium as fuel. Some of the uranium-238 atoms in the fuel absorb stray neutrons, and those atoms are transmuted into plutonium atoms. It turns out that plutonium is a more powerful nuclear explosive than HEU. Plutonium is in fact more powerful than weapons-grade uranium. Obtaining plutonium involves a chemical extraction process that requires dissolving highly radioactive “used nuclear fuel” in boiling nitric acid — not an easy task! This makes it difficult to divert the plutonium from civilian nuclear reactors into bombs, unless the plutonium has already been extracted ahead of time. Once the plutonium has been separated from the rest of the radioactive garbage, it can be packaged and transported without detection fairly easily. Using plutonium as a nuclear explosive does require a more elaborate bomb mechanism than the “gun-type” uranium bomb design. A sophisticated “implosion mechanism” is needed. That requires the simultaneous detonation of shaped charges (conventional explosives) surrounding a perfectly spherical ball of plutonium. Such an implosion device is by no means simple; it requires painstaking engineering and careful testing. The Nagasaki bomb was made in this fashion. It was tested months ahead of time at Alamogordo, New Mexico. All reactor-produced plutonium is weapons-usable, but nuclear weapons designers prefer to use plutonium with a very high percentage of plutonium-239 and a low percentage of plutonium-240. Such material is called “weapons grade plutonium”. Although plutonium-240 is a nuclear explosive material, its presence complicates the job of the bomb-maker in two ways: (1) it makes the explosive material more difficult to handle because of higher levels of radio- activity and heat; (2) it makes the power of the nuclear explosion less predictable because it produces a lot of stray neutrons. Despite these complications, any type of plutonium can be used to make reliable, highly effective nuclear weapons at all levels of technical sophistication. See http://www.ccnr.org/Findings\_plute.html C. Uranium-233 — Created from Thorium-232 As previously remarked, naturally occurring thorium — thorium-232 — is the raw material from which a new kind of uranium — uranium-233 — can be created. All that’s needed is to bombard thorium-232 with neutrons. The easiest way to do that is to put the thorium inside a nuclear reactor, where neutrons are abundant. (Of course the reactor has to be fuelled by uranium or plutonium, otherwise there will be no neutrons.) When a thorium-232 atom absorbs a stray neutron it is transmuted into an atom of protactinium-233, which then spontaneously transmutes itself into an atom of uranium-233 — a type of uranium not found in nature. It turns out that uranium-233 is immediately weapons usable without the need for any kind of enrichment. It is a more powerful explosive than uranium-235, and — unlike plutonium — it can be used in a simple gun-type device, like the Hiroshima bomb. Thus uranium-233 avoids one of the complications posed by the use of uranium-235 (the need for enrich- ment) as well as one of the complications associated with plutonium (the need for an implosion mechanism). There is however another complication that arises. When thorium is placed inside a nuclear reactor, there is another type of uranium created called uranium-232. Although uranium-232 is also a nuclear explosive material, it is highly undesirable because it gives off an extremely powerful burst of gamma radiation — so powerful, in fact, that it can seriously damage electronic equipment. The more uranium-233 is contaminated with uranium-232 the more difficult it is to use it as a nuclear explosive. But, as the article cited above (see link) points out, it is relatively easy to avoid this contamination problem. All that is required is to chemically separate the protactinium-233 at an early stage, remove it from the reactor environment, and then simply wait until it has almost all changed into uranium-233. In this way a stockpile of weapons-grade uranium-233 can be produced that is uncontaminated with uranium-232 and virtually trouble-free for making any type of nuclear weapon, including gun-type A-bombs. The reason this works is due to the absence of neutrons outside the reactor environment. Uranium-232 is created only in the presence of neutrons, and outside the reactor there aren’t any neutrons — so no uranium-232 is being produced. But protactinium-233 becomes uranium-233 spontaneously, without any need for neutrons. So by separating the protactinium-233 from the rest of the irradiated thorium, the potential bomb-maker gets lots of uranium-233, and virtually no uranium-232.

#### 5. Thorium increases waste – their argument doesn’t assume the increased number of reactors

Rees, 11– Reporter for the Ecologist (Eifion, “Don't believe the spin on thorium being a ‘greener’ nuclear option,” Ecologist, June 23, http://www.theecologist.org/News/news\_analysis/952238/dont\_believe\_the\_spin\_on\_thorium\_being\_a\_greener\_nuclear\_option.html)//vivienne

And yet the nuclear industry itself is also sceptical, with none of the big players backing what should be – in PR terms and in a post-Fukushima world – its radioactive holy grail: safe reactors producing more energy for less and cheaper fuel.   In fact, a 2010 National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) report concluded the thorium fuel cycle ‘does not currently have a role to play in the UK context [and] is likely to have only a limited role internationally for some years ahead’ – in short, it concluded, the claims for thorium were ‘overstated’. Proponents counter that the NNL paper fails to address the question of MSR technology, evidence of its bias towards an industry wedded to PWRs. Reliant on diverse uranium/plutonium revenue streams – fuel packages and fuel reprocessing, for example – the nuclear energy giants will never give thorium a fair hearing, they say. But even were its commercial viability established, given 2010’s soaring greenhouse gas levels, thorium is one magic bullet that is years off target. Those who support renewables say they will have come so far in cost and efficiency terms by the time the technology is perfected and upscaled that thorium reactors will already be uneconomic. Indeed, if renewables had a fraction of nuclear’s current subsidies they could already be light years ahead.    Extra radioactive waste All other issues aside, thorium is still nuclear energy, say environmentalists, its reactors disgorging the same toxic byproducts and fissile waste with the same millennial half-lives. Oliver Tickell, author of Kyoto2, says the fission materials produced from thorium are of a different spectrum to those from uranium-235, but ‘include many dangerous-to-health alpha and beta emitters’. Tickell says thorium reactors would not reduce the volume of waste from uranium reactors. ‘It will create a whole new volume of radioactive waste, on top of the waste from uranium reactors. Looked at in these terms, it’s a way of multiplying the volume of radioactive waste humanity can create several times over.’ Putative waste benefits – such as the impressive claims made by former Nasa scientist Kirk Sorensen, one of thorium’s staunchest advocates – have the potential to be outweighed by a proliferating number of MSRs. There are already 442 traditional reactors already in operation globally, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The by-products of thousands of smaller, ostensibly less wasteful reactors would soon add up. Anti-nuclear campaigner Peter Karamoskos goes further, dismissing a ‘dishonest fantasy’ perpetuated by the pro-nuclear lobby. Thorium cannot in itself power a reactor; unlike natural uranium, it does not contain enough fissile material to initiate a nuclear chain reaction. As a result it must first be bombarded with neutrons to produce the highly radioactive isotope uranium-233 – ‘so these are really U-233 reactors,’ says Karamoskos. This isotope is more hazardous than the U-235 used in conventional reactors, he adds, because it produces U-232 as a side effect (half life: 160,000 years), on top of familiar fission by-products such as technetium-99 (half life: up to 300,000 years) and iodine-129 (half life: 15.7 million years).  Add in actinides such as protactinium-231 (half life: 33,000 years) and it soon becomes apparent that thorium’s superficial cleanliness will still depend on digging some pretty deep holes to bury the highly radioactive waste. Thorium for the UK? With billions of pounds already spent on nuclear research, reactor construction and decommissioning costs – dwarfing commitments to renewables – and proposed reform of the UK electricity markets apparently hiding subsidies to the nuclear industry, the thorium dream is considered by many to be a dangerous diversion. Energy consultant and former Friends of the Earth anti-nuclear campaigner Neil Crumpton says the government would be better deferring all decisions about its new nuclear building plans and fuel reprocessing until the early 2020s: ‘By that time much more will be known about Generation IV technologies including LFTRs and their waste-consuming capability.’ In the meantime, says Jean McSorley, senior consultant for Greenpeace’s nuclear campaign, the pressing issue is to reduce energy demand and implement a major renewables programme in the UK and internationally – after all, even conventional nuclear reactors will not deliver what the world needs in terms of safe, affordable electricity, let alone a whole raft of new ones. ‘Even if thorium technology does progress to the point where it might be commercially viable, it will face the same problems as conventional nuclear: it is not renewable or sustainable and cannot effectively connect to smart grids. The technology is not tried and tested, and none of the main players is interested. Thorium reactors are no more than a distraction.’

#### 6. Thorium requires reprocessing – creates a vulnerability for terrorist use

Edwards, 11 – PhD and President at the Canadian Coalition for the Nuclear Responsibility (Gordon, “Thorium Reactors: Back to the Dream Factory: The Nuclear Dream Factory,” July 13, Forgotten People, http://forgottennavajopeople.org/2011/07/14/7132011-thorium-reactors-back-to-the-dream-factory-the-nuclear-dream-factory/)//vivienne

Thorium is not a nuclear fuel: The fundamental fact about **thorium is** that it is **NOT a nuclear fuel**, because thorium is not a fissile material, meaning that it cannot sustain a nuclear fission chain reaction. In fact the ONLY naturally occurring fissile material is uranium-235, and so — of necessity — that is the material that fuels all of the first-generation reactors in the entire world. Thorium cannot replace uranium-235 in this regard. Not at all. Thorium is a “fertile” material: But thorium-232, which is a naturally occurring radioactive material, is about three times as abundant as uranium-238, which is also a naturally occurring radioactive material. Neither of these materials can be used directly as a nuclear fuel, because they are not “fissile” materials. However, both uranium-238 and thorium-232 are “fertile” materials, which means that IF they are placed in the core of a nuclear reactor (one that is of necessity fuelled by a fissile material), some fraction of those fertile atoms will be transmuted into man-made fissile atoms. Some uranium-238 atoms get transmuted into plutonium-239 atoms, and some thorium-232 atoms get transmuted into uranium-233 atoms. Both plutonium-239 and uranium-233 are fissile materials which are not naturally-occurring. They are both usable as either fuel for nuclear reactors or as nuclear explosive materials for bombs. (The USA exploded an atomic bomb made from U-233 in 1955.) Reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel: In general, to obtain quantities of plutonium-239 or uranium-233, it is necessary to “reprocess” the irradiated material that started out as uranium-238 or thorium-232. This means dissolving that irradiated material in acid and then chemically separating out the fissile plutonium-239 or uranium-233, leaving behind the liquid radioactive wastes which include fission products (broken pieces of split atoms, including such things as iodine-131, cesium-137, strontium-90, etc.) and other radioactive waste materials called “activation products” and “transuranic elements” Reprocessing is the dirtiest process in the entire nuclear fuel chain, because of the gaseous radioactive releases, liquid radioactive discharges, and large quantities of highly dangerous and easily dispersible radioactive liquids. Reprocessing also poses great proliferation risks because it produces man-made fissile materials which can be incorporated into nuclear weapons of various kinds by anyone who acquires the separated fissile material. Advanced Fuel Cycles and Breeders: “Any nuclear reactor-fuelling regime that requires reprocessing, or that uses plutonium-239 or uranium-233 as a primary reactor fuel, is called an “advanced fuel cycle”. These advanced fuel cycles are intimately related with the idea of a “breeder” reactor — one which creates as much or more fissile material as a byproduct than the amount of fissile material used to fuel the reactor. So it is only in this context that thorium reactors make any sense at all — like all breeder concepts, they are designed to extend the fuel supply of nuclear reactors and thus prolong the nuclear age by centuries. The breeder concept is very attractive to those who envisage a virtually limitless future for nuclear reactors, because the naturally occurring uranium-235 supply is not going to outlast the oil supply. Without advanced fuel cycles, nuclear power is doomed to be just a “flash in the pan”. Thorium reactors are most enthusiastically promoted by those who see “plutonium breeders” as the only other realistic alternative to bring about a long-lived nuclear future. They think that thorium/uranium-233 is a better fate than uranium/plutonium-239. They do not see a nuclear phaseout as even remotely feasible or attractive. “Molten Salt” reactors : Molten salt reactors are not a new idea, and they do not in any way require the use of thorium — although historically the two concepts have often been linked. The basic idea of using molten salt instead of water (light or heavy water) as a coolant has a number of distinct advantages, chief of which is the ability to achieve much higher temperatures (650 deg. C instead of 300 deg. C) than with water cooled reactors, and at a much lower vapour pressure. The higher temperature means greater efficiency in converting the heat into electricity, and the lower pressure means less likelihood of an over-pressure rupture of pipes, and less drastic consequences of such ruptures if and when they do occur. Molten salt reactors were researched at Oak Ridge Tennessee throughout the 1960s, culminating in the Molten Salt Reactor Experiment (MSRE), producing 7.4 megawatts of heat but no electricity. It was an early prototype of a thorium breeder reactor, using uranium and plutonium as fuels but not using the thorium blanket which would have been used to “breed” uranium-233 to be recovered through reprocessing — the ultimate intention of the design. This Oak Ridge work culminated in the period from 1970-76 in a design for a Molten Salt Breeder Reactor (MSBR) using thorium as a “fertile material” to breed “fissile” uranium-233, which would be extracted using a reprocessing facility. Molten Salt Thorium reactors without reprocessing?: Although it is theoretically possible to imagine a molten-salt reactor design where the thorium-produced uranium-233 is immediately used as a reactor fuel without any actual reprocessing, such reactor designs are very inefficient in the “breeding” capacity and pose financial disincentives of a serious nature to any would-be developer. No one has actually built such a reactor or has plans to build such a reactor because it just isn’t worth it compared with those designs which have a reprocessing facility. Here’s what Wikipedia says on this matter (it happens to be good info): http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Molten\_salt\_reactor To exploit the molten salt reactor’s breeding potential to the fullest, the reactor must be co-located with a reprocessing facility. Nuclear reprocessing does not occur in the U.S. because no commercial provider is willing to undertake it. The regulatory risk and associated costs are very great because the regulatory regime has varied dramatically in different administrations. [20] UK, France, Japan, Russia and India currently operate some form of fuel reprocessing. Some U.S. Administration departments have feared that fuel reprocessing in any form could pave the way to the plutonium economy with its associated proliferation dangers.[21] A similar argument led to the shutdown of the Integral Fast Reactor project in 1994.[22] The proliferation risk for a thorium fuel cycle stems from the potential separation of uranium-233, which might be used in nuclear weapons, though only with considerable difficulty. Currently the Japanese are working on a 100-200 MWe molten salt thorium breeder reactor, using technologies similar to those used at Oak Ridge, but the Japanese project seems to lack funding. Thorium reactors do not eliminate problems: The bottom line is this. Thorium reactors still produce high-level radioactive waste, they still pose problems and opportunities for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, they still pose catastrophic accident scenarios as potential targets for terrorist or military attack, for example.

### A2 Withdraw from Deal CP

#### Perm do the CP – the Middle East only has nuclear reactors funded by Russia, so banning nuclear power from a Russian deal is identical to banning nuclear power outright

#### Doesn't solve terror – if the Middle East decides to buy reactors from a different country, those would be just as vulnerable to attack – civil unrest and ISIS expansion proves

#### Counterplan flaw – Rosatom isn't a part of Russia, just a firm that operates from Russia

### A2 Increase US Aid CP

#### Perm do the counterplan – the Middle East does not currently have nuclear reactors from the US, so banning nuclear power minus US reactors is consistent with banning it outright

#### Reject counterplans that mandate an action by an actor not in the plan. The standard is utopian fiat – Middle Eastern countries can't determine US influence – the counterplan artificially fiats through a key and nuanced part of policymaking – reject object fiat since it skews aff ground and steals advantages, which moots 1AC time.

#### Voter for fairness – it's an axiomatic rule of any game. Reject the debater for deterrence – dropping arg doesn't solve our abuse since the 1AR was already skewed

#### Doesn't solve relations –

#### Doesn't solve ISIS – reactors will remain vulnerable to terror attacks that steal fissile materials

### A2 Accept US Aid CP

#### Perm do the counterplan – the Middle East does not currently have nuclear reactors from the US, so banning nuclear power minus US reactors is consistent with banning it outright

#### Doesn't solve relations – the counterplan keeps the current nuclear deal with Russia in place

#### Reject counterplans that mandate an action by an actor not in the plan. The standard is utopian fiat – Middle Eastern countries can't determine US influence – the counterplan artificially fiats through a key and nuanced part of policymaking – reject object fiat since it skews aff ground and steals advantages, which moots 1AC time.

#### Voter for fairness – it's an axiomatic rule of any game. Reject the debater for deterrence – dropping arg doesn't solve our abuse since the 1AR was already skewed

#### US nuclear exports are nonexistent

Whitman & Cheney 15 [Christine Todd Whitman (American Republican politician and author who served as the 50th Governor of New Jersey from 1994 to 2001, and was the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency in the administration of President George W. Bush from 2001 to 2003), Stephen Cheney, "Why the U.S. should export nuclear power," Fortune Magazine, 10/22/2015] AZ

Competition with Russia in the nuclear energy technology industry will continue to be an issue as Asian and European nations look for carbon-free energy options like nuclear power. The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission on Thursdsay released an operating license for a new nuclear energy facility in Tennessee, marking the first U.S. nuclear energy facility to come online in the 21st century. It also comes at a time when many other U.S. nuclear facilities will be prematurely retired due to cost pressures. Because other countries, including rapidly growing counties like India, realize the true value of baseload power to supply their economies with clean electricity, they are actually taking steps to grow their nuclear energy capacity. But the United States, which has the most stringent and effective nuclear safety regulations, is missing an opportunity by not exporting its expertise to developing nations like India. The U.S. Department of Commerce predicts that the global market for nuclear power technology will total $740 billion over the next 10 years. Unfortunately, without changes in U.S. export policy, Russia — and soon, China —could dominate the international nuclear energy market. Setting themselves apart from the United States, both Russia and China view nuclear technology exports as a strategic tool to solidify long-term relations and influence and provide attractive financing for their nuclear energy businesses.

#### US can't export reactors – controls and no competition

NEI 12 [Nuclear Energy Institute, "US Nuclear Export Rules Hurt Global Competitiveness," Winter 2012] AZ

However, antiquated U.S. government approaches to nuclear exports are challenging U.S. competitiveness in the nuclear energy market. New federal support is needed if the United States wants to reclaim dominance in commercial nuclear goods and services—and create the jobs that go with them. “The U.S. used to be a monopoly supplier of nuclear materials and technology back in the ’50s and ’60s,” said Fred McGoldrick, former director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Export Policy at the State Department. “That position has eroded to the point where we’re a minor player compared to other countries.” America continues to lead the world in technology innovation and know-how. So what are the issues? And where is the trade? Effective coordination among the many government agencies involved in nuclear exports would provide a boost to U.S. suppliers. “Multiple U.S. agencies are engaged with countries abroad that are developing nuclear power, from early assistance to export controls to trade finance and more,” said Ted Jones, director for supplier international relations at NEI. The challenge is to create a framework that allows commercial nuclear trade to grow while ensuring against the proliferation of nuclear materials. “To compete in such a situation, an ongoing dialogue between U.S. suppliers and government needs to be conducted and U.S. trade promotion must be coordinated at the highest levels,” Jones said.

### A2 Aff is Multi-Actor Fiat

Multi-actor fiat is irrelevant – in this specific case,

## T/Theory

### A2 Cannot Spec New States

#### Counter-interpretation – the aff must specify a government or group of governments that either already have nuclear power or have a formalized agreement in place to build nuclear power plants.

#### We meet – there are already two research reactors in Egypt

#### solves ground – ensures that there's literature on the aff since debate about whether to approve a new nuclear deal is extensive

#### the standard is overlimiting – forcing the aff to only ban in countries that exist kills core aff ground on the topic – advantages about prolif in new states

#### lit checks

#### new states give the neg more nuanced disad links – read links to how new reactors are key to generate power, how they are necessar

#### also expands research – ensures the neg has to do a greater variety of research on specific countries

### A2 TVA

#### no topical version of the aff- banning in all countries allows the neg to PIC out of every other country – we can't ban it in Russia since it's export based not domestic

### 2AR – A2 Limits

#### Our limits are necessary for nuanced and innovative clash – we don't explode the topic since only 20 countries have signed formal agreements, and that number is further narrowed down by literature since our advantages have to be based in evidence that advocates for the aff – their interp overlimits by removing aff advantages based on new states proliferating, the dangers of new nuclear plants, and the possibility of accidents during construction and accidents.

### Reasonability

#### Use reasonability with a brightline of in round structural abuse- this means they need to prove an argument or practice skews reciprocal access to the ballot, not just qualitative harms. Prefer

#### 1. Brightline solves judge intervention- I have a clear metric to determine abuse and it’s non arbitrary

#### 2. Competing interps leads to a race to the bottom- debaters can always nitpick some minor flaw with an interpretation or suggest a marginal advantage even in the absence of actual abuse. Outweighs:

#### A. Ensures theory functions as check on abuse- my brightline is key to making sure theory is only run in face of insurmountable abuse, instead of just a strategic tool to win rounds

#### B. Education- holds debaters accountable to answering arguments instead of whining, which means more topical debate instead debate about the rules of debate. We both try to win the round, so he shouldn’t win because I might’ve made it more difficult

#### C. Proportionality- the ballot is the ultimate punishment so it’s reserved for the most egregious crimes- competing interps creates absurd scenarios where a 1% risk of offense means an auto-loss but that’s ridiculous over punishment, kills fairness

#### D. Accessibility- the most intuitive response to “you’re being abusive” to explain why the position is fair but defense is insufficient under competing interps- his methodology excludes debaters without resources to keep up with arcane conventions

## WIP

### Cutting board

#### NP used to prolif

Aboul-Enein 16 [Sameh Aboul-Enein (Adjunct Professor, American University in Cairo, Egypt), Tayseer Al-Khunaizi (Chairman, Al-Andalus Group for Economic and Management Consultancy, Dammam, Saudi Arabia) Valeriya Chekina (Research Associate, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) Moscow, Russia), Serdar Erdurmaz (Director, WMD and Disarmament Institute, Turkish Centre for International Relations and Strategic Analysis (TURKSAM), Ankara, Turkey) Ayman Khalil (Director, Arab Institute for Security Studies (ACSIS), Amman, Jordan) Anton Khlopkov (Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), Moscow, Russia) Dmitry Konukhov (Research Associate, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), Moscow, Russia), "Prospects For Nuclear Power in the Middle East: Russia’s Interests" Valdai Discussion Club Grantees Report] AZ

Desire to build scientific, technological, and industrial capability Yet another incentive for nuclear energy development that may well feature prominently in Middle Eastern countries’ domestic debate is the desire to acquire a scientific, technological, and then industrial nuclear capability that could later be used for weapons purposes, if a political decision is made to that effect.34It is entirely possible that Iran’s real strategy ever since the mid-1970s has always been to develop peaceful nuclear energy in parallel with the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability, i.e. the science, technology and resources that would enable it to build nuclear weapons. According to former Iranian foreign minister Ardeshir Zahedi, before the Islamic Revolution the Iranian government thought it necessary to have the kind of nuclear capabilitythat would enable it to build nuclear weapons within 18 months of the political decision being made. Recent examples of foreign interference in sovereign states’ affairs under various pretexts, and diverging interpretations of fundamental principles of international law when launching military campaigns against Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya have forced several countries (especially those who have fraught relations with the United States) to think hard about their own deterrence capability. Meanwhile, Israel, which possesses nuclear weapons, remains outside the NPT. All these considerations could well serve as a catalyst for some Middle Eastern states to give the go-ahead to their nuclear technology development programs. The conclusions drawn by some Middle Eastern researchers have dire implications for the nuclear nonproliferation regime. These researchers argue that third-world countries must acquire nuclear weapons if they want to remain sovereign states, because only nuclear weapons can guarantee non-interference by foreign powers.35 Many experts in the Middle East, including Iran, regard the deposal of Col. Gaddafi shortly after he relinquished his WMD programs as something much more than a mere coincidence

#### NP occurring regardless of turbulence

Aboul-Enein 16 [Sameh Aboul-Enein (Adjunct Professor, American University in Cairo, Egypt), Tayseer Al-Khunaizi (Chairman, Al-Andalus Group for Economic and Management Consultancy, Dammam, Saudi Arabia) Valeriya Chekina (Research Associate, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) Moscow, Russia), Serdar Erdurmaz (Director, WMD and Disarmament Institute, Turkish Centre for International Relations and Strategic Analysis (TURKSAM), Ankara, Turkey) Ayman Khalil (Director, Arab Institute for Security Studies (ACSIS), Amman, Jordan) Anton Khlopkov (Director, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), Moscow, Russia) Dmitry Konukhov (Research Associate, Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), Moscow, Russia), "Prospects For Nuclear Power in the Middle East: Russia’s Interests" Valdai Discussion Club Grantees Report] AZ

2. Turbulence in the Middle East, which is a large exporter of hydrocarbons, has exacerbated concerns about the reliability of energy supplies — including concerns felt by countries in the region itself. This has strengthened the argument in favor of nuclear energy. A case in point is Jordan. Since the change of government in Egypt the pipeline used for Egyptian gas exports to Jordan (as well as Israel) has suffered more than 20 separate bombing attacks. As a result, according to various reports, Jordan received only 10–25% of the natural gas it was supposed to receive under the contract. Gas-burning power plants account for up to 90% of electricity generation in the country. In addition, the new Egyptian government revised the financial side of the contract, making Egyptian gas supplies much more expensive. According to the Jordanian government, the country suffered losses of more than 5 bn dollars as a result.54 These developments served to strengthen the argument of nuclear energy advocates, especially since Jordan, which currently imports 95% of its primary energy, has its own uranium reserves. Another example is Turkey. Events in Syria have led to a deterioration in Turkish-Iranian and Turkish-Russian relations. Natural gas imports currently account for about a half of Turkey’s energy needs, and about a third of those imports are sourced from Iran. This has increased concerns about the reliability of gas supplies and the nation’s energy security. Turkey already has first-hand experience of the dire consequences of dependence on gas imports. In January 2008 gas supplies from Iran first fell well below the figures agreed in the contract, and then stopped altogether for a certain period because the Iranian government had imposed a temporary ban on gas exports. Turkey therefore has good reasons to diversify its energy basket and speed up nuclear energy development.

#### Public opinion doesn't check

3. Public opinion on nuclear energy is becoming a more influential factor for the region’s governments. In some cases legitimate public concerns are becoming more prominent. In others, politicians merely exploit the issue to score political points. For example, some forces in Jordan are prone to criticizing plans to build a nuclear power plant merely because those plans have the king’s support.

### Russia Impact

#### Scenario 3 is Russia war

#### [i/l]

#### Russia war causes extinction

Barrett et al 13—PhD in Engineering and Public Policy from Carnegie Mellon University, Fellow in the RAND Stanton Nuclear Security Fellows Program, and Director of Research at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Seth Baum, PhD in Geography from Pennsylvania State University, Research Scientist at the Blue Marble Space Institute of Science, and Executive Director of Global Catastrophic Risk Institute—AND Kelly Hostetler, BS in Political Science from Columbia and Research Assistant at Global Catastrophic Risk Institute (Anthony, 24 June 2013, “Analyzing and Reducing the Risks of Inadvertent Nuclear War Between the United States and Russia,” Science & Global Security: The Technical Basis for Arms Control, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation Initiatives, Volume 21, Issue 2, Taylor & Francis)

War involving significant fractions of the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, which are by far the largest of any nations, could have globally catastrophic effects such as severely reducing food production for years, 1 potentially leading to collapse of modern civilization worldwide, and even the extinction of humanity. 2 Nuclear war between the United States and Russia could occur by various routes, including accidental or unauthorized launch; deliberate first attack by one nation; and inadvertent attack. In an accidental or unauthorized launch or detonation, system safeguards or procedures to maintain control over nuclear weapons fail in such a way that a nuclear weapon or missile launches or explodes without direction from leaders. In a deliberate first attack, the attacking nation decides to attack based on accurate information about the state of affairs. In an inadvertent attack, the attacking nation mistakenly concludes that it is under attack and launches nuclear weapons in what it believes is a counterattack. 3 (Brinkmanship strategies incorporate elements of all of the above, in that they involve intentional manipulation of risks from otherwise accidental or inadvertent launches. 4 ) Over the years, nuclear strategy was aimed primarily at minimizing risks of intentional attack through development of deterrence capabilities, and numerous measures also were taken to reduce probabilities of accidents, unauthorized attack, and inadvertent war. For purposes of deterrence, both U.S. and Soviet/Russian forces have maintained significant capabilities to have some forces survive a first attack by the other side and to launch a subsequent counter-attack. However, concerns about the extreme disruptions that a first attack would cause in the other side's forces and command-and-control capabilities led to both sides’ development of capabilities to detect a first attack and launch a counter-attack before suffering damage from the first attack. 5 Many people believe that with the end of the Cold War and with improved relations between the United States and Russia, the risk of East-West nuclear war was significantly reduced. 6 However, it also has been argued that inadvertent nuclear war between the United States and Russia has continued to present a substantial risk. 7 While the United States and Russia are not actively threatening each other with war, they have remained ready to launch nuclear missiles in response to indications of attack. 8 False indicators of nuclear attack could be caused in several ways. First, a wide range of events have already been mistakenly interpreted as indicators of attack, including weather phenomena, a faulty computer chip, wild animal activity, and control-room training tapes loaded at the wrong time. 9 Second, terrorist groups or other actors might cause attacks on either the United States or Russia that resemble some kind of nuclear attack by the other nation by actions such as exploding a stolen or improvised nuclear bomb, 10 especially if such an event occurs during a crisis between the United States and Russia. 11 A variety of nuclear terrorism scenarios are possible. 12 Al Qaeda has sought to obtain or construct nuclear weapons and to use them against the United States. 13 Other methods could involve attempts to circumvent nuclear weapon launch control safeguards or exploit holes in their security. 14 It has long been argued that the probability of inadvertent nuclear war is significantly higher during U.S.–Russian crisis conditions, 15 with the Cuban Missile Crisis being a prime historical example. It is possible that U.S.–Russian relations will significantly deteriorate in the future, increasing nuclear tensions. There are a variety of ways for a third party to raise tensions between the United States and Russia, making one or both nations more likely to misinterpret events as attacks. 16

### Neg

#### no Russia influence in the region – weak foreign policy

Cottee 5/20/16 [Matthew Cottee (research associate for non-proliferation and nuclear policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies) and Hassan Elbahtimy, "Russia's Nuclear Ambitions in the Middle East," Foreign Affairs] AZ

This doesn’t mean that Russia will be able to sell its wares everywhere. Not every country is burdened by the cost of building their nuclear infrastructure. For example, Saudi Arabia will have fewer incentives to pursue Russia’s current model, given the nation’s abundant wealth. Russian foreign policy in the Middle East could also become a stumbling block. Moscow’s political and military support for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad strained the country’s relationship with Turkey and the Gulf Arab states. The downing of a Russian fighter jet by Turkish forces in December 2015 raised concerns that the two countries would halt their agreement to build the Akkuyu nuclear power plant in Southern Turkey. Although that hasn’t happened yet, the project’s fate still hangs in balance as political relations between the two countries continue to deteriorate.